A German Perspective on the American Attempt to Recapture the British Forts at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence on September 18, 1777

Recently translated reports by German officers fighting for the British army contain details not previously available regarding the dynamics of the attacks on Mount Independence and Diamond Island.

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Until recently historians have relied on British and American documents to reconstruct events during the British occupation at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence following the American evacuation under General St. Clair on July 6, 1777. Some German accounts recently discovered and translated describe in greater detail the efforts made by the meager and ill German garrison to hold open the line of communication and supply while General Burgoyne’s army pursued and engaged the American rebels to the south. Together with selected British and American documents and archaeological evidence—each of which taken separately gives us only a partial picture of activities, motives, and conditions—we can assemble a more complete understanding of this important campaign in the American Revolution.

Military strategists have long recognized that establishing and maintaining lines of communication and supply are essential to the success of any campaign. The Burgoyne Campaign of 1777 was no exception. Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne, Commander of the Northern British Army in America, knew well this principle. The forts at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were the first location of engagement with the Americans and were to become the site of an American attempt to recapture the former stronghold and sever
Burgoyne's line of supply and route of retreat. In the case of the American attempt on the depots, strategy and "regimental esprit" emerge as major elements in a successful defense.

**CRITICAL MOMENTS AND DECISIONS**

On July 5, 1777, Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair, American commander of Ticonderoga, and his officers decided to abandon Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence in order to avoid encirclement by British troops and the hired German auxiliaries from Braunschweig and Hesse-Hanau under Burgoyne's command. Information St. Clair obtained from scouts suggested that the American army would not be able to sustain a prolonged defense of the forts, which were located at the narrows on Lake Champlain. The Germans were ready to complete their road across East Creek and the narrow neck from the Mount, which would have isolated the Americans.

Ebenezer Fletcher, a fifer in Capt. James Carr's company in the battalion of Col. Nathan Hale of New Hampshire, writes in his journal, "By sunrise the enemy had landed from their boats, and pursued us so closely as to fire on our rear." Thomas Hughes, ensign in the 53rd British Regiment, describes taking possession of Sugar Loaf Hill (Mount Defiance) on July 5 and the American retreat the next day by water up to South Bay and by land toward Castleton. He writes, "Had they remain'd twelve hours longer, their escape would have been impracticable, as the Germans that morning were to have been posted on their only remaining communication with the country, and completed their investment."

On the morning of July 6, the British and German forces occupied the forts after learning of the secret evacuation by the Americans. British and German units, under the leadership of Brig. Gen. Simon Fraser and Maj. Gen. Friedrich von Riedesel, pursued the colonials by land toward Hubbardton, while other British units chased a flotilla of Americans attempting to make their escape south to Skenesborough (Whitehall) by water.

A series of engagements over the route to Stillwater, New York, during the next three months resulted in losses for both armies. However, the greatest losses for Burgoyne resulted from the gradual depletion of his army as he established a chain of posts as rear guard in his march toward Albany. For example, Burgoyne left five companies to guard Diamond Island on Lake George, which he established as a depot for supplies.

**THE BRITISH-GERMAN OCCUPATION**

After the Americans evacuated Mount Independence and Fort Ticonderoga, one of Burgoyne's tasks was to garrison the forts. When Sir Guy Carleton refused to send troops from Canada, Burgoyne was compelled to order the 62nd British Regiment and the German Prinz Friedrich Regiment to occupy
the two forts under the command of Brig. Gen. James Hamilton. The 62nd was later replaced by the 53rd Regiment under the leadership of Brig. Gen. Henry Watson Powell.\(^7\)

- **A British Perspective.**

Thomas Hughes recalls no noteworthy happenings at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence until September 18. However, General Hamilton records that some special problems did occur during the occupation in regard to supply, care of prisoners and sick, and the relations between the British and German troops.\(^8\)

- **A German Perspective.**

Ens. Julius Ludwig Friedrich von Hille provides almost daily entries about the Prinz Friedrich Regiment. The diary is of particular importance as a source for a German perspective of garrison life and for his impressions of the British command. Hille comments that the "dignified" Brigadier General Hamilton left with the remainder of the 62nd on August 12 and the "not very refined" Brigadier Powell returned and took over command. The 53rd began arriving on August 18.\(^9\)

Lt. August Wilhelm Du Roi The Elder, Regimental Adjunct of the Prinz Friedrich Regiment, provides detailed descriptions about conditions, engagements, the bridge between the forts, Lt. Col. Baum's Dragoon Regiment's defeat at Bennington, and deployment of troops. He writes that on August 1 the 62nd regiment began its march to Fort George; and confirms that it was replaced by the 53rd Regiment. The command of the garrison changed as well. In mid-August, Du Roi describes the deployment of troops: The Prinz Friedrich regiment occupied the Mount with four companies of the 53rd; thirty-three men and one officer from the Prinz Friedrich Regiment guarded Fort Ticonderoga; four companies of the 53rd were at the portage of Lake George; and fifteen men were on Sugar Loaf Hill with four cannon. Two schooners, *Maria* and *Carleton*, were in South Bay and two gunboats in East Creek. Two hundred men were stationed on Diamond Island with a few cannon, and thirty men were at Fort George.\(^10\)

Lt. Col. Christian Prätorius, field commander of the Prinz Friedrich Regiment, also maintained a journal. However, it contains entries only for the period from June 2 through July 17, 1777.\(^11\) He makes reference to activities of the occupation, notably the raising of the Prinz Friedrich Regiment banner over the fort, a thanksgiving service, guard duty and activities associated with supply and assistance for the sick and wounded.
- An American Perspective.

American views have been gathered from several sources: the records of Gen. Benjamin Lincoln and John Brown; letters by Lincoln, Brown, and Jonathan Warner; and orders and a letter from General Lincoln to General Gates. During the summer of 1777 Col. John Brown and Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, probably working together, conceived a plan to make a surprise attack on Ticonderoga. General Lincoln indicates in his orders and letters that the attack on Ticonderoga was intended as a raid not an assault. By September 8 some 2,500 troops from Massachusetts and some Green Mountain Boys gathered in Pawlet, Vermont. The Rebels, as they were known, had gained a reputation for their ardent devotion to the spirit of liberty and with it an ability to rally in support of the cause.

Among the officers of Benjamin Lincoln’s command were Brig. Jonathan Warner of the Massachusetts militia and three colonels: John Brown and Benjamin Ruggles Woodbridge of the Massachusetts militia, and Thomas Johnson of the Vermont militia. Lincoln and his officers recognized that Burgoyne’s rear line of communication was weak and that the defense at Ticonderoga was limited. They planned to conduct a simultaneous attack upon Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, with a third force upon Skanesborough, thus isolating Burgoyne’s army.

Each colonel commanded 500 men to attack his respective target: Johnson against Mount Independence following the Hubbardton Road; Brown against Ticonderoga using a land route along the Champlain-Lake George basin; and Woodbridge to Skanesborough where he would cover Brown’s retreat and eventually continue onto Fort Edward. The remaining 1,000 men would be held in reserve. By September 17, Brown and Johnson were prepared to launch a two-pronged attack. Col. Brown was to attack the British post at the north end of Lake George, and if successful, to unite with Johnson in his attack upon Ticonderoga.

On September 18, 1777, Colonels Brown and Johnson made their attempt to recapture the forts, which were held by approximately 1,000 men under the British commander General Powell. The Prinz Friedrich Regiment was on Mount Independence and the 53rd Regiment, along with some Canadians, defended Ticonderoga. A small British naval detachment served on vessels on Lake Champlain and on batteaux on Lake George. Two-thirds of the 462 men of the 53rd were at the fort, while others were dispersed among the outer works (the mill, bridge, blockhouse landing, and a battery on Mount Defiance) or served as guards for 100 American prisoners.
A number of documents published during the first half of the twentieth century inform us of the British perspectives on the fight for Ticonderoga: a journal by Ens. Thomas Hughes of the 53rd regiment;\(^\text{15}\) a manuscript letter by British naval officer Lt. John Stark;\(^\text{16}\) letters to Sir Guy Carleton from Brig. Gen. H. Watson Powell, commander of Ticonderoga during the occupation;\(^\text{17}\) a letter from Brig. Gen. Alan MacLean to Carleton;\(^\text{18}\) a journal entry by Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne;\(^\text{19}\) a letter by Capt. James Irwine, British Commander of Fort George;\(^\text{20}\) and orders by Brig. James Hamilton, initial commander at Ticonderoga during the occupation.\(^\text{21}\)

John Stark describes the attack at the portage at the north end of Lake George, freeing the Rebel prisoners, the encounter at the blockhouse on Sugar Loaf Hill, and the defense of Mount Independence. Stark tells how the German picket responded to the American attack on the Mount. The rebel attack began with an “Indian War Cry.” The vessels, guarding the road to the Mount, responded with a “gallant and spirited service” using grape shot, then their cannon to scour the woods every night, thus preventing the Americans from attacking the British stronghold. Stark ends his remarks by identifying what he believed to be the British garrison’s shortcomings: a failure to use scouts to gain intelligence, a general lack of security; the use of the king’s bateau by some strangers to get their families and possessions from Skenesborough with the permission of the Brigadier; and inattention to the repair of fences and the clearing of the outer works of Ticonderoga.\(^\text{22}\) See illustration, page 10.\(^\text{23}\)

On September 20 John Brown decided not to attack Fort Ticonderoga as he believed the Mount to be strongly fortified. Brown decided to proceed by water with a quantity of ammunition and military stores to attack the British depot on Diamond Island in Lake George.\(^\text{24}\) There, too, he was unsuccessful and retreated.

Although Brown failed in his efforts at Mount Independence and Diamond Island, British and American documents show general agreement that he succeeded in his attack on the portage, the blockhouse at the mill and the battery on Sugar Loaf Hill with few injuries and loss of life. Here Brown released the more than one hundred prisoners captured at Hubbardton, Vermont, and captured 293 British soldiers; he also destroyed a number of bateau, gunboats, and an armed sloop above and below the falls in Lake George. Capt. Ebenezer Allen with his company of rangers captured Mt. Defiance with its cannon. Brown sent Brig. Gen. Powell a demand for surrender, which Powell rejected. The following day Jonathan Warner, the Brig. Gen. of the Massachusetts Militia, sent a similar ultimatum. Powell never replied.\(^\text{25}\)
Manuscript map drawn by John Stark to accompany his "remarks on affairs at the Portage between Ticonderoga and Lake George, and at Mount Independence in Sept. 1777." Courtesy of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.
- A German Perspective on the Attack.

Until recently the *Journal of Du Roi The Elder* was one of the few sources available describing the events surrounding the Johnson-Brown attack on Ticonderoga and Mount Independence from a German perspective. Du Roi writes that the attacking rebel force consisted of 1,400 men led by Brigadiers Browne[sic] and Warner, with General Lincoln as commander in chief.\(^{26}\)

An anonymous account, translated and published in 1993 under the title *Garrison Life in French Canada and New York: Journal of an Officer of the Prinz Friedrich Regiment, 1776-1783* is now confirmed to have been written by Ens. Julius von Hille. His observations provide another view of the engagement along with those recorded by Du Roi and Lt. Col. Pratorius of the same regiment. Ensign von Hille describes the days surrounding the attack. His daily entries combine objectivity and a personal sensitivity about losses and injuries from the engagements, and an assessment of the German regiment's overall ability to resist the American attack.\(^{27}\)

In addition to Ensign von Hille's account, two recently translated reports written from the Mount by officers of the Prinz Friedrich Regiment are now available for comparison with existing documents. The two reports contain details not previously available regarding the dynamics of the attacks on Mount Independence and Diamond Island. The content, style, and tone of these two letters reveal the officers' appreciation for the common soldier and their sensitivity to and concern for them. These documents also help us understand the feelings of pride and honor felt by the German auxiliary army under British command.

One of the letters, written by Lt. Ernst Christian Schroeder, is believed to have been sent to Major General von Riedesel. He describes the engagement and includes a map to which he makes reference.\(^{28}\) The other letter was written by Maj. Friedrich Wilhelm von Hille, father of Ens. Julius Ludwig von Hille, of the same regiment. The letter was written to Maj. Gen. Eckert Heinrich von Stammer, then in Braunschweig, regarding the September attack by the Americans. It appears that the father had access to and used his son's journal to prepare his report to Major von Stammer.\(^{29}\)

On September 24 the rebels attacked Diamond Island after having captured gunboats, a sloop, and batteaux from the landing area on Lake George. According to the British account, the island depot was under the command of Captain Anburey. The island was occupied by two companies of the 47th Regiment.\(^{30}\) Lt. Geo. Irwine, commander of the 47th Regiment at Fort George, reports that the engagement lasted an hour and a half. The Rebels retreated and were pursued by gunboats; they finally burned their boats. A few were killed and many wounded, according to American and British documents, while great losses among the Rebels were reported by the Germans. There were no casualties among the defenders.\(^{31}\) On October 3, 1777, Sir Guy
Carleton appointed Capt. Samuel Greaves to command the armed vessels on Lake Champlain and Lake George. He directed Greaves to assist Brig. Powell at Ticonderoga and to reestablish a naval force on Lake George. Carleton recommended strict vigilance and discipline. A translation of the text of Ernst Schroeder's and Wilhelm von Hille's letters follow:


Right Honorable Sir,
Gracious, High and Mighty General,

Your right honorable remembrance of all the officers of this regiment causes me to take the liberty and dare most humbly to address you with these lines. At the same time it also redounds to my honor to report to your honor about the Rebels' attack on Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, where His Highness Prinz Friedrich's Regiment is charged with its occupation; for greater clarity I also enclose a drawing of these places.

It was in the morning of 18 Sept. about one hour before daybreak that the Rebels intended a sudden raid on us; our piquets, however, were awake, sounded the alarm and in less than thirty seconds the entire regiment stood under arms and occupied the line that is marked
with A on the drawing. This line is fairly fortified by nature and in most spots irreplaceable. Near the front of this line is a forest into which we have been making various inroads for some time now and have passed as far as a good musketeer shot [would reach]. The Rebels, that are supposed to be 3,000 men strong on this side, retreated into this forest. On the little river, there lay two cannon boats B; when the Rebels came out of the woods, these could spread [command] the whole ground in front of our line. On the right wing, in the bay C, there lay a frigate with 24 cannon, which was responsible for the ordinary [public?] road; the 3 batteries and 3 newly constructed blockhouses were all provided with cannon. The Rebels, however, had no cannon and tried almost the whole night how they could stage a raid on us. But since we steadfastly stood under arms throughout the night and met them with heavy fire whenever they dared to come out [of the woods], they soon withdrew back into the forest and finally lost courage to try again. Thus they risked no real attack on our side although they had soundly provoked us at their [first] arrival. But just on this morning of 18 Sept. another corps of Rebels [appeared], that, about 5,000 men strong, had come from Fort George; for this fort was no longer occupied by us, but the garrison—after the army had set out to join up with General Howe—had advanced with its cannon, ammunition and baggage around the Rebels to Diamond Island, one German mile from Fort George. The Rebels’ first attack occurred before daybreak and was aimed at the new redoubt on Sugar Loaf Hill or Zuckerhutberg, that commands Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. While taking these places it was the very redoubt at which we aimed when establishing our batteries and through it forced the enemy to withdraw. Said redoubt and the portage where the rapids divide Lake Champlain from Lake George, were occupied by 4 companies of the 53rd Engl. Regiment. These were attacked and captured by the Rebels. In the redoubt, there were fortunately no more than 2 cannon, which the Rebels took as booty together with about 100 shots of ammunition; they later used these to fire at both forts. For also here the corps had not taken along any cannon and when the ammunition was spent [they] had to stop firing. After that they advanced up to the French lines and took possession of all the smaller redoubts except those that lay closest to Ticonderoga; these, however, had not been occupied by us. In these redoubts, the Rebels had found 3 more among the cannon, that had not been trunnioned, together with balls and cartridges. They fired them as long as their powder horns would last onto the fort, which they had challenged before. Yet when all their powder horns were empty, the firing stopped, but only on their part for our cannon did not cease firing day and night. While the Rebels now thought every night of how to take this fort without us being aware of it, we still received a little reinforcement. These were about 150 men, who came to us instead of recruits from the [high] command in Canada. They all came in
batteaux and the Rebels tried to make their landing difficult; but our cannon fired so fiercely at them [the Rebels] that they forgot their intentions and allowed the batteaux to land safely.

Finally the Rebels withdrew with considerable losses in the evening of 24 Sept. Those who had been at Mount Independence went on the way toward Hubbardton and the others on the road via Lake George. Our losses were not considerable. Two men of His Highness Prinz Friedrich's Regiment are dead and Lieutenant Volckmar and 2 men were burned to death by an accidentally exploding powder keg.

While withdrawing, the Rebels took possession of a one mast ship [cutter] on Lake George and went with it and the batteaux that they had also taken away from us to Diamond Island to take our baggage there as booty. They were, however, so [badly] received with cannon fire on 24 Sept. that they had to flee in a hurry and leave the island after not only the big ship mentioned before but also 15 batteaux with men had been stranded; altogether 700 men drowned.

This is what I am able to report to You, Right Honorable Sir, about this attack. Otherwise I humbly recommend myself to the favorable disposition of Your Honor whom I have the honor to respect and esteem greatly until my very end.

Your Most Honorable Sir,
your humble and obedient

Mount Independence
26 Sept. 1777

E.C.Schroeder

In the Camp on Mount Independence, Sept. 23, 1777.

Right Honorable Sir!

You will by now have received my letter from Nov. 9 and 10 of this year. In it I wrote that because of their change of position, we were cut off from the Burgoyne army and expected a Provincial visit. Both came to pass for since that time we know nothing of the army even while holding a 5 day blockade on that side of Mount Independence and on the side of Lake George, 4 Engl. companies of the 53rd Regiment were attacked and destroyed.

Sept. 18 was the day on which [Maj.] General Starck and under him Brigadier Brown at Lake George and there also Brigadier Werner
[Warner] wanted to overtake our very weak and sick garrison from all sides at dawn and take them prisoner. The reveille shot from the frigate *Maria*, that lay at anchor next to the frigate *Carleton*, was the enemy signal agreed-upon. [The ship] was to cover Alarm Battery I, [in charge] from the bank through the dense forest to Hubbardton.

At the portage to Lake George, Brigad. Brown with a corps of provincials succeeded in attacking and capturing 4 Engl. comp. of the 53rd Regiment in the camp, 2) destroying the Canadian work force there 3.) with 15 provincials assailing and taking the so-called Sugar Loaf Battery, that was manned by 1 sgt. and 12 Englishmen. Since the last plan we transmitted, this battery has been newly laid out and so marked; it dominates both Ticonderoga and Mount Independence.

Immediately thereafter, some small arm shots were fired at our picket, which consisted of one non-com. officer and 13 privates and was about 1,000 paces on the road to Hubbardton where a warning post was set. The regiment immediately hurried to its alarm places. Your Honor's comp. had its place in the 1st Battery, mine, the one of v. Tunderfeldt and Dietrichs behind the lines up the 2nd Battery, in which the comp. of Lt. Col. Prtiorius was stationed, and the very, very weak group of the 53rd Regiment to the 3rd Battery.

Coming back, the pickets brought the news that a corps was moving toward the 2nd and 3rd Batteries through the dense forest. We immediately became aware of some skirmishes on the big road. Yet on account of the heavy cannon fire from the batteries and frigates, you could not see anything further ahead.

Meanwhile there was a heavy cannonade onto Fort Ticonderoga from the 12 pound cannon of the Sugar Loaf Battery. Yet as often as the provincials were seen there, they were shot at.

At 9 o'clock in Fort Ticonderoga, Musk. Wilke from Your comp. was fired at; one cannon ball severed both his thighs and he died immediately. At the same time Lieut. Volckmar, who had been ordered to the fort with 40 men from the regt., 1 capt., 2 officers and about 50 convalescing Englishmen, and Musk. Francke from Your comp. and Hartmann from mine were very severely burned by an exploding powder-barrel.

At 11 o'clock, the provincials sent one of their officers with a pole, on which a white rag was hanging, and asked the garrison to surrender and be imprisoned. It was refused. Except for a few skirmishes and cannonades, nothing important happened that night.
We stayed at our alarm places, pitched several tents and half a company was under arms at all times.

Our entire defense consisted of breastworks [made] of trees and stones piled one on top of the other; here and there was an abatis in the woods.

Sept. 19 Having none of their own with them, the Provincials brought 2 cannon they had found into the nearest redoubt of Ticonderoga and cannonaded the fort.

At noon, Brigadier Brown again sent a letter [asking] to exchange the Engl. officers with the Provincials who were here. Refused.

At 4 o'clock, a Provinc. captain of the militia came with a fellow carrying a white rag. who in a letter from Brig. Warner called on the garrison to surrender into captivity. Refused.

Tcday, the generals of the Provincials had observed our position in the woods; the small arms fire was often very heated.

Around 9 o'clock this evening, the enemy seemed to move into the nearby woods and sneak up to the 2nd and 3rd Battery; some individuals were observed [moving] toward the first. Because of the dark night and the fact that we could not hold any advance posts, we, on our part not able to discern anything, staged a general, violent firing of small arms and a cannonade from the batteries and frigates for 2 [15?] minutes. Later we learned that since they had not succeeded in yesterday's surprise attack on this side, the Provinc. were at this time about to undertake a general assault aimed particularly at the line between the 1st and 2nd Battery but were deterred by the vehement shooting. Each fellow had 60 cartridges with him and 40 in reserve. Brig. Powell gave out the order to use the bayonet in a forced assault and in case of dire need, when it might still be possible, to withdraw into the barracks, which were equipped with palisades and several cannon. For the rest of the night nothing noteworthy occurred. Lieut von Wallmoden arrived from Canada with 1 non-com. off. and 7 gren. this afternoon. During the night, all stayed at the alarm places under arms although it was very cold.

Sept. 20 There was little small arms firing [in general] and from Sugar Loaf Battery [in particular]; yet more with the 2 cannon from the redoubt against [Fort] Ticonderoga. These, however, were fiercely answered by the cannon of the redoubt on Mount Independence at Lake Champlain.
Sept. 21  Around noon, a sergeant from the 53rd Regiment, who had been recruited by Scheiter, deserted from the 3rd Battery. Since the Provine. had apparently abandoned the redoubt with the 2 cannon, 10 men from Lieut. Wolgast's detachment at the bridge were sent from Mount Independence in a batteaux to spike the cannon. At the disembarkation, about 50 Provine.coming out of various ditches and holes attacked our men, very severely wounded Musk. Engelke from Capt. v. Tunderfeldt [s company] on his head, shot the hat, saber and sword strap from Musk. Liefert to pieces and slightly wounded his left ear. The former was taken prisoner.

At 4 o'clock, the officers and recuits from the light infantry, the dragoons, Prinz Friedrich and v. Riedesel [regiments] came from Canada. They were immediately distributed in the regiment. Lieut. v. Reitzenstein had to remain in Chambly with all the large baggage. In the evening, Musk. Bodemann from Capt. Dieterich's comp. deserted from the detachment at the left wing of the 3rd Battery. The garrison remained under arms the whole night long and nothing important happened.

Sept. 22  The Prov. seemed to swarm about Ticonderoga; therefore there was much small arms and cannon fire.

Since various movements of the enemy were observed between the 3rd Battery and the redoubt at the boat bridge, our detachment from the regiment was reinforced there to 130 men.

It redounds to the honor of the regiment that it had to occupy the main parts of both wings while the Engl. troops merely held the 3rd Battery. At 10 o'clock at night, the enemy made an attack on Ticonderoga but was greeted with violent firings; there was also vehement fire from the woods against Mount Independence. Because it had been raining continuously for 24 hours, it was a very nasty night.

Sept. 23  On all sides, nothing could be heard or seen of the enemy and later it was learned that the main corps had started to retreat at 5 o'clock in the evening. Since their first surprise assault and the attacks on the 19th and 20th had not turned out too successfully for them and, moreover, they ran short on supply, they only left very weak troops during the night to mask their retreat. Horses and cows on the slopes around Ticonderoga had been abandoned by the enemy; the 2 cannon in the redoubt had been spiked; neither the batteaux at the portage nor the house there had been burned down. Yet the 12 pounder, which they had brought down from the Sugar Loaf Mountain on the 20th, was missing. They also left their sick and wounded at Lake George as well as more than 100 guns; from most of these the locks had been removed.
Patrols could not be sent after them because it was feared that the enemy had staged a masquerade and lay hidden in the dense forest still ready to undertake something. During the night, alternately half the garrison remained under arms.

Sept. 24 About 20 savages arrived via Crown Point. They had immediately to patrol the woods toward Hubbardton. In the afternoon, heavy cannonading was heard in the region of Lake George. We were worried that Brig. Brown had attacked and conquered Diamond Island in Lake George where the small baggage of the Burgoyne army had been stored. To cover it, there were 2 comp. of the 47th Regiment and Ens. Godecke with 90 men and 6 cannon. Tonight we manned the batteries and lines with more sentries.

Sept. 25 The Savages brought the news that nothing of the enemy was to be found up to Hubbardton.

Sept. 26 The Savages patrolled around Lake George and reported from Diamond Island in the evening that the Prov. had attacked it with 2 cannon found on boats on the lake, 13 boats with infantry and the 12 pound cannon, which they had also put on boats. They had, however, been repelled and most had perished.

The enemy's avant garde on Mount Independence was said to have been 500 men strong; about 1 Engl. mile behind, 1,000 men were standing. The Brown corps at Lake George was said to be 12 men strong. It was the same corps that on Aug. 16 was in battle with the dragoons, grenadiers and light infantry. If the enemy had held Fort Ticonderoga or Mount Independence, not only our and one part of the army's baggage but the main key to Canada would have been lost. The most dismal in this situation was that almost all the supplies were on the side of Carillon, which was particularly in danger because 4 Engl. comp. at the portage had allowed themselves to be taken off guard.

On account of the many detachments and sick men, the regiment was very weak so that the comp. at times had no more than some 20 men at the alarm places and that each man had to be positioned at more than double distance from the other. The situation of the supplies was deplorable since we were still given nothing but wheat bread and salted pork. On days of fighting, Brig. Powell let every man have 1/8 quart of rum as a large bonus; fresh meat, vegetables and rice would have been better. As in the region between Hubbardton and Skenesborough 4 newly cleared roads led to Boston, we were not safe against new visits, for this was truly irregular warfare.
Sept. 27 In the evening, a part of Lt. Col. St. Leger's corps arrived via Montreal and disembarked here on the shore of Ticonderoga. This corps had played a very unfortunate role against Gen. Arnold in the regions of Oswego and Niagara.

Sept. 28 In the afternoon, 4 Hanau jäger comp., that had been with Lt. Col. St. Leger, arrived here at the shore of Ticonderoga.

Sept. 30 130 of these men went to camp on Mount Independence to hold an advance post in the woods.

A few days ago, a batteaux arrived from Canada with potatoes for which one had to pay 6 schilling per himten [2/3 bushel] and another with 30 head of lean rams, each of which was sold for 7 piaster (about 8 1/2 talers). You could not get wine at all these days. You could conclude from this how it stood here with foodstuffs in general.

Your honor will be gracious enough and pardon my son that he dared to render this little report above. Heaven may grant us that we will not have to spend the winter in this desert.

On Oct. 1, Musk. Briel of Capt. v. Tunderfeldt's and Musk. Matz and Mus. Hartmann of my camp died. Unfortunately we did not receive any letters this entire year. God alone may know the reason for this.

I recommend my family and myself very obediently to your honor and your honored spouse and with great compliments to all acquaintances and friends I persist with all respect in being.

Your Honor's quite obedient servant

Closed Oct. 1, 1777

v.Hille

These two documents agree with each other in the facts of the activity and in giving praise to the German regiment for its performance of duty. However, differences between the writers are evident in tone and use of content. Unlike Schroeder who uses a direct style, Major von Hille's narrative provides details and some insight into the hardships and suffering experienced by the German garrison. However, he makes no estimates of the enemies' strength. Hille makes some judgments and provides vivid images: on September 18, the condition of his regiment, "our weak and sick garrison"; on September 22, "The Prov. seemed to swarm about Ticonderoga"; and "It redounds to the honor of the regiment that it had to occupy the main parts of both wings
while the Engl. troops merely held the 3rd Battery”; and on September 26, "4 English comp. at the portage had allowed themselves to be taken off guard.”

Schroeder overestimates the Rebel army and puts their strength at 3,000 men on the Mount side and 5,000 from Fort George. He omits the Rebels’ demand for the Mount’s surrender and an exchange of prisoners which von Hille includes. Schroeder does not mention the losses by desertion and does not clarify why the German forces did not pursue the retreating Americans. When his figures are compared to those reported by Lt. Irwine and Col. Brown, it is clear that he, again, overestimates American losses at the battle for Diamond Island. Du Roi only makes a passing comment on the Americans having lost courage in their attempt. Perhaps Hille’s use of exaggeration was his way to make a statement, in this case, underscore the exemplary qualities of the defenders.

**ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE**

The section of land lying between East Creek and Lake Champlain has been under investigation since 1992. East Creek is one of several regions being studied as part of a comprehensive archaeological survey along the east side of the Lake Champlain. The project began in 1987 and is under the direction of the writer. The purpose of the project is to document and interpret the activities surrounding the hired German auxiliaries who engaged the American forces during 1777. The fields below the Mount were examined and sensed for metal in order to obtain data on type, distribution, and density of artifacts. Grape shot and iron fragments were among the artifacts discovered along a circumscribed line varying approximately a quarter of a mile from the base of the Mount. Three maps, cited in this article, are associated in particular with the 1777 occupation: the map accompanying Schroeder’s letter; Stark’s sketch which accompanies his remarks; and an anonymous map.

The distribution of artifacts defines what might have been the boundary of the cleared area and the dense tree line on the section of land between the lake and East Creek along the base of the Mount. It was at this tree line that the accounts of von Hille, Du Roi, and Stark locate a concentration of cannon shot from the Mount and vessels fired in order to discourage an American attack under Col. Johnson. Traces of an early roadway have been discovered along a section of the present property boundary across the land approach from East Creek to the Mount. It may be a road used by General Riedesel’s troops on July 3 under the leadership by Captain Heinrich Gerlach and one hundred men as they sought a strategy of envelopment of the Americans in their rear.
"PLAN of Carillon or Ticonderoga which Was quitted by the Americans in the night from the 5th to the 6th of July 1777." Courtesy of the National Archives of Canada.39

The large burned area containing several stones, charcoal, brick and a scatter of eighteenth and nineteenth century habitation artifacts was uncovered during a town road project to widen a drainage ditch on the east side of the road leading from the Mount. The excavation was in the general vicinity where the German picket is believed to have been and on the site of a nineteenth-century structure, identified as “J. Buttolph” on an 1871 map of Orwell.40

THE BRITISH-GERMAN WITHDRAWAL TO CANADA

Upon learning of the surrender of General Burgoyne, Gen. and Gov. Guy Carleton ordered the abandonment of posts south of the province.41 However, Lieutenant Du Roi indicates that Powell gave a directive after holding a council of war. At this meeting the British decided to destroy everything that could be used by the Rebels, including the posts at Fort George, the French lines, Diamond Island, the portage at Lake George, the bridge and mills at Ticonderoga, the cannon, the floating bridge across Lake Champlain that connected the two forts, and the forts themselves.42 The small British-German garrison occupying Ticonderoga and Mount Independence began the process of removing resources, spiking cannon, and destroying the standing structures
of the forts. Ensign von Hille recounts in his journal the tragic and perilous wintry journey back to Canada. He describes the sufferings experienced by the battalion, including the deaths caused by drownings and freezing, before their arrival in winter quarters on November 26. Du Roi The Elder, likewise, includes a similar description of the difficult journey across Lake Champlain into Canada.

An infrequently cited American letter, addressed to General Gates from Thomas Chittenden, President of the Vermont Council, presents another version of the withdrawal to Canada. Chittenden claims that some of Herrick's rangers harassed the rear of the garrison as they withdrew to Canada and imposed substantial losses to men and supplies.

BENNINGTON, 22 Nov. 1777.

Dear General: I have the pleasure to inform your honor of the success of our Green Mountain rangers, in harassing the enemy's rear on their retreat from Ticonderoga, in which Capt. Ebenezer Allen, with fifty rangers, has taken forty-nine prisoners, upwards of one hundred horses, twelve yokes of oxen, four cows and three of the enemy's boats, &c., &c.

Major Wait, who was sent to take possession of Mount Independence, found nothing of consequence, excepting several boats which the enemy had sunk, in which there were some provisions. All barracks, houses and bridges were burnt, cannon to the number of fifty broken and spiked up. He was fortunate as to take one French sutler, with rum, wine, brandy, &c. ...

I have the honor to be, by order of the council, your honor's most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS CHITTENDEN, President

Hon. Major General Gates.

RECOGNITION OF THE GERMAN AUXILIARIES

Unlike American and British soldiers serving during the war, the German auxiliaries were hired by Britain to supplement their army. The German princes with whom contracts had been made were paid according to the status of the men who were serving the British cause. The detailed accounts of injury, death, and desertion included in the letters written by the officers of the German auxiliaries provided a record for financial accounting for the British.
The outcome of the attack shows that the Prinz Friedrich Regiment fulfilled its responsibility of maintaining the northern outposts at Ticonderoga and Diamond Island. Their skillful defense denied the Americans a complete victory. Their successful efforts resulted in the Americans deciding to withdraw and attack Diamond Island. The combined effort of men from the Prinz Friedrich regiment and the British 47th Regiment successfully repelled the Americans in their effort to take the island.

The expedition by the Americans to challenge and perhaps recapture the forts at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence was a well-conceived strategy, particularly when the Rebels were in need of support among the colonists. The Americans were able to claim some elements of success from their attack, namely freeing approximately one hundred American prisoners held at Ticonderoga and inflicting damage on supplies and vessels, thus further threatening the already weak communication and supply route to Burgoyne.

While the Braunschweig officers and common soldier were subject to both subtle and outright criticisms by some of the British, the engagements at Mount Independence, Ticonderoga and Diamond Island forced the Americans to gain a respect for Britain’s hired army. The German auxiliaries are recognized for their strict discipline, precision, and the accountability of the clerks. However, it was good training and “esprit” that contributed to the caliber of officer and common soldier and to their success for the British cause.

NOTES

1 Major General Arthur St. Clair (1734-1818) was placed in command of the American forces at Ticonderoga during Burgoyne’s 1777 campaign and was subject to court martial proceedings following the retreat. John Burgoyne (1739-1815) was second in command to Sir Guy Carleton in 1776 and given command of the 1777 campaign into New York, only to surrender later to General Gates, American commander at Stillwater, on 17 October 1777. James Baxter, The British Invasion from the North: The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada 1776-1777 with the Journal of Lieutenant William Digby of the 53rd or Shropshire Regiment of Foot (Albany: Munsell, 1887), 114-116, 219. Braunschweig, a duchy under the ruler Duke Carl I, is located in north central Germany. The Germans from Braunschweig were referred to as Brunsickers (in English). Approximately 2,400 troops were first sent with an eventual total of 4,000 troops arriving in Canada in six regiments for the American service.


4 Thomas Hughes was one of four brothers. His father, William, was a major in the 53rd Regiment. Thomas enlisted in the 53rd at the age of fifteen. He later purchased the rank of ensign. The regiment was sent to Canada in April 1776. He describes the escalating events on July 5. Edward Benians, ed. A Journal of Thos: Hughes. For His Amusement, & Designed only for his perusal by the time he attains the Age of 50 if he lives so long (Cambridge: University Press, 1947), vii, 9.

5 Letter of Thomas Aubrey, Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, 1930, 2, no. 1:22-23. Thomas was a member of Fraser’s advanced corps. Simon Fraser was a Brig. Gen. and Friedrich von Riedesel was the German commander of the Braunschweig troops. James Baxter, ed. The British Invasion from the North: The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada

6 Peter Nelson, "The Battle of Diamond Island," Proceedings of the New York Historical Association (New York History) (N.Y.: 1922) 20:45-53. He states that the island was guarded by two companies of the 47th under Captain Aubrey, three companies of Germans, and some artillery. Burgoyne had hoped to unite at Albany with General Howe, who was situated to the south at New York, and St. Leger's force from the west coming from Oswego and through the Mohawk Valley. St. Leger's action was intended to separate New England from the colonies to the south. At Stillwater, along the Hudson River and north of Albany, the American army under General Gates would later meet Burgoyne, engage in two major encounters, September 19 and October 7. This would result in the British-German army surrendering on October 17, 1777.


9 Ens. Julius Friedrich von Hille accompanied his father, Maj. Friedrich Wilhelm von Hille, of the same regiment to America in 1776, when he was thirteen years old. Julius became an ensign in 1775. The von Hilles were two of the seven Braunschweig officers on the ship Providence. Julius is believed to be the writer of the journal about the experiences of the Prinz Friedrich Regiment and garrison life. Julius Friedrich von Hille, The American Revolution, Garrison Life in French Canada and New York: Journal of an Officer of the Prinz Friedrich Regiment, 1776-1783 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), xxii-xxxiv, 74-78.


16 John Stark, "John Brown's Attack, September 18, 1777: Remarks on Affairs at the Portage Between Ticonderoga and Lake George and at Mount Independence in September 1777," Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, 1927, 1, no. 1:19-21. His letter is reprinted 1964, 11, no. 4:207-210 with his map to accompany the manuscript. John Starke was a British naval officer with the rank of lieutenant. He was stationed at the portage between Lake George and Ticonderoga and also served on Lake Champlain at the battle of Valcour Island.


19 Nelson, Proceedings, 49.

20 Ibid., 50.

21 Willard Wallace, "The British Occupation of Fort Ticonderoga, 1777," Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, 1951, 8, no.7:302-320. James Inglis Hamilton (7-1814) was a brigadier general and led the 2nd Brigade of the British right wing army composed of the 21st, 62nd, and 20th regiments. He took the initial command of Ticonderoga upon the retreat of the rebels on July 6. (Baxter, Digby Journal, 196-198). William Phillips (1731-1781) was an artilleryman, held the rank of major general and was Burgoyne's second in command (Baxter, Ibid., 174-175).

23 The map, which accompanies Stark’s manuscript, appears in the Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, 1964, 11, no.4:206. The map was presented to the Fort Ticonderoga Museum by the Library of Boston University.

24 Nelson, Proceedings, 46


26 Epping, Du Roi the Elder, 102; also Hille, Journal, xxvi n32. Du Roi overestimates the number of Rebels and he omits Johnson’s name. John Brown and Benjamin Ruggles Woodbridge were colonels in the Massachusetts militia. Benjamin Lincoln was an American general who directed the attack on Ticonderoga. Thomas Johnson was a colonel in the Vermont militia who led the attack on Mount Independence.

27 Hille, Journal, 78-82.


29 The von Hille letter, begun September 23 and closed on October 1, was translated by Helga Doblin and appears in the book The American Revolution, Garrison Life in French Canada and New York: Journal of an Officer in the Prinz Friedrich Regiment, 1776-1783 on 90-94. The book is edited and with an introduction by Mary C. Lynn. The original manuscript is also among those recorded on microfilm, as the Schroeder letter. Mrs. Doblin translated the journal from a microfilm copy at the Saratoga National Historical Park. The original document is identified as Generalsstaab I, xxxiv 853 He, A.R. 15A. Pak 337. Preuss, Geh. Staatsaarchiv, Berlin Heeresarchiv v. Rep. 15A. Kap xxxiv. Nr. 853 Letter 145. The translation is replicated from the Journal with permission of Helga Doblin, translator. Major General Eckhard Heinrich von Stammer was commander of the Prinz Friedrich Regiment. He did not accompany his regiment to America. Stammer died in 1777. (Hille, Journal, 99 n39 and 125 n24)

30 Burgoyne does not mention Brown or the Germans in his letter; in his Journal on p.81, von Hille states that in addition to the 2 British companies, there were German troops which included Ensign Godeke, 90 men, and 3 cannon.

31 Nelson, “Diamond Island,” Proceedings, 50; In his Journal, on p. 81, von Hille states that Indian reports were used. They indicated that the rebels attacked with 2 cannon boats, 13 small boats and the 12 pound cannon from Sugar Bush Hill. Hille reports in his Journal and Major von Hille in his letter (p. 93) that “most” of the rebels were lost. Schroeder’s report says 700 of the rebels were lost and one of Brown’s legs was shot off. See also von Hille’s Journal, p. 102 n62, which points out that the Americans did capture Skanesborough and Ft. George, thus isolating Burgoyne from Ticonderoga and Canada. Epping,(Journal Du Roi, 103) makes only a brief comment of the unsuccessful American attack. The duration of the attack and losses incurred vary somewhat from the British and American perspectives (Pell, “Dash for Ticonderoga,” Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, 39-40). Also see Scott Padeni, “John Brown’s Attack on Diamond Island, Lake George,” The Lake George Nautical Newsletter, 1994, 3, no.2:5,8.

32 Sir Guy Carleton, “Instructions to Captain Samuel Greaves appointed to command All His Majesty’s Vessels upon lakes Champlain and George,” Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, 1945, 7, no.1:36

33 The Map “Plan of Fort Carillon or Ticonderoga with Mount Independent” [sic] appears with Lt. Schroeder’s letter. Under the scale appears “drawn July 1777 von C.F. Weisener, Lieut.” Christian Friedrich Weisener was born 1741. He served in the Prinz Friedrich Regiment and resigned in 1783. (Hille, Journal, 58 n18). The map is catalogued as Heeresarchiv V. Rep. 15A Kap, XXXIV, 139. The original map and journal of an officer in the Prinz Friedrich Regiment were among documents photographed in Berlin in 1929 as a project undertaken by the Library of Congress. A microfilm copy is to be found on reel #106 at the Saratoga National Historical Park, Stillwater, New York.

34 This is an exaggerated number. It was actually 1,000 men, according to American figures. See the letter cited in Pell, Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, 33, and in Nelson, Proceedings, 43.

35 Hille, Journal, 79. Ensign von Hille includes in his journal that on two occasions the rebels approached Brigadier Powell, once on September 18 with a demand for an unconditional
surrender, and again on September 19, Major General von Hille includes these demands but also records a request made by Brown at noon on September 19 for an exchange of English officers with the Provincial. This was also refused.

36 The American estimate reported by Brown was two killed, two mortally wounded and several wounded and the British perception was a few killed and many wounded. Nelson, Proceedings, 48, 50; De Roi gives no estimate of the losses. Epping, Du Roi the Elder. 103.


38 The distinct band of low density iron artifacts that could have been fired by cannons on the Mount was found closely approximating the current property line to the south and east of the Mount. Documents note the excessive cannon fire from the Mount. While density may have been affected by looting over the years, low density might suggest posturing by sound to convey alertness and the resolute state of the German defenders. Perhaps unknown to the rebels, the Germans may have been conserving valuable shot. By July 3 the Germans troops under the command of Capt. Heinrich Gierlach had crossed East Creek and had begun to reconnoitre the peninsula of land behind Mount Independence. Friedrich von Riedesel, Memoirs, and Letters and Journals of Major General Riedesel During His Residence in America, I, Max von Eelking, ed., William Stone, tr. (Albany: J. Munsell, 1868), 112.

39 Anonymous map of the "Plan of Carillon or Ticonderoga which Was quitte by the Americans in the night from the 5th to the 6th of July 1777." Ph/1250/Ticonderoga/1777. From a copy at the National Archives of Canada. The original is held at the Archives du Génie (Vincennes), France, Article 15.Ph/1250/Ticonderoga/1777.

40 The map accompanying the Schroeder letter identifies "t" as the location of the picket of 32 classeurs on a breast work of wood. Ensign von Hille's journal describes the picket as the warning post, located about 1,000 paces on the road to Hubbardton. It was manned by a sergeant and 13 men. Major von Hille refers to the picket in his letter as involving a non-commissioned officer and 13 privates. Ensign von Hille, in his Journal, makes reference to a picket in the forest on the road to Hubbardton on August 14, 1777 (p. 77). A nineteenth-century map shows a structure in the vicinity of the picket. Frederick W. Beers. Orwell, Atlas of Addison County, Vermont, (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle, 1871, 1971).

41 Hiland Hall, The History of Vermont (Albany: Munsell, 1868), 266.


43 Hille, Journal, 87-89.

44 Hall, History of Vermont, 266.

45 Simon Fraser comments in his journal that the Germans "are a helpless kind of troops in the woods." Simon Fraser, "Gen. Fraser's Account of Burgoyne's Campaign on Lake Champlain and the Battle of Hubbardton," Essays in the Early History of Vermont (Montpelier: Vermont Historical Society, 1943), 6:142.