


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“ . . . the facile connection between the Indians, Jane McCrea, and the spirited gathering of the militia at Bennington during the Saratoga campaign simply does not exist.”

## Massacre or Muster? Burgoyne's Indians and the Militia at Bennington

By BRIAN BURNS

As many Americans commemorated the first anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, news from the north might have led the more thoughtful to doubt whether the celebrations would become annual events. In the early summer of 1777, the legions of Lieutenant General John Burgoyne swept south into the Champlain Valley. The Gibraltar of the North fell without battle, and British regulars again mounted guard at Fort Ticonderoga. The swift light infantry and their lumbering German allies spoiled the Continental breakfast at Hubbardton, while another column had chased the confused Americans past Fort Ann and almost to the Hudson before pulling back to regroup. In early July Burgoyne appeared on the verge of effecting his planned “junction with General William Howe” and putting out the fires of revolution.<sup>1</sup>

Unknown to those who struggled two hundred years ago in the Champlain Valley, Burgoyne's star had reached its zenith. For him, the path of glory would soon begin a long descent through defeat and disgrace, climaxing with an inconclusive Parliamentary inquiry.<sup>2</sup> After July, 1777, so little went right for Burgoyne that his complaint that he had been deserted by the fortunes of war contained merit. Historians, however, have not been so faithless to the general. Almost from the moment of his defeat at Saratoga, partisans have engaged in spirited debate over the campaign. Much ink has flowed over his fatalistic epigram, as generations of investigators have sought to determine whether the true failure of the northern campaign of 1777 lay in the stars or in Burgoyne himself.<sup>3</sup>

Even those who bitterly disagree over Burgoyne's personal responsibility for the debacle have been remarkably unanimous on several points. Most agree that the British defeat was a classic militia triumph, which provides a striking example of the potential of the citizen soldier. Students also generally concur that the militia was motivated almost totally by a single event — the brutal murder of Jane McCrea. On the morning of July 27, British Indian allies ranged ahead of the light infantry and swept down on Fort Edward, the last obstacle before the Hudson. The retreating Americans chose to make a stand across the river and left only a token force at the dilapidated fortification. While most civilians had also fled, few remained. In the confusion after the raid, young Jane McCrea was murdered and scalped. She immediately passed into the folklore of the American Revolution.<sup>4</sup>

Whiggish eighteenth century histories seized upon her dramatic tale, and pictured her as the madonna of the north, whose "innocence of youth and bloom of beauty" changed the course of the war. After her death, the local colonists had no choice, for "they had no security left, but by abandoning their habitations and taking up arms. Every man saw the necessity of becoming a temporary soldier, not for his own security, but for the protection and defense of those connections which are dearer than life itself. Thus an army poured forth from the woods, mountains, and marshes."<sup>5</sup> The notion of quiet, peaceful farmers rising to avenge the death of an innocent quite naturally pleased the sentiments of Victorian America, and Jane McCrea was well-known to the nineteenth century. Her story was retold in passionate terms: "The blood of the unfortunate girl was not shed in vain. For every drop, hundreds of armed yeomen arose."<sup>6</sup> Her blooming innocence graced the canvasses of such artists as John Vanderlyn and Asher Durand. In fact, she appears to have reached a kind of secular sainthood in New York City in 1853. Enterprising Yorkers hawked splinters from a tree near Fort Edward allegedly beneath which the savages murdered poor Jane. Their advertisements bear the reverence normally reserved for fraudulent relics of the True Cross.<sup>7</sup> Twentieth century scholars, while less florid, have generally followed the interpretations of their predecessors and concluded that the barbarity of the invader contributed to his downfall.

While the dramatic story of Jane McCrea and the downfall of John Burgoyne has gained credence by repetition, the actual connection between her death at the hands of British Indians and the muster of colonial militia lacks serious investigation. The victory of the American militia at the Battle of Bennington on August 16, 1777, is the crucial event for such an inquiry because of its timing in the campaign.<sup>8</sup> The militia who rallied at Bennington lacked many of the incentives available to those who later joined the campaign. In mid-August Burgoyne's troops had not suffered defeat. Those who rallied



*John Vanderlyn (1777-1852), Death of Jane McCrea, oil on canvas, Courtesy of the Wadsworth Atheneum, Hartford, Connecticut, purchased by subscription.*



later on, in September and October, had the examples of victory at Bennington and Stanwix as clear evidence that this British army was not invincible. Also, when Horatio Gates relieved Philip Schuyler, the Northern Army took on a different appearance to New England militiamen. Later in the season, with the harvest in, militia service would not pose so severe a family hardship. For the desperate men who rallied to Bennington, however, the outlook was grim. The American effort had been a litany of disaster. The patrician Yorker still commanded the Continentals. The crops needed tending. Because of this unpromising situation and because Jane McCrea was killed so close by, Bennington provides a test of the relationship between Indian terror and the muster of the American militia during the Saratoga campaign.

Numerous historians have drawn an explicit relationship between Jane McCrea and the militia at Bennington. John Fiske, for example, maintained that the tragedy aroused "the thirst for vengeance . . . among the yeomanry of northern New York, of Vermont, and of western Massachusetts . . . the lamentable story was told at every village fireside, and no detail of horror or pathos was forgotten. The name of Jenny McCrea became a watchword, and a fortnight had not passed before General [Benjamin] Lincoln and Colonel [Seth]



*Nathaniel Currier (1813-1888),  
The Murder of Miss Jane  
McCrea, lithograph.*

Warner had gathered on the British flank an army of stout and resolute farmers, inflamed with such wrath as had not filled their bosoms since the day when all New England had rallied to besiege the enemy in Boston."<sup>9</sup> George Otto Trevalyn confidently asserted that "the Green Mountain Boys and the New Hampshire minute-men . . . were fighting to preserve their children from the tomahawk, and their roof-trees from the torch."<sup>10</sup> In our own century, Willard Wallace places the lurid story "fresh in the minds of many of the militia from Vermont and New Hampshire as they gathered under General [John] Stark and Colonel Warner to resist the attack."<sup>11</sup> To test the validity of these traditional assertions, it must be determined to what extent Vermonters were aware of Burgoyne's Indian allies and the murder of Jane McCrea, and what methods the authorities used to prod the militia into action.

From the moment he advanced the northern campaign, Burgoyne intended that Indians be enlisted to accompany the regulars.<sup>12</sup> Although he had seen no action in America during the French and Indian War, he knew that the hostile Indian evoked terror on the frontier. He also understood the incompatibility of Indian and European warfare and intended to exploit the Indian reputation of apparently indiscriminate and barbaric behavior. He believed that fear of the In-



dians could alter men's behavior. During the campaign, he threatened that deserters would not be tried by court martial, but rather would be pursued and scalped by their erstwhile Indian allies.<sup>13</sup> The Indians could reduce the rebel will to resist.

Accordingly, Burgoyne early in the campaign issued a public manifesto. This opening salvo in the propaganda war compared the new American government to "the Inquisition of the Romish Church," and wordily entreated all who loved liberty to seek shelter beneath the standard of the King. Searching "for more persuasive terms" to give the proclamation "impression," and to prevent people from disregarding it "by considering their distance from the immediate situation of my camp," Burgoyne reminded them that he had "but to give stretch to the Indian Forces under my direction, and they amount to thousands, to overtake the harden'd enemies of Great Britain and America." The proclamation closed by reminding the benighted that they could never escape his "messengers of Justice and Wrath."<sup>14</sup>

Although Burgoyne later cautioned his Indians that even the vengeance of the state had limits, he took pains to disseminate the proclamation. The evidence suggests that the General succeeded admirably in informing America of the dreadful threat posed by his Indian allies. One officer commented that his commander's words were "spread as much as possible thro' the Rebel Country."<sup>15</sup> The responsibility for its distribution fell to Burgoyne's adjutant general, Major Robert Kingston. That industrious officer signed and stamped hundreds of these manifestos during the early weeks of the campaign, and some of these passed quickly into the hands of Vermonters. Brigadier General Simon Fraser, in command of the Advanced Guard, attempted to inform the rebel populace of the invasion's purpose. Fraser on June 19, 1777, reported: "I got some cattle from the opposite side of Lake Champlain [Vermont] . . . I paid the inhabitants solid coin and sent them away with many copies of Mr. Burgoyne's manifesto." Quite probably the specie made the document palatable, but the subsequent expedition into Vermont encountered a less favorable reception. On the 22nd, Fraser sent a patrol up Otter Creek to obtain beef and "to dispense manifestos." The latter task seems to have been more successful, for the patrol complained that the inhabitants were "most disaffected" and were engaged in driving their cattle away from the King's troops.<sup>16</sup> Unofficial channels also spread Burgoyne's veiled threats of bloodshed and massacre. Energetic colonial editors seized upon the proclamation as a newsworthy item and often reprinted it in full. Its appearance in the public press, however, was too late to have affected the militia at Bennington.<sup>17</sup>

News of the war crowded the pages of colonial journals, and Burgoyne's invasion of the north provided plentiful copy in the

summer of 1777. The most space was devoted to the acrimonious debate over who to blame for the fall of Ticonderoga, but Burgoyne's Indians also made frequent appearances. Numerous correspondents testified to the fear and anxiety the red men inspired among the dispirited American defenders. Before the loss of Ticonderoga, the Indians constantly harassed the outer defenses and conducted night ambushes of unwary patrols. "We have been alarmed these two nights past," wrote one worried soldier, because of "Indians in the woods who have killed and taken 8 or 10 of our men, within Ten Days past."<sup>18</sup> Another soldier complained that "two soldiers of Col. [Jonathan] Hale's were killed and one made prisoner by a party of Indians . . . [who] have been almost every day discovered near this place."<sup>19</sup> These examples of the Indian impact upon the morale of combatants typify stories appearing in the newspapers during the campaign. Although Vermont had no press, most likely copies of Connecticut, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York journals filtered in. Only an extremely isolated denizen of Vermont could have failed to be aware of the invasion, and, thanks to Burgoyne's proclamation, aware of the Indian menace as well.<sup>20</sup>

According to traditional accounts, the militia at Bennington also knew of the death of Jane McCrea, and it is probable that they did. The scene of her death lay hard by the more populous towns of southwestern Vermont, and nearly three weeks elapsed between her murder and the Battle of Bennington, ample time for the news to spread. Kenneth Roberts presents the most widely read chronicle of how these yeomen learned the story in his *Rabble in Arms*. After hearing eyewitness accounts of the murder, General Philip Schuyler quickly decided that the story could be used to muster the reluctant New England militia. Directing his orders to the novel's hero, Captain Peter Merrill, Schuyler sweeps his hand across the map: "Go there, there, and there . . . make a circle that ends at Bennington. Talk everywhere to everyone. Talk about Jenny McCrae [sic] . . . Stop at every settlement. Stop at every village. Call the people together. Tell 'em the story of Jenny McCrae. Tell 'em if we don't get men, the same thing'll happen to their womenfolk that happened to Jenny McCrae." Naturally, Merrill's ride results in an outpouring of enraged militia, bound for the west to fight "agin' Burgoyne."<sup>21</sup>

Unfortunately, Philip Schuyler's papers suggest his response to the murder was considerably less dramatic. The commander, who wrote almost daily to General George Washington, forwarded extensive accounts of activity on the crumbling northern front. On July 27, it was his unhappy task to describe the futile rearguard action at Fort Edward. "A body of Indians and Regular troops," he wrote, "attacked a picket detached from a Body of about 150 which we keep at Fort Edward, killed and scalped a Subaltern, two serjeants and a private and took four prisoners. They also scalped a woman and carried off



another."<sup>22</sup> Quite probably these latter two were Jane McCrea and her companion, Mrs. McNeil, who had the misfortune to survive and thus escape the pages of history. On the following day the Northern commander penned a more extensive letter to Washington, expanding on his initial knowledge of the previous day's action. In this second dispatch, the two women do not appear.<sup>23</sup> Further, Schuyler never again mentioned them in his official correspondence, nor did he ever invoke the name of the famous martyr. Her name would later receive wide publicity as a result of public correspondence between Burgoyne and Horatio Gates, but far too late to have affected Bennington.<sup>24</sup> Despite Kenneth Roberts' story and the common historical interpretation of the McCrea connection, the high command did not dispatch circuit riders to every New England village and farm. Peter Merrill's fictional ride notwithstanding, most Vermonters knew of both Burgoyne's Indians and their most famous victim.

Burgoyne's thrust coincided with the Vermont separatists' attempt to enforce their declaration of independence from New York by drawing up a constitution and erecting the machinery of government. As the General Convention meeting at Windsor worked on a draft of the Constitution, Colonel Seth Warner provided the first official news of the British invasion. From Rutland on the 2nd of July he wrote of the impending threat to Ticonderoga and passed on the request of General Arthur St. Clair to "call out the militia of the state, of Massachusetts, and of New Hampshire, to join him as soon as possible."<sup>25</sup> Reiterating the threat to the fort, the General Convention forwarded Warner's request to New Hampshire on the following day. It made no mention of an Indian menace.<sup>26</sup>

In a letter written from Otter Creek on the 7th of July, St. Clair informed the General Convention that Ticonderoga had fallen to the British.<sup>27</sup> Two days later he wrote again to urge the muster of the local militia. As yet unaware of the extent of the losses at Hubbardton, the general confidently told the residents of the New Hampshire Grants that "the militia that can be raised in your Country will I think keep the people in security, for in my opinion they have little to fear except the depredations of a few Indians."<sup>28</sup> In this message St. Clair provided the first evidence which could be used to link the Vermont militia to an Indian threat. The tone of the message was reserved and not fraught with the hysteria which often accompanied warning of an impending Indian attack.

By the 15th of July, the consequences of the fall of Ticonderoga had been assessed, and the full story of the battle at Hubbardton was known. Ira Allen, Secretary of the Vermont Council of Safety, appointed by the General Convention to govern Vermont until the provisions of the Constitution came into effect, sent a strongly worded request for aid to the New Hampshire Council of Safety. Allen asserted that "our Good Dispositions to Defend ourselves and






make a frontier for your State cannot be Carried into Execution without your assistance."<sup>29</sup> In this message, a frank appeal to the self-interest of New Hampshire, the Vermonters made no explicit references to an Indian threat. In response to a concurrent request by Allen, several Vermont militia companies took up arms by the 28th of the month.<sup>30</sup>

Dismayed by New Hampshire's slow response to Vermont's pleas for aid, on July 18, Seth Warner wrote directly to the New Hampshire Council himself. He stated that "there is an army or Body of the Enemy to the Amount of three Thousand at Castleton. Many of the People have fled and Left all in the Enemy's hands . . . Some have took Protection From them already, and . . . many more Stand Ready to take it Likewise. I therefore Earnestly Request of Your Honors to without Fail speedily to send on the Militia of your State."<sup>31</sup> Allen's last message, however, had convinced New Hampshire to act, and they quickly raised some 1400 men under General John Stark. In order to pay for the expedition, John Langdon of the Council pledged three thousand dollars in hard money, an equal amount in silver and pewter, and the proceeds from the sale of seventy hogsheads of Tobago rum.<sup>32</sup> The New Hampshire militia who rallied were thus assured of payment for their services. The immense local popularity of John Stark provided another inducement for mustering.<sup>33</sup> His well known opinion of the Continental Congress, together with his distaste for Philip Schuyler, assured the independent New Hampshire men that they would never be placed under the control of the Yorkers. To give official sanction to his personal views, Stark demanded and received remarkable instructions from the New Hampshire Council that he was "to take command of the militia and march into the State of Vermont, and there act in conjunction with the Troops of the State, or any other of the States, or of the United States, as it should appear expedient to You."<sup>34</sup> John Stark was his own master. The militia with him would be paid for their trouble, and they could rely on Stark's judgment to prevent their subordination to "foreigners." Nowhere does an appeal to their sentiments about Burgoyne's Indian policy appear.

Meanwhile, the Vermont Council of Safety struggled to rouse its militia. Their frenzied correspondence of early August, however, contains no reference to the death of Jane McCrea. On the 11th, the Council issued a mild warning that "the Indians may do some mischief by



*Leroy Williams, Prisoners Taken at the Battle of Bennington, oil on canvas, painted in 1938 depicts a romanticized view of the American leaders and their prisoners. Courtesy of The Bennington Museum.*



firing on scattered parties, &c."<sup>35</sup> Two days later, with Baum's column already marching toward Bennington, the message sent to militia leaders spoke only of the approach of "a Large Body of the Enemy's Troops."<sup>36</sup> Unmentioned by the Council of Safety's propagandists, Baum's column included Indians. In response to the invasion, Vermont rallied bravely. Many companies "entered service" as late as August 16th, the day of the battle.<sup>37</sup> The militia had come forth only when enemy troops actually appeared, behavior not atypical in the history of militia. Contrary to the popular assumption, the officials made no attempt to play upon the militia's fear of the depredations of British Indians in general or the Jane McCrea incident in particular.

While dispatches before the battle seldom mentioned the Indians, they played a more prominent role in Stark's later reports. True to his prejudices, the general would not notify the Continental Congress or the Northern Army of the victory at Bennington. When his friend Horatio Gates replaced Schuyler, however, Stark wrote a personal letter to the new commander of the Northern Army in which he dwelled on the Indians. "I was informed," he wrote, "that there was a party of Indians in Cambridge on their march to this place; I sent Col. Gregg of my brigade, to stop them, with two hundred men. In the night I was informed, by express, that there was a large body of the enemy on their march in the rear of the Indians."<sup>38</sup> After the battle, Stark also sent a report to the editor of the *Connecticut Courant* in which he detailed the yeoman service of the Vermont Council of Safety. In his version of Vermont's July 15th request for New Hampshire aid, Ira Allen "wrote to the Honorable Council of the State of New Hampshire, setting forth in the most pressing terms the necessity of the assistance of the militia of that State to guard so valuable a part of the country from the immediate ravage of the Indians, as was threatened by General Burgoyne's manifesto."<sup>39</sup> The message in question, of course, did not contain such a reference. Perhaps the old Indian fighter stated what he assumed would be the consequence of British victory.

British Indian allies were certainly a factor in the Burgoyne campaign. Contrary to long accepted tradition, however, no explicit evidence forges a link between their presence and the militia at Bennington. While the oral persuasion employed by anxious militia captains is not extant, records of the Vermont Council of Safety are. Vermont's leaders, no mean propagandists in other causes, used neither the British Indians nor their most famous victim in those desperate days of early August. The circumstances before Bennington were ideal for the use of Indian atrocity stories. That Jane McCrea and her fellow victims were not officially invoked could indicate that the Indian threat was so obvious that it was not necessary to dwell upon it. But propagandists seldom avoid the obvious. More likely, the facile



connection between the Indians, Jane McCrea, and the spirited gathering of the militia at Bennington during the Saratoga campaign simply does not exist.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>"Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada" in Lieutenant General John Burgoyne, *A State of the Expedition* . . . (London: J. Almon, 1780), app. pp. ii-vii.

<sup>2</sup>Evidence for the hearing appears in *Ibid.*; and Lieutenant General John Burgoyne, *The Substance of General Burgoyne's Speeches* . . . (London: J. Almon, 1780).

<sup>3</sup>The varying theories are summarized in H.N. Muller, III, and David A. Donath, "'The Road Not Taken': A Reassessment of Burgoyne's Campaign," *The Bulletin of The Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, 13, No. 4 (1973), 272-285.

<sup>4</sup>The death of Jane McCrea is comprehensively treated in Hoffman Nickerson, *The Turning Point of the Revolution, or Burgoyne in America* (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1928), pp. 183-186 and 470-472. Many accounts of her death are analyzed in James A. Holden's deceptively titled "Influence of the Death of Jane McCrea on the Burgoyne Campaign," *New York State Historical Proceedings*, 12 (1913), 249-310. Arthur Reid *Le Loup's Bloody Trail from Salem to Fort Edward* (Utica, New York: Roberts, 1859), is livid, sensational, and complete with fictional dialogue. Philip A. Carroll, *Jane McCrea: A Tragedy in Five Acts* (Albany: Ft. Orange, 1927) is vintage and dreadful melodrama.

<sup>5</sup>*The Annual Register* . . . for the year 1777 (London: J. Seely and J. Wright, 1805), pp. 156, 177-178.

<sup>6</sup>William L. Stone, *The Campaign of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne* (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1877), p. 303.

<sup>7</sup>D. Wilson, *The Life of Jane McCrea* (New York; n.p., 1853), endpiece.

<sup>8</sup>George A. Billias, "Horatio Gates: Professional Soldier," in George A. Billias, ed., *George Washington's Generals* (New York: Morrow, 1964), pp. 92-93, discusses Gates' influence on the militia. Jane V. Lape, Curator and Librarian of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, considers that the agricultural season exerted great impact on the militia during the Saratoga campaign. John Shy, "A New Look at the Colonial Militia," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 20 (1963), 175-185, and *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for Independence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 25-33, emphasizes the social differences between the Revolutionary militia and the incompetent "colonial volunteers" of earlier wars.

<sup>9</sup>*The American Revolution* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1895), I, 280.

<sup>10</sup>*The American Revolution* (New York: Longman, Green, 1918), IV, 132.

<sup>11</sup>*Appeal to Arms* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1951), p. 145.

<sup>12</sup>Burgoyne, "Thoughts," app. pp. ii-vii.

<sup>13</sup>Edward B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne* (Albany: Munsell's, 1860), pp. 65-66, 78, and 123.

<sup>14</sup>Burgoyne MSS, Fort Ticonderoga Museum, Ticonderoga, New York; also quoted in George G.F.C. Stanley, ed., *For Want of a Horse* (Sackville, New Brunswick: Tribune Press, 1961), p. 104.

<sup>15</sup>Stanley, *For Want of a Horse*, p. 104.

<sup>16</sup>Fraser's account appears in Vermont Historical Society, *Essays in Early Vermont History* (Montpelier: Vermont Historical Society, 1943), VI, 133-141.

<sup>17</sup>*The New York Evening Gazette and Weekly Mercury*, 18 August 1777; *The Pennsylvania Evening Post*, 21 August 1777; *The Providence Gazette*, 9 August 1777; *Connecticut Courant and Weekly Intelligencer*, 8 September 1777; *Freeman's Journal*, 20 September 1777; *The Continental Journal*, 11 September 1777; *The Boston Gazette*, 15 September 1777.

<sup>18</sup>*The New England Chronicle*, 10 July 1777.

<sup>19</sup>*The Continental Journal*, 10 July 1777; *The Boston Gazette*, 14 July 1777.

<sup>20</sup>In fact, Indian raids were reported in the Otter Valley as early as July 6. See Wynn Underwood, "Indian and Tory Raids on the Otter Valley, 1777-1782," *Vermont History*, 15, No. 4 (October, 1947), 198-199.

<sup>21</sup>Kenneth Roberts, *Rabble in Arms* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1970), pp. 501-507.

<sup>22</sup>Schuyler MSS, Schuyler to Washington, 27 July 1777, Letterbook V, New York Public Library, New York, from a typescript copy at the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, Schuyler to Washington, 28 July 1777.

<sup>24</sup>*The Boston Gazette*, 15 September 1777; *The Pennsylvania Evening Post*, 16 September 1777; *The New England Chronicle*, 18 September 1777; *The Freeman's Journal*, 20 September 1777; *Rivington's Royal Gazette*, 4 October 1777; *The New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury*, 6 October 1777.

<sup>25</sup>Vermont, *Records of the Governor and Council* (Montpelier: J. and M. Poland, 1873), I, 64-65.

<sup>26</sup>Vermont Historical Society (hereafter VHS) *Collections*, I (1870), 167.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 174.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 178-179.

<sup>29</sup>Vermont, *Governor and Council*, I, 131-132.

<sup>30</sup>John E. Goodrich, ed., *Rolls of the Soldiers in the Revolutionary War* (Rutland: Tuttle, 1904), pp. 45-53.

<sup>31</sup>VHS, *Collections*, I, 188.

<sup>32</sup>Caleb Stark, *Memoir and Official Correspondence of Gen. John Stark* (Concord: G.P. Lyon, 1877), p. 46.

<sup>33</sup>Edward E. Curtis, "Stark, John," in Dumas Malone, ed., *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York: Scribner's, 1936), IX, 530-531.

<sup>34</sup>VHS, *Collections*, I, 188-189.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 197.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup>Goodrich, *Revolutionary Rolls*, pp. 26-34.

<sup>38</sup>VHS, *Collections*, I, 206-207.

<sup>39</sup>An extremely poor copy appears in *The Connecticut Courant and Weekly Intelligencer*, 7 October 1777. See also Vermont, *Governor and Council*, pp. 144-145.