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The Vermont Secretary and the Apache POWs: Redfield Proctor and the Case of the Chiricahuas

For a brief moment at the end of the nineteenth century, the path of a Yankee politician and businessman from the Green Mountain State crossed that of Chiricahua warriors from the desert Southwest.

By COLIN G. CALLOWAY

The Indian wars of the west that ground to their bloody close at the end of the nineteenth century seemed far away from Vermont. Secure in their mythology that such things had “never happened here,” Vermonters joined other easterners in occupying the moral high ground, criticizing federal Indian policy, denouncing western campaigns, and condemning the reservation system. However, Vermont was not just a distant observer as industrializing America crushed the last enclaves of resistance among the country’s original inhabitants. Some officers who fought against the Sioux, Cheyenne, Nez Percé and Apache had ties to the Green Mountain State, and politicians and reformers from Vermont played their part in initiating and implementing solutions to the “Indian problem.”¹

In an age when scandal was commonplace in public affairs in general and Indian affairs in particular, some issues—the trial of the Ponca chief Standing Bear, the retreat of Joseph’s Nez Percés, the massacre at Wounded Knee—offended public opinion even by the standards of the

time. Another such issue was the case of the Chiricahua Apaches who were shipped from Arizona to Florida in 1886, held there as prisoners of war, then transferred to Alabama to continue their captivity. From 1889 to 1891, the Secretary of War, under whose charge the captives fell, was Redfield Proctor, a former Republican governor of Vermont. Proctor maintained an interest in the Indians even after he resigned from the War Department and took a seat in the U.S. Senate, where he served four terms. His involvement in the controversy surrounding relocation of the Chiricahuas even generated suggestions that the Apaches be removed to live in his home state of Vermont.

The Chiricahuas comprised one of a half-dozen major Apachean groupings in the southwest. Divided into three or four major bands, the Chiricahuas occupied the southwestern extremes of Apache country, from the Rio Grande into southern Arizona and northern Sonora. They believed that Life Giver had made this land for the Apaches and that the *G'an* or mountain spirits were the special protectors of the Apache people. The Chiricahuas clung tenaciously to the mountain homelands they shared with the *G'an*, but in the wake of their military defeat they were cut off from their mountains and from their protectors.²

For generations, the Apaches defended their mountain and desert homelands against all invaders, and the American conquest of Apacheia was achieved in the teeth of fierce resistance by skilled guerilla warriors and marked by vicious and brutal deeds by both sides.³ In 1876, as part of the government's policy of concentrating all the Apaches where it could keep an eye on them, the Chiricahuas' own reservation was terminated and the Chiricahuas were moved to the San Carlos reservation in Arizona. Conditions there were so bad that many Chiricahuas broke out in 1877-78, and for the next eight years the U.S. army engaged in an exhausting cat-and-mouse pursuit of the various Chiricahua bands. Only when General George Crook turned to employing Apache scouts did the army have any success and, in fact, Geronimo's final surrender to General Nelson A. Miles in September 1886 was made possible and arranged by Apache scouts. Two Chiricahuas, Kayihtah and Martine, went alone into Geronimo's camp and persuaded the warriors of the futility of further resistance. Torn between fighting to the end and surrendering, Geronimo addressed Lt. Charles Gatewood: "We want your advice. Consider yourself one of us and not a white man. Remember all that has been said today, and as an Apache, what would you advise us to do?" Replied Gatewood, "I would trust General Miles and take him at his word."

Miles, however, had suggested the murder of Geronimo at the surrender talks. Anxious for glory as the conqueror of Geronimo, he was now quick to promise anything to secure the Apaches' surrender. The next twenty-

six years would reveal the extent to which Miles betrayed both the Chiricahuas and Gatewood.⁴

A band of Chiricahuas under Chihuahua who had surrendered earlier had already been sent to Florida. Now President Cleveland's cabinet decided to ship Geronimo and his handful of warriors to Florida, where they were placed in confinement at Fort Pickens on Santa Rosa Island near Pensacola. In direct violation of the terms on which they surrendered to Miles, Geronimo's men were separated from their wives and children. But most Americans had little sympathy for Geronimo and his holdouts; what caught public attention and embarrassed the War Department was the treatment accorded to the rest of the Chiricahuas. Between March and November 1886, 498 Apaches were rounded up, put on trains, and sent from Arizona to Fort Marion in Florida as prisoners of war. Three hundred and ninety-nine of the group were women and children; the rest included the Chiricahua scouts who had served the United States faithfully in bringing an end to the wars in the southwest. Some of the scouts were still in uniform and still on the government payroll. Martine and Kayitah, who had risked their lives to arrange Geronimo's surrender, were thrown onto the trains along with the others. Chato, a former scout who had been visiting President Cleveland, left Washington clutching a medal from the president, only to be intercepted on his way home and sent to join his people in prison at Fort Marion.⁵

Fort Marion was originally the Castillo de San Marcos; the Spaniards began building it in 1672 and the United States army took it over in 1825. Now it served as a prison camp for almost five hundred Apaches, most of whom arrived despite the earnest recommendations of the fort's commander that "no more Indians be sent here." The place was "excessively crowded" even before the last of the Apaches arrived.⁶ Diet, shelter, sanitation, and clothing were all woefully inadequate. Children died of tuberculosis and bronchitis, and Apaches who were accustomed to open spaces and mountain air suffered terribly in the overcrowded conditions and humid climate: "Perhaps we were taken to Florida for that purpose," reflected one Chiricahua.⁷

More worrying than their own health and confinement for the Chiricahua adults was the fate of their children. In November, twenty-five boys and fifteen girls were taken from their parents and sent to Carlisle Indian School in Pennsylvania. Others followed. There, in keeping with the assimilationist philosophy of the times, they were forced to wear Anglo-American clothing, punished for speaking their native language, and the boys shorn of their long hair. In addition to receiving the rudiments of an Anglo-American education they also encountered tuberculosis and other diseases new to them. Soon, dying Chiricahua

children were being returned to their parents. By 1889, 112 Chiricahua children had been sent to Carlisle; of these thirty-seven died of tuberculosis. It was little wonder that the Chiricahuas dreaded separation from their children. "Even a present of clothing to their more than half-naked children excites their mistrust and makes them restless," reported Fort Marion's commander, "because it looks to them like preparing them for a journey, a separation from their parents."⁸

The punishment of the Apache scouts and their families along with Geronimo and his warriors aroused the ire of army officers who had served with the Chiricahuas and of humanitarian groups such as the Philadelphia-based Indian Rights Association. General Crook protested bitterly against the treatment meted out to men who had repeatedly proven their loyalty to the United States. Captain John Bourke, Crook's former aide, who had fought alongside the Chiricahuas and knew them as well as any white man, felt that no punishment was too severe for Geronimo but maintained: "There is no more disgraceful page in the history of our relations with the American Indians than that which conceals the treachery visited upon the Chiricahuas who remained faithful in their allegiance to our people."⁹

Prompted by Bourke, Herbert Welsh of the Indian Rights Association visited Fort Marion in March 1887 to see for himself the conditions there and to interview the prisoners. His report, published that same year, brought to public attention the injustices done to the Apaches, especially to faithful scouts like Chato, Martine, and Kayitah who, said Welsh, had "abundant time to reflect upon the gratitude of Republics."¹⁰

The Secretary of War in 1887, William C. Endicott, had little sympathy for the Apaches, having expressed his opinion that hanging was the best thing for the men, but, even before Welsh's report was published, the government began hearing public demands that something be done for the Indians. Cleveland's administration succumbed to the pressure, and in April 1887 the Apaches were loaded onto a train and shipped from Fort Marion to Mount Vernon Barracks, a disused arsenal thirty miles north of Mobile, Alabama. Geronimo and the warriors who had surrendered with him were reunited with their families and moved to Mount Vernon a year later, although not before one of Geronimo's wives, She-gha, died of Bright's Disease, pneumonia, or tuberculosis.¹¹

Moving the Apaches to Mount Vernon, however, was "simply an empty gesture made in response to public pressure."¹² It quickly became clear that Mount Vernon was also unsuitable. Eugene Chihuahua, a young Chiricahua prisoner at the time, recalled: "We had thought that anything would be better than Fort Marion with its rain, mosquitoes, and malaria, but we were to find out that it was good in comparison with Mt. Vernon

Barracks. We didn't know what misery was until they dumped us in those swamps. There was no place to climb to pray." Roofs leaked under almost constant rain, babies were bitten by disease-carrying mosquitoes and died, and "our people got the shaking sickness." The Apaches were vaccinated against smallpox, but tuberculosis, bronchitis, and hunger continued to thin their ranks.¹³

Bourke, Welsh, and the Indian Rights Association urged moving the Apaches to a location with a healthier climate. The Boston Indian Citizenship Committee and the Massachusetts Indian Association—a branch of the Women's National Indian Association—also took an interest and offered to purchase land for the Chiricahuas in North Carolina or Virginia if the War Department would move them there.¹⁴ But the outgoing administration did not want to risk reviving an embarrassing issue, and the question of what to do with the Chiricahuas was left to the incoming administration of Benjamin Harrison and his new Secretary of War, Redfield Proctor. While the government dragged its feet, seven more Apache children were reunited with their parents at Mount Vernon and died of tuberculosis contracted at Carlisle.¹⁵

Redfield Proctor's career as a Republican politician, attorney, and businessman provided him with little experience in Indian affairs.¹⁶ Born in June 1831 in Proctorsville, Vermont, he attended Black River and Derby academies and graduated from Dartmouth College in 1851. After a brief and unsuccessful move to Minnesota, he returned to Vermont, went into business, and enrolled in law school in Albany, New York. After graduation in 1859, he served in the Civil War. In June 1861 he enlisted in the Third Vermont Regiment as lieutenant and quartermaster; in June he was appointed a major in the Fifth Vermont Regiment. Tuberculosis forced his resignation in July 1862, but he was back in service as a colonel in the Fifteenth Regiment by the fall and went with his regiment to Gettysburg, though he saw no action there. He was mustered out of service with his regiment in August 1863.

Proctor entered law practice in Rutland but gradually devoted the bulk of his time to other business, organizing the Sutherland Falls Marble Corporation in 1870. He also became active in politics. He served as a Rutland selectman in 1865-66, represented Rutland in the House of Representatives in 1867-68, and became a state senator in 1874. In 1876 he was lieutenant-governor, and from 1878-80 he served as governor, pursuing policies of economy and retrenchment in state government. In 1880 he also formed the Vermont Marble Company, which became the world's largest marble producer. By 1890 he employed fifteen hundred workers. Like many industrial barons who amassed huge fortunes on the backs of their workers and then turned some of their wealth to public service, Proctor provided

his employees with low-rent housing, free hospital care, accident insurance and a library. In the words of a biographer, he was "a beneficent paternalist, strongly committed to programs of welfare capitalism for his workers."¹⁷

In 1889, in reward for his services at the Republican party's presidential nominating convention in Chicago, where Vermont's delegation supported Benjamin Harrison on every ballot, President Harrison appointed Proctor as his Secretary of War. During his term in office, Proctor achieved some notable military reforms. He improved soldiers' living conditions, dramatically reduced the desertion rate, revised the system of military justice, and increased the level of professionalism in the officer corps.¹⁸ But he was to prove unsuccessful in his efforts to resolve the Chiricahua controversy.

Proctor decided to appoint a commission to investigate alternative sites for the Apaches. On June 4, 1889, Captain Bourke visited the new secretary with proposals for relocation and at the end of the month Bourke and Charles C. Painter, a Congregationalist minister representing the Indian Rights Association, visited Mount Vernon and held a conference with the Chiricahua prisoners. They also investigated sites near Whittier and Wilmington, North Carolina, and near Hampton, Virginia, as possible locations for a Chiricahua reservation. Bourke recommended 100,000 acres of the Cherokee reservation in the Great Smoky Mountains, near Whittier. Proctor concurred, recognizing that the mountain country would be suitable and believing that the Apaches stood a better chance of becoming self-supporting in such an area. He hoped that the Indian Rights Association and other humanitarian groups would be prepared to buy the land, and he suggested that Bourke or some other officer take some Apache leaders to visit the North Carolina reservation. In September Proctor and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas Morgan agreed that the War Department would transfer the Chiricahuas as soon as the Boston organizations purchased the land. In the meantime, a dozen more tuberculous students returned from Carlisle.¹⁹

The move to North Carolina never took place. During the fall, Bourke detected a decline of enthusiasm for the project in Proctor: "Something in the manner of the Secretary makes me suspect that adverse influences have been at work," he confided to his diary.²⁰ Then opposition to the plan began to mount in North Carolina and Proctor may have become concerned by hostile editorials in the press. North Carolina governor Daniel Fowle suggested that Proctor's home state would make a good home for the Apaches: "I have been impressed very strongly," he wrote the secretary, "with the fitness of certain portions of the State of Vermont for the object you have in view." In a confidential letter to Herbert

Welsh, Proctor downplayed the North Carolinians' opposition to the plan and attributed Fowle's position to longstanding concerns about the presence of the Cherokees rather than to direct opposition to receiving the Apaches. But in a handwritten postscript the secretary added that it would be unwise to move the Apaches to a colder climate that fall: "Surgeons who know their liability to lung disease advise strongly against it."²¹ There was also growing dissension among the "Friends of the Indian." Proctor did not give up, though, and he enlisted North Carolina senator Zebulon B. Vance in support of the cause and spent the winter of 1889-90 trying to settle the disputes between the various reformers.²²

In 1889, General Oliver O. Howard, the one-armed "praying general" from Maine, a veteran of the Indian wars who was now commander of the Division of the Atlantic, ordered a report on the Apaches at Mount Vernon. The report, compiled by his son, Lieutenant Guy Howard, revealed that of the 498 people brought east in 1886, 119 had died, while 81 babies had been born. Whereas the normal annual death rate of white Americans was less than two percent, that of the Apaches during their three and a half years in captivity was 6.8 percent. "So many of their children have died away at school that not only have those been grief stricken who have lost their absent ones but all are constantly fearful of the taking from them for death at school of others of their children." Howard concluded that "the camp at Mount Vernon Barracks is as good as a prison camp can be but can not be made a home."²³

At the same time, Proctor ordered General Crook to inspect the Cherokee lands and confer with the Chiricahuas. Crook's report echoed Howard's findings. The general attributed the high death rate among the Apaches to "home-sickness, change of climate, and the dreary monotony of empty lives" and found a "general and earnest desire" among the prisoners to own their own farms "on which they can work out a future for themselves." Chato, who had lost his farm when he was imprisoned and had lost a son and nephew at Carlisle, asked Crook why the president had given him a medal to wear in jail. Chihuahua said simply that his people wanted to go where they could see great distances. Like Howard, Crook found that the Apaches "live in terror lest their children be taken from them and sent to a distant school." He told Proctor: "The most ordinary justice would seem to demand a different course of procedure with men not only innocent of offense against the Government, but to whom the Government is largely indebted for services of the very greatest value, and which they alone could have rendered." The general recommended that the Chiricahuas be moved to Indian Territory (Oklahoma) and reunited with their children.²⁴

In his annual report for 1889, Proctor related that the Apache prisoners at Mount Vernon — now 386 in number — were being quite well treated and “are kept employed fairly well in doing such work as is required for their own health and comfort,” but he acknowledged they were “restless and discontented.” The soil was too sterile for them to support themselves by farming, and Proctor recommended the purchase of a tract of land in the hill country of North Carolina, Tennessee, or Alabama and that the prisoners be moved there as soon as possible. He noted what the Apache mortality rate made clear: “They can not live in the lowlands.”²⁵

But when Proctor forwarded the Howard and Crook reports to President Harrison on January 13, 1890, he had modified his opinion on the new site for the Chiricahuas. He had had, he said in his cover letter, “a multitude of counselors.” Weighing the two feasible plans — removal to North Carolina or to Indian Territory — the secretary concluded: “Either plan would be fairly satisfactory. The latter is the more economical, and I am inclined to believe would be the most beneficial to the Indians.” A statute of 1879 prohibited the government from sending Indians from Arizona and New Mexico to Indian Territory unless authorized by act of Congress, but Proctor recommended to the president moving the Apaches to Fort Sill, a military reservation on Indian Territory, while Congress amended the law.²⁶

Senator Henry Dawes of Massachusetts, the chair of the Indian Affairs Committee, introduced Senate Joint Resolution 42, granting authority for the removal of the Apaches. The resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. On January 20, President Harrison sent a message to the Senate, urging removal of the Apaches to Indian Territory and transmitting the Crook and Howard reports, together with Proctor’s recommendation. The resolution passed the Senate and on January 23 was laid before the House and referred to the House Committee on Indian Affairs.²⁷

There, debate on the resolution produced controversy. General Miles, the western press, and other opponents claimed the area was unhealthy and too close to the Apache homeland and argued that the incarceration of the Chiricahuas involved no injustice as they had surrendered unconditionally. The feeling in Arizona was that the Apaches at Mount Vernon “Do Not Die Fast Enough,” and the Arizona delegate declared that his constituents would be glad to buy land for the Apaches in Vermont. Proctor countered with the comment that plans to send even two Apaches home would “raise a cry from Arizona that they are all to be murdered.”²⁸ The debate over the justice of the Apache internment became so heated that on January 28 Senator George F. Hoar introduced a resolution that the Secretary of War submit all evidence pertaining to the seizure of Chato

after his Washington visit. On March 11, Senator Dawes requested all correspondence between generals Crook and Sheridan relating to the surrender of Geronimo and the subsequent imprisonment of the Apaches. Proctor duly submitted the documentation. Old rivalries between Crook and Miles and differences of opinion over the conduct of the Apache campaigns and the employment of Apache scouts flared anew. The Washington press announced that the Geronimo campaign was "Being Fought Over Again at the Capitol."²⁹

In the middle of the debate, on March 21, 1890, Crook died. Senate Joint Resolution 42 died with him.³⁰ Proctor now decided to ask Congress to authorize the purchase of the Cherokee tract in North Carolina, but Congress chose instead to try to improve conditions at Mount Vernon rather than tackle the issue of relocation. In April, writing to Lt. Guy Howard who had investigated conditions at Mount Vernon, Proctor asked: "Now, I wish you would give me your opinion about what should be done with these Indians, supposing we are obliged to keep them at Mount Vernon; and what general course would be adopted there for their care and improvement, and then name whom you think the best officer to have in charge of it."³¹

Politicians were tiring of the furor over the Chiricahuas and by June "even Secretary Proctor was cool toward the entire topic." Sensitive to criticism from Welsh and others who felt he had not done enough to push the Chiricahuas' cause, Proctor responded: "I do not see what I can do for the Apache prisoners except to care for them the best I can where they are." It was now up to Congress. Welsh and his associates could continue to lobby for the Apaches' relocation but Proctor felt he had already "done too much rather than too little." He assured Henry Dawes that he had never changed his views in support of relocating the Chiricahuas, "but seeing little prospect of action in any direction by Congress, I took steps to do the best we could for them where they are. This was not intended to check or discourage Congressional action, and I think Mr. Welsh must be mistaken that it has had that effect." The Secretary of War expressed his continued readiness to help in the relocation effort in any way he could, but he was not going to push the question further with Congress.³² Meanwhile, Chiricahuas at Mount Vernon continued to die and four more years were to pass before Congress authorized their removal to Fort Sill.

On December 28, 1890, a new outrage occurred to capture public attention. On Wounded Knee Creek in South Dakota, in the tense atmosphere produced by the spread of the Ghost Dance religion among the tribes of the northern plains, troops from the Seventh Cavalry massacred over two hundred men, women, and children of Big Foot's

Miniconjou Sioux band. John Bourke, who had formerly seen Proctor as an ally in the fight to relocate the Chiricahuas, now expected the secretary to do little either to help the Apaches or to reveal the truth about Wounded Knee, and Proctor acted to absolve the army of blame rather than root out the truth about the tragedy. "Proctor is one of the slickest, smoothest old politicians to be found in a coon's age," Bourke told Welsh the following May.³³

Nevertheless, Proctor was not finished with the Chiricahuas. In June 1890, Lt. William Wallace Wotherspoon assumed command of the Apaches at Mount Vernon. Proctor described him as "a very capable young officer who is earnest and enthusiastic in the work" and who would do the best he could to improve the Apaches' situation. Wotherspoon set the Apaches to work converting a mess hall and kitchen into a hospital, clearing land to raise vegetables, and hiring out as day wage laborers on local farms. Like Proctor, Wotherspoon adhered to the prevailing philosophy that Indians should be "vanishing Americans" and disappear by merging into the general population.³⁴

Proctor, on a tour of military establishments in the south, visited Mount Vernon in March 1891. He told Wotherspoon that part of his plan to integrate Indians into American life involved military service and that he had decided to recruit fifteen hundred Indians. The War Department accordingly ordered the recruitment of Indians to serve with regular army units. In four regiments (the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth) the units were composed of Apaches. Wotherspoon's program of civilian employment crumbled as Apache men embraced a calling more in keeping with their warrior tradition, and forty-six Chiricahuas from Mount Vernon enlisted in Company I, Twelfth Infantry, the largest Indian soldier unit in the country. Among other duties, they built new homes and made furniture for their families at Mount Vernon, and Proctor was encouraged by the reports he received from the Apache companies and by such indications of "progress" as Apache soldiers playing baseball and football rather than traditional stickball games. The experiment lasted six years and Proctor remained a strong advocate of the program even after he resigned from the War Department on December 5, 1891, and was elected to the U.S. Senate.³⁵

Proctor, the Yankee paternalist, saw the Indian soldier program as an instrument of social control and moral uplift. Military service, he felt, would instill "habits of obedience, cleanliness, and punctuality" and provide an example for other Indians. He saw the primary object of the program as "to give employment, in useful and legitimate channels, to a considerable number of Indians of the war-like tribes," and he was particularly gratified by its success among the Chiricahuas "because I consider the

Apaches the least progressive and most dangerous of any we have to deal with." By treating them the same as white soldiers, "being careful, of course, at first, not to antagonize their traditions and prejudices," and providing them with firm yet tactful officers, Proctor was convinced the Apaches would make good soldiers "and that we shall have this season several companies of clean, short-haired, well trained Indian soldiers, eating the same food, occupying the same quarters, and taking care of themselves precisely the same way as other soldiers; and that they will do this cheerfully and take pride in it, and in other soldierly duties." In his annual report for 1891, the Secretary of War reported a remarkable transformation of "blanket Indians," his term for those who adhered to traditional ways. The Indian soldier program, he declared, "is not only an important step toward their civilization, self-support, and control, but it is the cheapest and best insurance against further Indian troubles."³⁶

After visiting Mount Vernon, Proctor headed west to the San Carlos reservation. From what he saw there, the secretary wrote to Wotherspoon, "I consider your charges very much better off," and he thought any of the Apaches at San Carlos "ought to be glad to go to Mount Vernon."³⁷ Even when the Indian soldier program went into decline, Apache enlistments and morale at Mount Vernon remained high. In 1894 the War Department ruled that Apaches who had completed three years of service would no longer be considered as prisoners of war and could return to Arizona. However, their families remained prisoners and, not surprisingly, all but two Apache soldiers opted for continued captivity. When the Chiricahua prisoners were finally sent to Fort Sill, the Apache soldiers went with them. For the second time in eight years, Apaches who had served the U.S. army boarded trains as prisoners of war.

In 1892 Grover Cleveland regained the office of president that he had lost to Benjamin Harrison in 1888. Cleveland and his new Secretary of War, Daniel Lamont, inherited the Chiricahua problem. In August 1894 Congress authorized the War Department to transfer the Apaches to any military reservation under its control, and the War Department briefly considered dispersing the prisoners in various locations across the country. Such a plan proved too much even for General Miles, however, and in September the War Department ordered removal of the Apaches to Fort Sill. The Apaches departed with mixed feelings. Geronimo left behind a wife buried at Pensacola, a daughter buried at St. Augustine, and a son (who had contracted tuberculosis at Carlisle) buried at Mobile. Kayihtah, who had talked Geronimo into surrendering, fared little better. "I had lots of friends—cousins brothers and relatives," he said, "but since coming to this country they have all died."³⁸

On October 4, 1894, the 296 surviving Chiricahuas arrived at Fort Sill

and took up residence alongside the Kiowas and Comanches, traditional enemies of the Apaches who now extended welcome and support to the Chiricahuas. Capt. Hugh L. Scott of the Seventh Cavalry was put in charge of them, and the Apaches set to work "industrially and cheerfully," sawing wood, sinking wells and building houses. About fifty of the men enlisted as soldiers. Better sanitation and a healthier climate made for a much improved situation but the new Secretary of War admitted that "their numbers are slowly decreasing by death."³⁹

In 1910 Fort Sill was chosen as the site for an army artillery school, and two years later Congress authorized the release of the Apaches, giving them the choice of remaining in Oklahoma or transferring to the Mescalero reservation in New Mexico. Most chose the latter. After twenty-six years during which the Chiricahuas were held as prisoners of war in an alien land, and after seemingly endless debates about what to do with them, the final decision to let them go home rested not on the arguments of Welsh and Bourke, Crook, or Proctor. The Chiricahua Apaches were finally allowed to return to the Southwest to make way for an artillery range.

For a brief moment at the end of the nineteenth century, the path of a Yankee politician and businessman from the Green Mountain State crossed that of Chiricahua warriors from the desert Southwest. The new century carried them along their separate ways. Redfield Proctor died of pneumonia in Washington on March 4, 1908, with the Chiricahuas still in captivity. Geronimo died less than a year later, on February 15, 1909, and was buried in Oklahoma.⁴⁰ Chato, having survived the brutal wars of the Southwest and the long years in captivity, lived to see a new age and new perils. He died in an automobile accident in 1934, driving while intoxicated.⁴¹

NOTES

¹ The vast majority of the members of the Lake Mohonk Conference, who debated and influenced American Indian policy at the end of the nineteenth century, were from New York and New England. General Oliver Otis Howard and his wife were regular participants. By 1895 the general was "home from the wars" and the Howards were living in Burlington, Vt. *Proceedings of the Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian, 1895*, 119.

² The other Apachean groupings were the Navajo, Western Apache, Mescalero, Lipan, and Jicarilla. The four Chiricahua bands were the Chihene (also known as the Warm Springs, Copper Mine, Ojo Caliente, Mimbreno or Mogollan Apaches) in the east; the Chokonen in the southeast corner of Arizona; the Bedonkohe (Geronimo's band) to the north and west of the Chokenen, and the Ndeinda (also known as the Cuchillo Negro Apaches) farthest to the south. D. C. Cole, *The Chiricahua Apache, 1846-1876: From War to Reservation* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), 8-12. Cf. Morris Opler, "Chiricahua Apache," in Alfonso Ortiz, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 10: Southwest* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983), 401-18, divides the Chiricahuas into eastern, central, and southern bands. Other sources suggest different divisions.

³ There are many books on the Apache wars. See, for example, Dan L. Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), idem, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), Donald E. Worcester, *The Apaches: Eagles of the*

Southwest (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), and C. L. Sonnichsen, *The Mescalero Apaches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958). First-hand accounts by American officers are provided in John C. Cremony, *Life Among the Apaches* (San Francisco: A. Roman and Co., 1868), and John G. Bourke, *On the Border with Crook* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891). Apache accounts are given in Eve Ball, *In the Days of Victorio* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), and idem, *Indeh: An Apache Odyssey* (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1980).

⁴Cole, *The Chiricahua Apaches*, 161-64; Angie Debo, *Geronimo: The Man, His Time, His Place* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), 285; S. M. Barrett, ed. *Geronimo: His Own Story* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970), 152-55; Ball, *Indeh*, 105-10, 129-30. On the role of Apache and other scouts in the Indian wars, see Thomas W. Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860-1890* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). The official documents relating to Geronimo's surrender are collected in Senate Executive Document 117, 49th Congress, 2nd session (Serial 2449) and in Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General (Main Series) File 1066 AGO 1883, National Archives microfilm, M666, reels 173-202. On Miles' suggestion that Geronimo be murdered, see David Michael Goodman, "Apaches as Prisoners of War, 1886-1894," Ph.D. diss., Texas Christian University, 1968, 35.

⁵Senate Exec. Doc. 35, 51st Congress, 1st session (Serial 2682).

⁶Reports of Lt. Col. Loomis E. Langdon. Aug. 20, 1886 and Oct. 1, 1886, Senate Exec. Doc. 117, 49th Congress, 2nd session (Serial 2449); Sen. Exec. Doc. 73, 49th Congress, 2nd session (Serial 2448).

⁷Goodman, "Apaches as Prisoners of War," 75-77, 83-84; Ball, *In the Days of Victorio* (London, ed., 1973), 210.

⁸Ball, *In the Days of Victorio*, 211-12; Cole, *Chiricahua Apaches*, 165; Sen. Exec. Doc. 73, 49th Congress, 2nd session (Serial 2448), 7.

⁹George Crook, *Resume of Operations Against the Apache Indians, 1882-1886* (Washington, D.C., 1887); Bourke, *On the Border with Crook*, 485. For an excellent biography of Bourke and an insightful study of his lifelong interest in the Apaches and other Indians, see Joseph C. Porter, *Paper Medicine Man: John Gregory Bourke and his American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986).

¹⁰Herbert Welsh, *The Apache Prisoners in Fort Marion, St. Augustine, Florida* (Philadelphia: Office of the Indian Rights Association, 1887), quote on p. 11.

¹¹William T. Hagan, *The Indian Rights Association: The Herbert Welsh Years, 1882-1904* (Tucson: University Press, 1985), 92; Goodman, "Apaches as Prisoners of War," 99-109, 128-29; Debo, *Geronimo*, 333-34.

¹²Worcester, *The Apaches*, 314.

¹³Ball, *Indeh*, 138-39, 152-53. Cf. Jason Betzinez, *I Fought with Geronimo* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 148; Goodman, "Apaches as Prisoners of War," 121.

¹⁴Porter, *Paper Medicine Man*, 254-55; Hagan, *The Indian Rights Association*, 143; Goodman, "Apaches as Prisoners of War," 118-25, 130-34.

¹⁵Worcester, *The Apaches*, 314-15; Goodman, "Apaches as Prisoners of War," 140.

¹⁶The following paragraphs on Proctor's life are drawn from Frank C. Partridge, "Redfield Proctor, His Public Life and Services," *Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society* (1913-15), 57-104, Chester Winston Bowie, "Redfield Proctor: A Biography," Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980, and *Dictionary of American Biography* 15: 245-46.

¹⁷Bowie, "Redfield Proctor," 1.

¹⁸Bowie, "Redfield Proctor," 162-88.

¹⁹Worcester, *The Apaches*, 315-16; Porter, *Paper Medicine Man*, 254-59; Goodman, "Apaches as Prisoners of War," 156-61; Proctor to Welsh, July 19, 1889, Redfield Proctor Papers, Proctor Free Library, Proctor, Vt., box 1, vol. 4: 466-67.

²⁰Quoted in Porter, *Paper Medicine Man*, 259.

²¹Goodman, "Apaches as Prisoners of War," 161-65; Proctor to Welsh, Oct. 19, 1889, Proctor Papers, box 2, vol. 6: 209.

²²Porter, *Paper Medicine Man*, 260-61.

²³Sen. Exec. Doc. 35, 51st Congress, 1st session (Serial 2682), 9-11.

²⁴Sen. Exec. Doc. 35, 51st Congress, 1st session (Serial 2682), 2-8.

²⁵*Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the Year 1889*, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1890) 1: 147.

²⁶Sen. Exec. Doc. 35, 51st Congress, 1st session (Serial 2682), 1-2. Proctor had also complained to General Miles that "there have been many newspaper reports that were without foundation." Proctor to Miles, Dec. 19, 1889, Proctor Papers, box 2, vol. 7: 96-97.

²⁷Martin F. Schmitt, ed. *General George Crook: His Autobiography* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), 294-95.

²⁸John A. Turcheneske, Jr., "Arizonians and the Apache Prisoners at Mount Vernon Barracks, Alabama: They Do Not Die Fast Enough," *Military History of Texas and the Southwest* 11 (1973), 197-226; Worcester, *The Apaches*, 318; Proctor to Lieut. Howard, Apr. 24, 1890, Proctor Papers, box 2, vol. 8: 72-73.

²⁹"Reports relative to the treatment of Certain Apache Indians," Sen. Exec. Doc. 83, 51st Congress, 1st session (Serial 2686); "Correspondence between Lt. Gen. P. H. Sheridan and Brig. Gen. George Crook regarding the Apache Indians," Sen. Exec. Doc. 88, 51st Congress, 1st session (Serial 2686); Schmitt, *General George Crook*, 295-98.

³⁰Schmitt, *General George Crook*, 300.

³¹Proctor to Howard, Apr. 24, 1890, Proctor Papers, box 2, vol. 8: 72-73.

³²Porter, *Paper Medicine Man*, 262; Goodman, "Apaches as Prisoners of War," 183-85; Proctor to Welsh, June 19, 25, 27, 1890; Proctor to Dawes, June 25, 1890; Proctor to B. W. Perkins, June 27, 1890, Proctor Papers, box 2, vol. 7: 62-63, 66, 84, 98; vol. 8: 499-500.

³³Porter, *Paper Medicine Man*, 265, also 280-81; Bowie, "Redfield Proctor," 241-49.

³⁴Debo, *Geronimo*, 348-49; Goodman, "Apaches as Prisoners of War," 194-99; Proctor to Welsh, June 19, 1890, Proctor Papers, box 2, vol. 8: 499-500. Wotherspoon's reports are in AGO 1883 File 1066. Wotherspoon's report to a receptive audience at the Lake Mohonk conference is in *Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference, 1891*, 29-33.

³⁵Worcester, *The Apaches*, 318-19; Debo, *Geronimo*, 350-52; Michael L. Tate, "Soldiers of the Line: Apache Companies in the U.S. Army, 1891-1897," *Arizona and the West* 16 (1974): 343-64; idem., "From Scout to Doughboy: The National Debate over Integrating American Indians into the Military, 1891-1918," *Western Historical Quarterly* 17 (1986): 417-43; Cole, *The Chiricahuas*, 166.

³⁶*Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1891* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1891), 14-16; Proctor to Welsh, May 26, 1891, Proctor Papers, box 3, vol. 13: 81-82.

³⁷Proctor to Wotherspoon, May 7, 1891, Proctor Papers, box 4, vol. 19: 158; Proctor to Welsh, May 18, 1891, box 3, vol. 12: 455.

³⁸Debo, *Geronimo*, 359, 361-64.

³⁹*Report of the Secretary of War for 1894* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1895) 1: 34, 130; Cole, *The Chiricahua Apaches*, 167.

⁴⁰Debo, *Geronimo*, 440.

⁴¹Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*, 184-85.