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George Aiken and the Taft-Hartley Act: A Less Undesirable Alternative

If Aiken had been chairman of the Senate Labor Committee the Eightieth Congress's labor bill might have been very different.

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The 1930s were organized labor's golden age in America. Despite the ongoing effects of the Great Depression, the organized labor movement expanded 170 percent between 1933 and 1938. Along with that expansion came equally unprecedented labor strife. The balance of power between employees and employer was radically altered. World War II provided an uneasy five-year truce in the increasingly confrontational labor movement, but labor shortages and increased industrialization accompanying the war further strengthened the hand of industrial labor leaders.

When the war ended in 1945, it must have seemed as if every labor union in America went on strike at once. In 1946 there were more strikes than any previous single year in American history. Republicans capitalized on this turmoil in the November election of that year. They used as their campaign slogan "Had Enough? Vote Republican," an appeal to those who feared that organized labor was unregulated and unmanageable and believed that the Democratic party was unable to con-

trol it. The success of this strategy was unequivocal—the Republicans won their first majorities in both congressional houses since 1930.¹ Most congressional Republicans interpreted the election's verdict as a popular mandate to enact labor-curbing laws.

As the Eightieth Congress prepared to sit in January of 1947, this was the Republican leadership's foremost priority. Such legislation was necessitated not only by the labor strife and the party's traditional affiliation with business interests, but also because union members tended to identify overwhelmingly with the Democratic party. Unions were a major source of Democratic campaign financing and Democratic votes.

However, the Republican leadership, in preparation for the new Congress, found itself with a problem. To ensure Senate approval of union-curbing labor legislation, it was crucial to enlist the support of the chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Without that support, it would be almost impossible for the type of labor bill that party leaders desired to reach the full Senate. In the prospective chairman of the Labor Committee, the Republicans found themselves with a man who was neither a Republican regular nor given to acceding to the wishes of his party. He was George Aiken, senior senator from Vermont.

With good reason was the Republican hierarchy loath to award Aiken the labor committee's leadership. Aiken was known as a friend of organized labor, and his political career supported that reputation. As governor of Vermont, Aiken had consistently displayed a sympathetic attitude towards unions. Although Vermont was one of the nation's least industrialized states, there were about as many Vermonters employed in industry as in agriculture in the mid-1930s.² Vermont experienced a period of profound labor strife in the years immediately preceding Aiken's ascendancy to the governorship in 1937. The unions representing each of Vermont's three largest industries, granite, marble, and textiles, had waged bitter and at times violent strikes in the mid-1930s.³

Upon assuming the governorship in 1937, George Aiken was able to present himself as an ally of Vermont's unionists while deftly avoiding antagonizing management. He firmly believed that it was best to avoid legislation. He promoted instead "informal agreements, compromises and common sense."⁴ He dramatized this perspective in 1938 when he played a large part in resolving a granite strike in Barre by presenting his own list of non-binding compromises. These were promptly accepted by both sides. During his tenure as Vermont's chief executive, Aiken formulated what he believed to be the correct manner to contend with labor-management relations. Legislation should be kept to a minimum, the rights of common workingmen should be protected. Extra-judicial methods to



*George D. Aiken, elected to the U.S. Senate in 1941, was not considered a party regular by Washington's Republican hierarchy. From Edith DeWolfe et al., *The History of Putney, Vermont, 1753-1953*.*

resolve labor disputes, such as labor-management councils, should be instituted in order to preclude government involvement in labor disputes. Legislators should become directly involved with the problems labor relations posed to their constituents, but in non-partisan postures. Government, Aiken thought, should only serve as a means to facilitate settlements.⁵

If Aiken's attitude toward labor marked him as a party irregular, and if he was influenced by ideas foreign or unacceptable to most of his GOP

colleagues, his voting record in the Senate was even more disturbing to mainstream Republicans. Throughout a Senate tenure that began in 1941, Aiken had frequently voted in opposition to party positions, particularly in regard to labor. During 1946, Aiken had voted twice against the reactionary Case Bill,⁶ which ultimately was passed overwhelmingly by the Senate but successfully vetoed by President Harry Truman. Aiken had been, in fact, the only Republican member of the Senate's labor committee to attempt to prevent the Case Bill's consideration by the full Senate.⁷ Aiken had, in fact, tried to prevent the consideration of all labor bills in 1946. In his judgement, his fellow legislators were so biased against labor that they "were not in the right frame of mind" to approach labor legislation without undue prejudice.⁸

In November 1946, the chairman issue was at its peak. The *Burlington Free Press* calculated at that time that Aiken had voted against his party on labor issues eighty-three percent of the time over the course of his senatorial career. Aiken vehemently refuted that figure, calling the implication that he was not a loyal Republican "a smear."⁹ The Republican party's hierarchy, however, agreed with the *Free Press*. They felt that to stop Big Labor it was absolutely necessary to stop George Aiken from becoming chairman of the labor committee.

George Aiken was actually the second-ranking Republican on the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, behind Robert Taft of Ohio. Taft was a traditional Republican conservative and was on record as being in favor of legislation regulating labor unions. Each senator could only chair one major committee, however, and Taft was intent on taking the chairmanship of the powerful Senate Finance Committee. Whereas Aiken coveted the labor committee position, Taft thought that the position would only be troublesome. Taft had his eye on his party's 1948 presidential nomination, and the labor position meant contending with highly controversial issues. Only the prospect of an Aiken-dominated labor committee prevented Taft from immediately taking the finance committee position.¹⁰

A large controversy developed over whether Aiken was fit to be chairman. As already noted, the 1946 election was interpreted by many as a popular mandate for Congress to regulate and restrict labor unions. Now Senate Republicans faced in George Aiken the prospect of a labor committee chairman notoriously "soft on labor." Newspapers throughout the nation debated Aiken's qualifications. Many editorials stated that the idea of Aiken as chairman was "unthinkable," as the Cincinnati *Times-Star* wrote on December 2.¹¹ If Aiken's letters from constituents can be any barometer, a clear majority of Vermonters agreed Aiken was unfit. In response to such criticism, Aiken openly campaigned for the job, por-

traying himself as a voice of reason. He declared that his only commitment would be to ensure that the committee's work was "conducted fairly" and that the committee would not become a platform "to promote my own ideas or anyone else's."¹²

Aiken's words left the Republican leadership unconvinced. They pressed the chairmanship on Taft, imploring him to take it as a responsibility to his party. Taft, the quintessential regular Republican, complied. Thus, George Aiken faced the new legislative year with one of his oldest and most bitter adversaries occupying the position he had coveted. Nevertheless, Aiken's position on the committee remained important. It was the hope of many labor advocates that Aiken would be able to temper the excesses of those on the committee who had displayed a pronounced animus towards organized labor in the past. The *St. Albans Messenger* was not alone when it stated in one December 1946 editorial, "Thank God [Aiken] is still a member of the labor committee in the Senate."¹³

The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare was comprised of eight Republicans and five Democrats. In addition to Aiken, there were two other GOP senators considered liberal.¹⁴ Furthermore, Taft could rely upon the faithful support of only one Democrat. As a result, Taft could only consistently count on the votes of six of the thirteen committee members. If the bloc of seven votes that generally opposed Taft could remain solid, it could moderate the legislation reaching the Senate floor. Thus, George Aiken remained in position to vitally affect the shape that the Eightieth Congress's labor legislation took, but only as long as his pro-labor cohorts on the committee did not desert the voting bloc he envisioned.¹⁵

The Eightieth Congress began just as predicted. When Congress opened in January, Taft immediately introduced thirty proposals to limit the power of unions.¹⁶ In addition to those offerings, the labor committee also had to consider what one author called an "avalanche" of restrictive labor measures that were introduced by other legislators. Meanwhile, seventeen anti-union bills were submitted in the House on the very first day.¹⁷ Mainstream Republicans, along with Southern Democrats who had traditionally been distrustful of organized labor, intended to waste no time in carrying out the "mandate" to curb unions.

George Aiken observed these events with growing alarm. There was a possibility of exerting some sort of modifying influence on the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, but the situation in the House was, in Aiken's mind, hopeless. The House Committee on Education and Labor was chaired by Fred A. Hartley, Jr., of New Jersey, a committed right-wing reactionary. Hartley's only qualification to lead the committee was seniority.¹⁸ Moreover, a clear majority of the other committee

members sided with Hartley. Knowing what Hartley was capable of further impressed upon Aiken his responsibility to temper the excesses of others.

Aiken labeled many Senate and House early proposals "so clearly outside the framework of our form of government that to support them would be to vote in favor of scrapping our Constitution."¹⁹ Aiken did believe that some labor legislation was needed to "even the playing field" in collective bargaining and contract negotiations. He labeled secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes "indefensible."²⁰ These positions corresponded with those of President Truman. Truman agreed that labor relations needed to be more balanced, but, like Aiken, Truman was repelled by both the mood in Congress and the excessive measures that had been proposed. Aiken also shared the consensus that unions should be required to make public their financial statements. It is very significant, however, that Aiken thought it only fair that businesses therefore do the same. Very few congressmen were able, or even tried, to maintain an even-handed approach as Aiken did.²¹

Aiken's disgust with the trend in Congress was crystallized in two speeches that he delivered in February 1946, before the labor committee had fully begun its work. On February 12, Aiken stated at a Lincoln Day banquet in Maryland that the Republican party ran the risk of losing the advantage it had gained in the previous election by enacting punitive and excessively reactionary labor legislation. He strongly advised restraint to his Republican colleagues. "The [labor] problem," he declared, "cannot be solved by name calling on either side." Aiken accused his fellow Republicans of misinterpreting results of the 1946 elections. He told his fellow Republicans that "the electorate did not vote for Republicans last November so much as they voted against the administration then in power."²² Many in his audience, assuming victory in the coming presidential election as a foregone conclusion, listened in disbelief.

Seven days later, on February 19, Aiken delivered a blistering Senate floor attack on his fellow Republicans, which came to be known nationwide as the "no mandate" speech. In the "no mandate" speech, Aiken covered the gamut of issues that were being considered by Congress, and, as he had done a week earlier, challenged the GOP assessment of the 1946 election results. Castigating the Republican leadership as "a little group of blind, selfish, ruthless men whose . . . influence is far out of proportion to their numbers," Aiken warned that the American people "gave no mandate [for Congress] to take from the American working man his high standards of living and his right to organize effectively to maintain that standard." If those rights were in fact taken away, Aiken explicitly stated, Truman would be returned to the Oval Office in 1948.²³

The "no mandate" speech gave Aiken nationwide notoriety, but it did not change the course of his congressional colleagues. The Senate labor committee held hearings from January 29 to March 8. Over that time, Aiken maintained that Senator Taft was conducting the hearings judiciously and without bias.²⁴ When the hearings ended, however, Taft still desired major restrictions on labor organizations, and Aiken remained committed to ensuring that such legislation would not be punitive or unduly favorable to management.

Senators Taft and Aiken agreed in principle that if labor legislation took the correct form the results would be beneficial to all Americans. By April 3, however, it was obvious they agreed on little else. On that day, Taft submitted a sixty-two-page "working print" from which a bill could be drawn. Among the paper's provisions was an outright ban on the closed shop, which was a system in which all of those hired for a specific business or industry were required to be union members. The closed shop was a controversial subject in 1947, and Aiken was even in disagreement with most of his constituents when he came out in April in opposition to its outright prohibition. Aiken also found two other specifications of Taft's "working print" objectionable: a proposal to prohibit coercion of workers by union members, and a requirement that union welfare funds had to be administered jointly by both union and management representatives.²⁵ With Taft's intentions now in the open, Aiken looked with hope towards his coalition within the committee.

The committee deliberated in closed session for fourteen days, and on April 17 had a bill ready to be voted on. Voting blocs within the committee had taken their expected forms. Aiken's bloc succeeded in striking from the bill four separate measures promoted by Taft. The ban on the closed shop remained. The provisions outlawing union coercion and sole union control of welfare funds were eliminated, however. Aiken also led the charge against one provision intended to limit industry-wide bargaining and another that facilitated injunctions to block jurisdictional strikes.

One aspect of the bill particularly bothered Aiken. Taft insisted that the bill be wrapped up in an omnibus form. This meant that President Truman could not sign the provisions with which he agreed and veto the others. Aiken knew that Taft wanted an omnibus form for purely political reasons. Even with some of its provisions eliminated, the Senate bill was too strong for Truman, and a veto was likely. This put Taft in a good position should a veto come; either Truman's veto would be sustained, and the Republicans could blame Truman for the lack of labor legislation, or the veto would be overridden, which would seriously undermine Truman's authority. George Aiken hated the fact that Taft was playing politics with a bill the Vermonter thought so crucial to the nation's well-

being; such an action offended his political beliefs and sensibilities. Nevertheless, Aiken had to be satisfied to a degree by the influence he had wielded. There remained provisions he found objectionable, but on April 17, feeling responsible to submit a bill for Senate consideration, he was one of an 11-2 majority to favorably vote the bill out of committee.²⁶

Aiken was not satisfied for long. On the first day of full Senate deliberation, Taft unexpectedly declared that he would submit as amendments those provisions that Aiken had led the fight against in committee. After extended and often rancorous debate, Taft succeeded in reattaching three of those provisions. The only exception was the curb on industry-wide bargaining, to which Aiken had been opposed more devoutly than any other. The vote on that provision was a bare 44-43 margin in favor of elimination.²⁷ Despite Aiken's efforts, the bill's final form was almost entirely what Taft had wished. Aiken now faced what he feared most — a bill so strong that President Truman was almost sure to veto it. His earlier fears were realized; the nation was either to get a bill he thought unduly strict or no labor legislation at all.

Yet, on May 13, Aiken sided with the majority on a 68-24 vote in favor of the bill. Significantly, the margin was large enough for a veto override, reinforcing the prospect that Truman was intentionally being put in a tough position politically. Reasons for Aiken's support included a realization that the Senate bill was mild compared to that of the House. The House bill made Taft's provisions look moderate. Aiken also strongly felt that, after all of the hearings and deliberations, the Senate had a responsibility to pass on the fruit of its efforts. His primary reasons for voting for the bill was that, having supported Taft, Aiken thought himself still in position to affect the bill later. He had consciously chosen to preserve his political capital for future opportunities to moderate the bill rather than take an ideological stance.²⁸

A Senate-House conference committee convened to hammer out the differences between the two bills. That committee did not include George Aiken or any of the other progressive Republicans on the labor committee. However, Aiken firmly reasserted his intentions to do all he could to prevent a damaging conference bill from being passed. He promised that if Truman were to veto the bill he would "be interested in reviewing the President's reasons for so doing and then vote according to my best judgement."²⁹

The bill that emerged from the conference was essentially the Senate version. The House immediately and overwhelmingly passed the Taft-Hartley bill, 320-79. Three days later, after more heated opposition, the Senate followed suit, 57-17. Despite lobbying efforts by national leaders and pressure from pro-labor constituents in Vermont, Aiken voted for

the bill again. He was among those who spoke against specific provisions of the bill. However, his opposition to those specifics, and his reservations about the bill as a whole, did not change his vote.

A period of very intense lobbying now began, as the bill sat on President Truman's desk. The Taft-Hartley was now widely called the "slave labor" bill by pro-union forces, and Philip Murray of the CIO called Taft-Hartley "the first step towards fascism in America." George Aiken was among those senators whose votes were still thought of as doubtful, and Aiken did nothing to discount the possibility of a reversal of his vote. Therefore, pressure on him was particularly heavy. He received numerous visits at this time by, among others, Lee Pressman, the CIO's chief legal counsel.³⁰ As a member of the labor committee who had previously voted for the bill, and also as the first vote in the Senate (votes were taken alphabetically), a turnaround on Aiken's part could possibly effect a reversal in the Senate. Religious and academic figures in Vermont joined local labor leaders in pressuring Aiken to change his vote.³¹ The volume of letters increased dramatically and ran two-to-one in favor of a vote against Taft-Hartley. Answering these letters, Aiken remained non-committal, careful always to state that "there are good and bad things about the bill."³²

On June 20, Truman vetoed the bill and gave a lengthy radio address outlining his reasons. That same day, the House overrode, 331-83. The next day the senators gathered for the vote. The *New York Times*, in a preview of the vote, named Aiken as one of twelve senators whose votes were "doubtful," and who were under intense outside pressure from lobbyists. Only six senators needed to change their votes to uphold Truman's veto, and that number did not seem out of reach.³³ As it was, Senator Robert Wagner of New York was dragged off his deathbed to vote to uphold the veto. It was Wagner's last speech, his last vote, his last appearance in the Senate.

From letters written later, it is clear that in the time between the veto and the Senate vote, Taft visited Aiken in the Vermonter's office. Taft promised Aiken that provisions of the bill could be changed in the future if they did not work or if they displayed an undue bias in favor of business. On June 24, Aiken went to the Senate to vote. There were more onlookers in the Senate's public gallery than at any time since the beginning of the Second World War. Senator Aiken later stated that it was the principal instance in his legislative career when he went to the floor not knowing how he was going to vote.³⁴ If Senator Aiken had known that the Taft-Hartley Act would have such a resounding and seemingly irreversible effect upon the labor movement, his uncertainty may have been even greater. Being first on the role call, he knew the effect his vote would have.

It is still a surprise that so much doubt remained in his mind. Certainly, he continued to be dissatisfied with much of the bill, but he had already voted for it twice. He felt that the Eightieth Congress was obligated to pass some sort of labor legislation, and he had Taft's assurances that aspects of the bill could be taken as experimental, open to revision depending upon performance. When the clerk called his name, Aiken voted "yea." There was a slight, audible rustle from the spectators packed into the Senate chamber, and then the vote preceded. The final vote was 68-25, six more votes than needed, and the Taft-Hartley was law.³⁵

Of course, some of Aiken's constituents were thrilled by his vote. To those who were not, Aiken wrote that "there are some things in it that I do not like, but which I had to accept in order not to get a bill which was much worse." He also promised that revisions would be made if warranted.³⁶ Interestingly, Aiken's reputation as a pro-labor senator emerged intact. In September, *Your Paper*, the voice of the Vermont Granite Cutters Union, described Aiken as a "friend of the common working man."³⁷ This may have either been because of Aiken's dissent over the Taft-Hartley or a recognition that the bill might have been very different had Aiken become chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

If Aiken had been named chairman of the Senate labor committee, or if he had been able to get the provisions he wanted, the labor bill produced by the Eightieth Congress might have been modified. Unions would have retained the right to collect dues directly from the wages of workers and would have continued to provide union executives with control over their welfare funds. This access to money had been crucial to the growth of union power over the preceding two decades. It had given unions financial independence and the freedom to fund causes and politicians they endorsed.³⁸ The anti-coercion measure has made union organizing more difficult, and the closed shop ban has allowed management abuses of the union-shop ideal. Aiken opposed all three of these measures. Aiken would also not have included the provision to allow employers to sue unions for losses incurred during jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts, a measure that has at times been financially disastrous to unions. It would indeed have been a changed bill, but Aiken had reason to expect that it would be amended in future sessions.

It has not been. Aiken was wrong in thinking that Taft-Hartley would be revised if it proved draconian. If Aiken had known then that the Taft-Hartley's provisions would become virtually impregnable to moderation, he might have voted differently. The senator did support later attempts to revise Taft-Hartley, most notably during the Democrat-controlled Eighty-First Congress in 1949. Robert Taft also eventually decided that

the Taft-Hartley Act was too strict and sought to revise it near the end of his legislative career. Neither Aiken nor Taft could undo what had been passed in 1947, however, and laws controlling labor unions have only grown more strict in the last forty years.

The mainstream Republicans were also wrong. The Taft-Hartley veto strengthened Truman's presidential bid in 1948. He, and not the GOP, was able to paint his opponent as out-of-touch with regular Americans, and Truman swept to one of the greatest upsets in United States electoral history. Furthermore, the Democrats regained majorities in both houses of Congress. The 1948 election is a benchmark in anti-incumbent sentiment during Congressional elections, and the turnover in Washington was due in no small part to a resurgent and overwhelming union vote. Aiken had seen this coming; he repeatedly warned that the Republicans were wrong in thinking that the 1946 elections were a mandate for what became the Taft-Hartley. The Taft-Hartley seems to have repelled more voters than it attracted and may have been the decisive factor in the 1948 election.

It is also reasonable to suppose that the national labor leaders were wrong. The Taft-Hartley did not lead to either slave labor or fascism. However, if the great statesmen of postwar labor overstated their case, and if they angered many whose support could have been gained by a more diplomatic approach to the Taft-Hartley Act, there was a good reason for such emotions. The Taft-Hartley radically shifted the balance of power in labor relations to the side of management, and the labor movement has never recovered from its provisions. With the adoption of the Taft-Hartley, labor's golden age was over.

NOTES

¹ After the election, a Gallup poll revealed that 66 percent of the American public answered affirmatively to the question, "Should the Congress elected in November pass new laws to control labor unions?" R. Alton Lee, *Truman and Taft-Hartley* (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1966), 52.

² Richard Munson Judd, *A History of the New Deal in Vermont* (New York: Garland Publishers, 1979), 128.

³ Judd, 133.

⁴ Judd, 155.

⁵ A notable and important influence on George Aiken was the Vermont Industrial Relations Council. The VIRC, which was founded in 1946 and based in Montpelier, was an excellent example of Aiken's idea of resolving labor disputes without governmental intervention. The Council grew out of the War Labor Board, and was comprised of equal numbers of representatives from labor and from business. As a mediating body, the Council proved immediately effective, resolving disputes in various industries throughout the state. In a speech before the Council in 1946, Aiken publicly stated that he would apply the VIRC's methods to the national labor scene, declaring that "In the VIRC there has been planted the seed which may well grow into a solution of the nation's economic ills . . . The Council proves that we can accomplish what compulsion and governmental regulations and interference can never do." *Rutland Herald*, 8 November, 1946.

⁶ The Case Bill, a "drastic" piece of legislation, proposed a number of provisions intended to curb the power of unions. Most notable among these was a cooling-off provision, which required unions to submit a strike or lockout notice five days in advance of any action being taken.

⁷ Montpelier *Argus*, 20 November 1946.

⁸ Montpelier *Argus*, 15 November 1946.

⁹ St. Albans *Messenger*, 20 November 1946.

¹⁰ Newport *Express*, 21 November 1946.

¹¹ Cincinnati *Times-Star*, 2 December 1946. The *Times-Star* was owned by Senator Taft's family. Its publisher was the senator's brother Charles.

¹² Montpelier *Argus*, 15 November 1946.

¹³ St. Albans *Messenger*, 28 December 1946.

¹⁴ Wayne Morse of Oregon and Irving Ives of New York.

¹⁵ James T. Patterson, *Mr. Republican* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 354.

¹⁶ Stephen Kemp Bailey, *Congress at Work* (New York: Holt, 1952), 419.

¹⁷ Arthur F. McClure, *The Truman Administration and the Problems of Postwar Labor* (Rutherford, N.J.: Associated University Press, 1969), 166.

¹⁸ Hartley's lack of previous interest in labor issues and his anti-unionism led the former chairwoman and ranking Democrat on the committee, Mary Norton, to resign in disgust upon his appointment.

¹⁹ George D. Aiken to James C. Ford, January 6, 1947. Aiken Papers, Crate 6, Box 1, University of Vermont Library, Burlington, Vermont (hereafter UVM).

²⁰ George D. Aiken to Fred H. Harris, January 16, 1947. Aiken Papers, Crate 6, Box 1, UVM.

²¹ Lee, 165.

²² *Rutland Herald*, 13 February 1947.

²³ Nashville *Tennessean*, 24 February 1947.

²⁴ George D. Aiken to Charles A. Congdon, March 1, 1947. Aiken Papers, Crate 6, Box 1, UVM.

²⁵ Harry Alvin Millis and Emily Clark Brown, *From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 382.

²⁶ *New York Times*, 18 April 1947.

²⁷ Essex Junction *Suburban List*, 15 May 1947.

²⁸ George D. Aiken to Harris W. Soule, July 1, 1947. Aiken Papers, Crate 6, Box 1, UVM.

²⁹ George D. Aiken to John Lawson, June 14, 1947. Aiken Papers, Crate 6, Box 1, UVM. Lawson was then president of the Vermont Industrial Relations Council.

³⁰ Aiken Appointment Book for 1947. Aiken Papers, Crate 39, Box 1, UVM.

³¹ Burlington *Free Press*, 5 May 1947.

³² George D. Aiken to John J. Beegan, June 17, 1947. Aiken Papers, Crate 6, Box 1, UVM.

³³ *New York Times*, 21 June 1947.

³⁴ George D. Aiken Oral History, 153. Those wishing to obtain copies of the Oral History should inquire at the History Department of the University of Vermont.

³⁵ *New York Times*, 25 June 1947.

³⁶ George D. Aiken to John J. Beegan, June 17, 1947. Aiken Papers, Crate 6, Box 1, UVM.

³⁷ *Your Paper*, Vermont Granite Cutters Union, 14 September 1947.

³⁸ The CIO alone had contributed \$750,000 to Franklin Roosevelt's reelection campaign in 1936, and John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers had been Roosevelt's primary source for funds in the attempted "purge" of Southern conservative Democrats in 1938.