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The Role of Lake Champlain in Canadian-American Relations

Canadian-American relations regarding Lake Champlain have ranged from bitter enmity to good neighborliness and close cooperation.

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Lake Champlain has many faces. From the summit of one of the beautiful peaks that ring most of its shoreline or from the window of a plane high above its surface, it often looks like a dagger pointing menacingly both north and south. At other times, it assumes the appearance of a highway or caravan route connecting the St. Lawrence and Hudson rivers. With different light, the lake takes on the dimensions of a great mirror, reflecting hundreds of square miles of surrounding territory, in both Canada and the United States. Images of its diverse identity—military, commercial, and environmental—have dominated the history of the Lake Champlain Basin.

The reality underlying these images is a complex blend of military, diplomatic, economic, and environmental factors that has provided the framework for Canadian-American relations on Lake Champlain. The Champlain Valley, of course, has seen other political frameworks: Algonquin-Iroquois, French-English, British-American. In the context of these past associations, North-South relations is, perhaps, a more useful term, since it transcends the various political arrangements that have existed in the region in the last four centuries. It is also a term that more closely describes the future that is now dawning: free trade on the economic front and United Nations recognition of the Champlain biosphere on the environmental.

The North-South concept is also important in understanding much of the history of the Champlain Valley—from the glacial advances and retreats that formed the valley to the prevailing weather pattern that makes it vulnerable to acid rain. The fact that the difference in elevation of the



north and south ends of the lake is only about a foot made its use as an invasion route easy for two centuries and, for another century and a half, held out to many the promise of commercial exploitation.

Lake Champlain has affected and, in turn, been affected by Canadian-American relations in many ways. Three aspects were particularly important: the military history of the lake since 1814, the many attempts to link the lake with the high seas by building a canal to the St. Lawrence, and the rise of environmental consciousness with respect to the lake in the last twenty-five years.

The legal and diplomatic framework within which Lake Champlain has functioned in Canadian-American relations gradually took form in the nineteenth-century.¹ The Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 had the effect of demilitarizing the lake, although it was, in fact, a naval limitation agreement. The Reciprocity Agreement of 1854, which for twelve years brought virtual free trade, chiefly in staples, between Canada and the United States, greatly enhanced the prospects of the Champlain Waterway. In the Treaty of Washington of 1871 both sides agreed to "urge upon" their respective lower levels of government reciprocity in the use of canals and navigable boundary waters. Carrying this concept further, the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 set up the International Joint Commission (I.J.C.). This body, consisting of three commissioners appointed by each country, quickly became a central instrument in Canadian-American relations, especially for areas such as the Champlain Valley. The I.J.C. rendered the decisive judgments on the Champlain Waterway in 1938 and 1967 and conducted two major investigations of the effects of proposed alterations of lake water levels. Its most recent report on water levels was made in 1981.

The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972 is important in a negative sense in that it excluded Lake Champlain as clearly as the Rush-Bagot Agreement included it. Unfortunately for funding of research, the lake has fallen between two stools, since it was also left out of the National Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. Finally, we have the important events of recent years: the historic Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation on the Management of Lake Champlain signed by Quebec, Vermont, and New York on August 23, 1988; and, in April of 1989, the designation by UNESCO of the Lake Champlain-Adirondack area as one of seventy reserves in its Man and Biosphere program.

This climate of cordiality and cooperation sometimes makes it difficult for present-day Canadians and Americans to contemplate the fact that the Champlain Valley was the scene of dozens of battles and hundreds of combat deaths in the period between the fateful shots fired by Samuel

de Champlain in 1609 on behalf of the Algonquins and the War of 1812. While the military history of this period has been vividly recorded by Ralph Nading Hill, Harrison Bird, Allan Everest, and others, the military significance of the lake since 1814 has been virtually ignored.²

In the wake of the War of 1812 Lake Champlain was regarded as one of the Great Lakes. The Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 was an exchange of notes "concerning the naval force to be maintained on the Great Lakes." The actual limitations were as follows:

On Lake Ontario to one vessel not exceeding one hundred tons burthen and armed with one eighteen-pound cannon.

On the Upper Lakes to two vessels not exceeding like burthen each and armed with like force.

On the waters of Lake Champlain to one vessel not exceeding like burthen each and armed with like force.³

Despite these severe limitations, potential naval warfare on the lake remained a significant obstacle when the prospect of a major commercial canal was discussed in the 1840s. Some U.S. citizens had given aid, comfort, and asylum to the defeated forces of the Canadian Rebellion of 1837. British forces had killed an American citizen when they crossed the Niagara River to burn the *Caroline*, a ship that had aided the rebels. This and other violent incidents took place in the context of a vaguely defined border, which had been a regular cause of friction since 1783.

Thus, Lower Canada (Quebec) alarmed Americans in 1849 when it granted a charter for a canal between Lake Champlain and the St. Lawrence that contained a clause reserving "exclusive use of the Canal" for the transport of "Her Majesty's Forces" whenever the legislature of Lower Canada should "deem it expedient." When canal supporters from both sides of the border held a convention at Saratoga later that year, it took considerable persuasion on the part of the Canadian participants to reassure their American counterparts that such a provision posed no military threat.⁴

Thirteen years later the situation was reversed. Largely because of the Civil War, a much more powerful and aggressive United States had severely strained relations with Great Britain and Canada. In this context, the New York Senate, in 1862, passed a resolution directing the State Engineer and Surveyor to study canal enlargement sufficient to allow "the passage of gunboats *through* Lake Champlain, thereby connecting the tidewaters of the Hudson with the St. Lawrence."⁵ As part of this plan, "gunboats could also pass down the river [the Richelieu] to the St. Lawrence, and thus aid in breaking the chain of water communication between Upper and Lower Canada Our colonial, our revolutionary and our national history each testify to the importance and danger of this old and very natural war path."⁶

After the war, Canadian-American relations slowly began to move in a more positive direction. Nonetheless, as late as 1897 the United States raised a military objection to another proposal to build a deep-sea link between Lake Champlain and the St. Lawrence. In that year the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers declared that such a route was "in a high degree objectionable from a military standpoint," since it "would be seriously exposed to hostile attacks in the event of war with Canada."⁷

In the twentieth century, war between Canada and the United States quickly became unthinkable. Nevertheless, this happy circumstance did not end the military significance of the lake in Canadian-American relations. The menace of Nazi Germany led to Franklin Roosevelt's famous speech at Kingston, Ontario, in 1938, in which the American president declared that should Canada be threatened by hostile forces from outside the hemisphere "we will not stand idly by." The Ogdensburg Declaration of 1940, which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, created a level of cooperation that made obsolete the earlier framework within which Canadian-American relations had been conducted.

Canada entered World War II on September 10, 1939, more than two years before Pearl Harbor. Ironically, American efforts to assist Canada during this period were complicated by the Rush-Bagot Agreement. The limitations noted earlier hindered shipyards on both sides of the border. Lake Champlain was the location of only one shipyard, at Shelburne, Vermont. This small enterprise had the capacity to build submarine-chasers to help what was soon to be the Allied cause but, under the terms of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, was barred from launching them on the lake.

In an exchange of notes in 1939 and 1940, the United States and Canada agreed to interpret the original agreement in a manner that would recognize the vastly altered circumstances that confronted the two nations. Both sides agreed that

it would be entirely in harmony with the intent of the negotiators and the spirit of the Agreement for either country to permit naval vessels, unquestionably intended for tidewater service only, to be constructed in shipyards situated on the Great Lakes. In order carefully to preserve the intent of the Agreement, however, it is believed that prior to the commencement of construction each Government should provide the other with full information concerning any naval vessels to be constructed at Great Lakes ports; that such vessels should immediately be removed from the lakes upon their completion.⁸

The first exchange of notes on this subject specified that "no armaments whatever should be installed until the vessels reach the seaboard." Subsequently, both countries affirmed that "armament might be installed on naval vessels constructed on the Great Lakes provided that . . . the armaments of the vessels are placed in such condition as to be incapable

of immediate use while the vessels remain in the Great Lakes." Two years later, after the United States had joined the war, the two countries further loosened the restrictions. It was agreed that in order for the ships in question "to combat enemy action upon their arrival in the open sea they be permitted to have their armament placed in complete readiness for action . . . it being understood that the proposed procedure is to be effective only for the duration of the present hostilities."⁹ Within this diplomatic framework, five subchasers were built at the Shelburne shipyard.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense and the high levels of cooperation reached during the war made the restrictions of the Rush-Bagot Agreement unwieldy for both Canada and the United States in the postwar period. In an exchange of notes on November 18 and December 6, 1946, both countries agreed that the Agreement was "not applicable to present-day conditions." "It is . . . the spirit of the agreement rather than its detailed provisions which serves to guide our Governments in matters relating to naval forces on the Great Lakes."¹⁰

Lake Champlain's potential as a channel of commerce provided a second basis for interaction between Canada and the United States. Two nineteenth-century attempts to build a canal between the lake and the St. Lawrence already have been cited. In fact, a group led by Ira Allen had made a serious effort to construct such a waterway even earlier, in the 1790s. On two occasions in the twentieth century, in the 1930s and 1960s, prolonged discussion of the Champlain Waterway moved Lake Champlain to the forefront of Canadian-American relations. Although, as noted earlier, military factors played an important role in the debates over the waterway, in the long run, other considerations, especially economic and environmental, were more significant in determining the ultimate fate of the project.

The Champlain Waterway was a dream of prominent Vermonters from Ira Allen to George Aiken. It was a project that had the potential of making Lake Champlain a key bond between Canada and the United States. Its construction, however, required a favorable configuration of military, economic, political, and environmental factors. One explanation of the failure to build the waterway is that its supporters were never able to align these factors positively. Each time the waterway was proposed at least one crucial element was missing. In the early years of Canadian-American relations, military tensions effectively blocked the canal. Why would either side want to make passage of its adversary easier? During most of the period from the Civil War to the 1930s, protectionist economic policies of both countries seriously damaged the prospects of the waterway. Why

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spend millions to facilitate trade that you are trying to prevent through high tariffs?

Since both of the twentieth-century deliberations of the two countries on the Champlain Waterway took place after the establishment of the International Joint Commission in 1909, Canadian and American policy with regard to the lake was expressed through this instrument. Article 3 of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty stated that "no further or other uses . . . of boundary waters . . . shall be made except by authority of the United States or the Dominion of Canada . . . and with the approval . . . of a joint commission, to be known as the International Joint Commission."¹¹

Thus, attempts to construct the waterway centered largely on efforts to obtain investigations and favorable recommendations from the I.J.C. In both 1935 and 1962 the efforts began with joint action by the two countries requesting the commission to conduct an investigation.¹² Extensive hearings were held on both sides of the border, with interested parties giving testimony that filled many volumes. At the same time, the commission set up its own boards of technical advisors and asked the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for cost/benefit analyses.

While the processes were similar in the 1930s and 1960s, the circumstances surrounding the two investigations were very different. The Depression and high unemployment rates of the 1930s created a favorable climate for large-scale projects that would provide jobs. The Trade Pact of 1935, which placed Canadian-American trade relations on a "most-favored nation" basis, offered the promise of expanded commerce.¹³ On the other hand, the proposal for a St. Lawrence Seaway looked like it would be bogged down forever in the U.S. Senate, so the waterway had to be considered on its own, not as a component of a new, much larger, inland water transport system. It quickly became clear, both from testimony at the hearings and from the experts' reports, that a "free standing" waterway had no future. The I.J.C. concluded in January of 1938 that the waterway could not "be justified except as an extension of or in connection with the St. Lawrence deep waterway."¹⁴

The second I.J.C. study, conducted between 1962 and 1967, took place in vastly altered circumstances. The completion of the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1961 provided a basis for supporters of the waterway to ask for another look at what was now often termed the "Champlain Cut-Off." Senator Aiken and a coalition of Richelieu Valley leaders saw the seaway as improving the chances of a new canal. However, the hard truth was that most Canadians and many midwestern Americans had gotten what they wanted in the St. Lawrence Seaway and now cared little about a

Champlain cut-off. The chief route considered in the 1960s had its St. Lawrence terminus at Sorel, about thirty miles downstream from Montreal. The prospect of being bypassed by waterway shipping led politically powerful Montreal interests to be either indifferent or opposed to the proposal. Even securing an I.J.C. study was difficult.¹⁵ Charles Weaver, Aiken's top legislative assistant, discussed this topic with William Hubbard of the U.S. State Department on May 9, 1961. Subsequently, Weaver wrote a blunt memo to Aiken:

"Let's face it, they don't want the Cut-Off study and the entire record bears this out," Hubbard told me. Hubbard also said your friends on the Interparliamentary Committee go back to Ottawa and make a lot of noise but the Government is against the Cut-Off and that's that.¹⁶

Weaver, Hubbard, and Aiken in 1961 had not counted on the vagaries of elections in a parliamentary system. The Diefenbaker government planned to call an election within the next twelve months, with the prospect of a much closer outcome than its 1958 landslide. The Tory sweep in that year had included an almost unprecedented fifty seats in historically Liberal Quebec. Feelings ran high on the subject of the waterway in the areas of Quebec, which stood to benefit from its construction. An indication of the strength of this sentiment can be seen in the House of Commons debates of February 13, 1961, in which the issue was fiercely and extensively contested.¹⁷


The government's inertia came under heavy fire. Lucien Cardin, the Member for Richelieu-Verchères, noted sarcastically that the government was

willing to spend, for instance, \$5,500,000 on military bands in this country . . . but refuses to pay some \$15,000 for a joint study of the economic advantages to be derived from one of the country's economic assets at a time when our standard of living depends so essentially upon our capacity for keeping our economy continually expanding. The government's attitude reminds me of a modern version of fiddling while Rome burns.¹⁸

Cardin scored his point. As the date of the 1962 election neared, the Canadian government found it politic to increase its chances in Quebec and in December of 1961 announced its support for a new I.J.C. study. On July 5, 1962, pursuant to Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty, the Commission was asked

to examine into and report, as soon as possible, on the feasibility and economic advantages of improving or developing a waterway from the St. Lawrence River in Canada through Lake Champlain to the Hudson River at Albany in the United States.¹⁹

The charge given the commission in 1962 was much more detailed than that which it had received in 1936. This time clear priority was given to



On the right is the Champlain-Richelieu waterway. The area near St. Jean, Quebec, which was the focus of the investigation by the International Joint Commission between 1973 and 1981, is illustrated on the left. Reprinted from International Joint Commission, Regulation of the Richelieu River and Lake Champlain (1981), frontispiece.

the route that followed the existing waterway to Sorel, although the commission was also instructed to report "in similar terms on any other routes." More importantly, the I.J.C. was asked "to bear in mind the effects" of a new waterway "on conservation, recreation and other beneficial uses."²⁰

The environmental consciousness implied in the charge to the I.J.C. proved crucial. The notion of large-scale commercial traffic, possibly including ocean-going freighters, was unacceptable to most residents of the Champlain Valley by the 1960s. Environmentalists struggling to "save the lake" found unexpected allies in the business community. The Burlington area, which had been economically depressed since World War II, was experiencing a remarkable recovery, based on the location there of such high-technology firms as Simmonds Precision Products, General Electric, and International Business Machine. A major new waterway was irrelevant to such companies; recently completed U.S. Interstate Highway 89 was more than adequate. As the valley's tourism and recreational industries thrived, it became apparent that, even in the narrowest economic terms, a scenic, unpolluted lake had much greater value than could be attained by a Champlain Waterway.

The hearings conducted by the I.J.C. reflected this situation. In Burlington on September 17, 1963, after presiding over a long day of negative testimony, the chair of the United States section, former Wyoming congressman Teno Roncalio, exclaimed with some exasperation: "Now, somebody, some place, wanted this seaway, or we wouldn't be here."²¹ Charles Ross, another member of the United States section and himself a Vermonter, recalled that a consensus on a negative decision emerged quickly when the commission began to write its report. According to Ross, the Canadian members were more heavily influenced by the unfavorable economic prospects of the waterway, while their American counterparts focused on environmental issues. As to which of the two factors was the more influential, Ross stated unequivocally that it was the environmental: "That was the clincher."²²

The second major source of I.J.C. activity concerning Lake Champlain has been almost totally environmental—the regulation of lake levels. Since the lake drains north the Richelieu River has often been subjected to serious flooding. Any remedial work along the river, however, entailed alterations of the level of the lake. Proposals to dam the Richelieu were made as early as 1887 and again in 1907. No action had been taken, however, before the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.²³ Article 4 of the treaty placed any Richelieu dam squarely in front of the commission. The two countries agreed that:

they will not permit the construction or maintenance on their respective sides of the boundary of any remedial or protective works or

any dams or other obstructions in waters flowing from boundary waters . . . the effect of which is to raise the natural level of waters on the other side of the boundary unless the construction or maintenance thereof is approved by the aforesaid International Joint Commission.²⁴

In 1936 Canada's Parliament appropriated \$500,000 for a dam to be built at Fryer's Island, a few miles north of St. Jean. In the spring of the following year the I.J.C. agreed to consider the issue and began a process that culminated in hearings at St. Albans, Vermont, and Montreal on June 9 and 10. Although a few American shoreline property owners opposed the project, their opposition testimony was overwhelmed by the representations of a large number of Canadians, especially those with a direct interest in controlling floods. After hearing testimony and considering a lengthy brief from the government of Canada, the commission approved the construction of a dam that would be aimed at holding lake levels between ninety-two and ninety-five feet above sea level, depending on the season. The project also included extensive rechanneling of the river to make the dam more effective.²⁵ Considering the intense environmental concern that has surrounded the lake in the last twenty-five years, it is noteworthy that in 1937 the commission heard virtually no testimony that addressed the environmental aspect of the proposal.

Although the Fryer's Island dam was itself very modest, the goal of holding to a seasonal fluctuation of only three feet a long, narrow lake fed by two large watersheds, the Adirondacks and the Green Mountains, was extremely ambitious. When one considers that work on rechanneling the river was never undertaken, it is not surprising that the Fryer's Island dam did not solve the problem of flooding on the Richelieu.²⁶ The situation was complicated by the fact that the area in question experienced considerable development in the 1950s and 1960s.²⁷

The Canadians, building on an essentially unregulated floodplain, were living on borrowed time. The situation's potential for disaster became a reality between 1968 and 1976, when water on the lake and river reached levels not seen for more than a century. On March 29, 1973, the I.J.C. was asked to investigate the desirability of new measures to control extreme water conditions. The commission, in turn, set up the International Champlain-Richelieu Engineering Board on April 24, 1973, which subsequently funded an extensive series of economic, engineering, and environmental reports on the problem.²⁸


The dozens of scientific studies mark the emergence of a Canadian-American scientific community focused on Lake Champlain: researchers at the Université de Québec à Montréal, the University of Vermont, New York's Department of Environmental Conservation, Vermont's Agency

for Environmental Conservation, and the Centre de Recherche en Aménagement Régional at the Université de Sherbrooke. It was largely as a result of these studies that the I.J.C. shifted its focus in March of 1975 "from alleviating extreme water conditions to an investigation of the environmental consequences" of regulating lake levels.²⁹

The hearings on lake levels conducted by the I.J.C. showed considerably different attitudes on each side of the border. Serious flood damage had occurred almost exclusively in Canada. Canadians were interested in protecting property that, in many instances, had land titles going back to the French regime. Since the United States had suffered very little flood damage, the Americans who testified before the I.J.C. were concerned primarily with environmental harm that might result from remedial measures. While Canadians were strongly supportive of almost any proposal that would control flooding, Americans remained wary and skeptical. An exchange between Will Staats of Middlebury, Vermont, and Canadian I.J.C. Commissioner René Beupré reflected the underlying conflict. Staats told the commission: "first of all, what is funny to us is why the Canadians have built on a floodplain to start with." Beupré, reflecting Canadian resentment of American attitudes, sharply interjected: "Two hundred years ago." Vermont's position was made clear by Martin Johnson, Secretary of Vermont's Agency of Environmental Conservation, who read a letter in which Governor Thomas Salmon took the position that only one possible solution should be considered — that "having the least environmental effect."³⁰

The study of the problems of the upper Richelieu was long and intensive, lasting from 1973 to 1981. The official record runs to about three thousand pages of hearings, reports, and scientific studies. During this eight-year period President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 11990, which greatly enhanced the legal status of existing wetlands in the United States and strengthened the position of those opposed to regulating lake levels. At the same time, the cycle of high water itself crested. Since 1976, in fact, the chief concern with regard to lake levels has been occasional low water.³¹

The I.J.C.'s final recommendation reflected considerable ambivalence. The commission found that a dam at St. Jean, with gates that could be opened and shut as needed, was technically feasible and could be operated in a way that would not adversely affect the environment. The commission suggested that, if such a structure were built, the channel of the river be deepened to increase the potential flow of water through the gates. However, it declined to pass judgment as to whether such changes were desirable, calling on the two governments to make such a determination. The only clear and unambiguous recommendations made in its 1981 report



This U.S. Corps of Engineers map illustrates long-standing U.S. bias in terms of shared stewardship of the Canadian biosphere. It limits its focus to the area south of the U.S.-Canadian border or 45th parallel.

were for zoning the area in question through floodplain regulation and for an improved flood-warning system.³²

This brief survey shows that Canadian-American relations regarding Lake Champlain have ranged from bitter enmity to good neighborliness and close cooperation. The early history of the lake was dominated by its military significance. The middle period was characterized by largely unsuccessful efforts to make the lake a major commercial route. The third period, which began in the early 1960s, has been governed by a growing environmental awareness. Past insensitivity to the concept of shared stewardship of the Champlain biosphere is reflected in the map above, which routinely served as a frontispiece for the scientific reports made by the Corps of Engineers in the 1960s. In this map, Corps planning is artificially limited to the area south of the 45th parallel. This attitude contrasts sharply with attitudes fifteen years later. The studies made in con-

nection with the proposed regulation of the Richelieu River routinely addressed the entire Champlain-Richelieu ecosystem. In the 1980s, the growth of political and environmental consciousness led policy-makers to recognize the folly of allowing the boundary between Quebec and Vermont to artificially circumscribe scientific investigations. Today's concept of joint stewardship has resulted in the highest level of Canadian-American cooperation yet reached on the lake.

NOTES

The author wishes gratefully to acknowledge the generous assistance provided by Connell Gallagher, Jeffrey Marshall, and the staff of Special Collections, Bailey-Howe Library, University of Vermont. The Aiken papers cited in this article are used with Mr. Gallagher's permission.

¹ For purposes of this paper I am omitting any discussion of the interesting evolution of Canadian sovereignty.

² See Harrison Bird, *Navies in the Mountains: The Battles on the Waters of Lake Champlain and Lake George, 1609-1814* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962); Allan Seymour Everest, *The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981); Ralph Nading Hill, *Lake Champlain, Key to Liberty* (Taftsville, Vt.: Countryman Press, 1987).

³ Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada in force between His Majesty and the United States of America* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1927), 12-3.

⁴ *An Act to Incorporate a Company for the Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of Lake Champlain and the River St. Lawrence* (Montreal: Queen's Printer, 1849), 19, 53. See also Charles F. O'Brien, "The Champlain Waterway, 1783-1897," *New England Quarterly* LXI (June 1988): 173-4.

⁵ Emphasis added.

⁶ O'Brien, "The Champlain Waterway," 175.

⁷ *Preliminary Examination for a Ship Canal, from the Great Lakes to the Navigable Waters of the Hudson River*, 55th Congress, First Session, House Document 86, 25.

⁸ Charles I. Bevans, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), Vol. 6, 153-6, 197, 255-6; Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Documents On Canadian External Relations* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1976) 1939-1941, Part II, Volume 8, 468.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Bevans, *Treaties of the United States*, 426-27.

¹¹ *Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada*, 314.

¹² International Joint Commission, *Interim Report of the International Joint Commission on the Champlain Waterway* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1938), 5; International Champlain Waterway Board, *Report to the International Joint Commission* (30 June 1965), 1-2.

¹³ C.P. Stacey, ed., *Historical Documents of Canada* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), 208-9, 213-14.

¹⁴ International Joint Commission, *Interim Report of the International Joint Commission on the Champlain Waterway* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1938), 17. The commission used the word "interim" in the title because it wished to review the matter in the event the St. Lawrence Seaway was constructed.

¹⁵ Charles F. O'Brien, "The Champlain Waterway, 1897-1967," *The American Review of Canadian Studies* XIX (Autumn 1989): 249, 251.

¹⁶ Charles Weaver to Aiken, May 9, 1961, Aiken papers, crate 47, box 1, folder 18, Special Collections, Bailey-Howe Library, University of Vermont.

¹⁷ Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, Vol. 105, No. 46, 4th Sess., 24th Parl., February 13, 1961, 1996.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ International Champlain Waterway Board, *Champlain Waterway Feasibility Report*, (30 June 1965), Vol. I, 1-5.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ International Joint Commission, *Public Hearings on a Waterway Through Lake Champlain*, Transcript of Proceedings, Ward and Paul, Official Reporters, Vol. 2, 177.

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²² Interview with author, June 25, 1986.

²³ International Joint Commission, *Richelieu River Remedial Works* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1938), 5.

²⁴ Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Treaties and Other Agreements*, 314.

²⁵ *Richelieu River Remedial Works*, 6-8.

²⁶ International Champlain-Richelieu Engineering Board, *Regulation of Lake Champlain* (September, 1974), part 8, "Richelieu Remedial Works"; International Joint Commission, *Regulation of the Richelieu River and Lake Champlain* (January, 1981), 17-20.

²⁷ International Joint Commission, *Regulation of the Richelieu River and Lake Champlain* (January, 1981), 27. Hereafter referred to as *1981 Report*.

²⁸ International Champlain-Richelieu Engineering Board, *Regulation of Lake Champlain* (September, 1974), 1-3.

²⁹ *1981 Report*, ii.

³⁰ *Public Hearing of the International Joint Commission*, held at the Ramada Inn, South Burlington, Vermont, December 3, 1974, B. Prouse Reporting Services, 27-30, 120.

³¹ *The Burlington Free Press*, 22 November 1982, sec. 1b, p. 1; 10 January 1983, sec. 1b, p. 4.

³² *1981 Report*, 23-4.