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The French and the Abenaki: A Study in Frontier Politics

*For the Abenaki, the French
connection meant making the
best of a bad predicament.*

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The phrase "French and Indians" has a special significance in the annals of North American frontier warfare, invoking as it does the image of "cultivated" Europeans in league with "wild" Amerindians to conquer colonial rivals by means of frontier wars that had more in common with the "savage" practices of the New World than they had with the "civilized" customs of the Old.¹ A widely accepted myth, particularly by American historians, is of the French and Amerindians having an almost familial relationship with each other, regarding each other as brothers-in-arms while glorying in their military prowess by spreading devastation along the frontier. That this is a simplified picture, to say the least, should not surprise students of historical mythologies. Since this belief arose largely because of the French alliance with the Abenaki — who, "of all the savages of New France, [are] those who have rendered, and who are in a condition to render, the greatest service"² — this article will examine that relationship to see how it evolved in the context of colonial rivalries and to determine its nature as well as its role in North American colonial history.

One of the first of the Atlantic Coast peoples known as "those living at the sunrise" or perhaps "dawnland people" (among other variations) to come into continuous contact with Europeans, in this case the French, were the Eastern Abenaki.³ The term "Abenaki," as used here, includes a range of Algonkian-speaking peoples, from the hunting and gathering Maliseet of the St. John River on the northeast to the farming Sokoki of the Connecticut River on the southwest, but principally those clustering in what is now western Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, and the peoples living in the Presumpscot, Androscoggin, Kennebec, and

Penobscot drainages.⁴ Those living on the Merrimack and Connecticut rivers and in the interior are the Western Abenaki (Pennacook, Sokoki, Missisquoi, and Cowasuck, among others), although the division from Eastern Abenaki is not always clearly defined.⁵

An early account of the land of the Eastern Abenaki is that of the English divine, Samuel Purchas (1577?-1626), whose "The Description of the Country of Mawooshen" was published in 1613.⁶ "Mawooshen," extending from Mount Desert Island in the east to the upper reaches of the Saco River in the west, may derive from the Penobscot "Maweshenook," berry place or "Moshokuquen," on or near the coast. A variant was "Moasham."⁷ According to John R. Swanton, "Moassones" was also an Abenaki name for their land. "Norumbega," apparently derived from "ornbega," which identifies the lower Penobscot on the 1529 map by Girolamo da Verrazzano (brother of Giovanni), was to become a better-known name for the region.

Purchas's description has led to the conclusion that Mawooshen counted ten thousand to fourteen thousand souls living in semi-permanent villages under Bashabes (d. 1615). Bashabes appears to have been the paramount chief among twenty-three sagamores whose villages were strung along eleven rivers.⁸ Most of the known Abenaki villages, Eastern as well as Western, were in areas where the growing season was 140 days or more. Although some authorities today would not place the population of Mawooshen above ten thousand, others believe Purchas's estimate to be conservative, as his account itself suggests.⁹ Even at that early date, introduced diseases were taking their toll: already villages had been wiped out, and others drastically reduced in population. Also the influx of new trade goods (especially iron tools and weapons) inflamed long-standing rivalries; the first decades of the seventeenth century saw the Abenaki, Micmac, and Maliseet all fighting each other. Marc Lescarbot (c.1570-1642) attributed the 1607 victory of the Micmac over the Abenaki at Chouacoet, at the mouth of the Saco River, to the fact that the French had armed the former with metal points for spears and arrows, but above all with swords and cutlasses, and even with muskets. He wrote that the cutlasses and swords were devastatingly effective, with the muskets providing the coup de grace. This points to the fact that the French had not yet begun to use missionaries as an official arm of colonization (that would not develop until the second decade of the seventeenth century) and so were not as scrupulous about enforcing the European ban against supplying arms to non-Christians as they would be later with the Huron.¹⁰ At this time their interest in the New World was predominantly commercial.

The French at first shared the Micmac antipathy for the Abenaki of the lower Saco River drainage, whom they labeled "Armouchiquois."¹¹ Some French writers carried this to the point of describing the

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Armouchiquois, a farming people who differed from their northern relatives in their hair and clothing styles,¹² as deformed, with small heads, short bodies, and bony limbs, whose knees, when they squatted on their heels, passed their heads by more than half a foot.¹³ Samuel de Champlain (c.1570-1635), who actually visited them, reported that they had well-proportioned bodies and even found them to be of "good disposition," although inveterate thieves who could not be trusted.¹⁴ More usually, accounts were not even that accommodating, and the Armouchiquois were reported to be "devious and treacherous, always scheming under the guise of friendliness; they must be handled by means of fear and severity." The French even suspected them of cannibalism.¹⁵ These impressions could have been the result of the influence of the unfriendly Micmac (or Maliseet) who were guiding the French.¹⁶ Similar sentiments were later applied to the ill-defined "Loups," also enemies of the Micmac/Maliseet, until they were drawn into the French camp. From this inauspicious beginning developed what was to become one of the most effective and long-lasting alliances in North American colonial history.

The Maliseet, along with their neighbors the Micmac, entered into active relations with the French well before the main body of the Abenaki, a situation that was at least partly dictated by geography. The proximity of the fisheries (a term that included seal and walrus hunting as well as whaling), and a location far enough north to allow for the fur trade were the pertinent factors. The St. John River, called Ougoudi by the Maliseet (who shared it with the Micmac) and named Saint-Jean by the French, had a fortified village at its mouth, on the west side of St. John's harbor. This was the domain of the Maliseet sagamore Chkoudun (Secoudon, Schoudon, d. before 1616), "a man of great influence" who befriended the French and acted as a guide for Champlain during his explorations of the region.¹⁷ Although he had met Etchemins (which included Maliseet/Passamaquoddy, among other Abenaki groups) at Tadoussac in 1603, Champlain made the earliest reference to the "Obenaquiuoit" when he told of a Montagnais envoy coming to Quebec in 1629 on behalf of these farming people to the south who were anxious for an alliance with the French against the Iroquois. Champlain was immediately interested, not so much at that point to take up the fight against the Iroquois (with whom, in any event, he was already on hostile terms as a consequence of his trading ties with the Montagnais, Algonquins, and Hurons), but because these unknown people were farmers and could possibly help provision his fledgling colony, which was not yet capable of feeding itself. Although not in a position to assist against the Iroquois immediately, he promised to do so as soon as possible, perhaps even during that same year; in the meantime, he proposed a mutual assistance program involving food supplies and trade goods.¹⁸

Champlain's initiative quickly fell apart after his death in 1635, for commercial reasons, as Jesuit Paul Le Jeune (1591-1664) reported:

As our savages occasionally go to the land of the Abenquois, those also wish to come and visit them at kebec and further up. But it is not for the good of Messieurs the Associates; for those barbarians come to carry off the Beavers of these countries to take them elsewhere. Hence, Monsieur the Governor, in view of this disorder, summoned the Captain of the Montagnais and the Abenquois to notify them that he was displeased that these peddlers should come trafficking in the footsteps of the French—even threatening the Montagnez that he would prohibit the store from selling them any provisions until the Abenquois should go away.¹⁹

The Montagnais assured the French of their wish that the Abenaki return to their own country. Amerindian entrepreneurship had annoyed the French from early in their trading relationship: for instance, they had not been at all pleased to encounter their good friend Chkoudun in the Penobscot area, actively engaged in trading goods he had obtained from the French. Because of such enterprise, Abenaki had been warned in 1646 to restrict their visits to New France. When a group of thirty came to Quebec in 1649, they were notified that “they were not to come again, and that their goods will be plundered if they return.”²⁰ Apparently the missionaries did not share these sentiments, and the well-known Jesuit Gabriel Druillettes (1610-1681) enjoyed considerable success in evangelizing the Eastern Abenaki during the 1640s and 1650s; in 1646 he established a mission on the Kennebec River at the request of its people.²¹

Although the French did not meet Western Abenaki until 1642, when their Algonquin allies brought a Sokoki prisoner to Trois-Rivières under the impression he was an Iroquois,²² they moved much faster to consolidate this new relationship than they had done previously with the Eastern Abenaki. In 1651 Druillettes was able to bring together various groups, including the Mahican (not usually included with the Abenaki but related), to form a solid front against their traditional enemies the Iroquois, especially as the latter were trading with the English and were consequently in alliance with them. The Iroquois responded by intensifying their attacks.²³ The French seem to have been spurred in their initiative by the fall of Huronia, an event that had taught them a bitter lesson: to arm their allies, even if not Christianized, if they expected them to withstand their common enemies, the Iroquois and the English. The French appear to have assumed, because of the remoteness of the Huron in the interior, that they could maintain them as allies and trading partners even while refusing to provide them with arms as long as they were not converted, in accordance with the Christian European ban against trading arms with the infidel. This policy, a consequence of Europe's centuries-old conflict with Islam, was most rigorously implemented in the New World by Spain. The French were more pragmatic; for instance,

they did not invoke the ban against the Abenaki, their only Amerindian allies who were fighting both English and Iroquois.²⁴ The Abenaki, on an exposed frontier vital to French interests, were never deprived of guns as the distant Huron had been.²⁵

The English taking of Acadia in 1654 and the growing intensity of the French-Iroquois War severely restricted communication between French and Abenaki. It was not until France's repossession of Acadia in 1670 that the French-Abenaki alliance that would become famous in colonial military history fully developed. The strategic importance of the position of the Abenaki between French and English and Iroquois was becoming only too evident as colonial rivalries escalated. Jean Talon (1626-1694), who as intendant of New France, 1665-68 and 1670-72, was one of the colony's most capable administrators, moved quickly to put the alliance on a firm footing.²⁶

On the other side of the picture, the French were looking increasingly attractive to the Abenaki as English settlement pressures from the south intensified, in effect pushing many of them into the French orbit. The alliance with the Eastern Abenaki was further consolidated during the 1670s when French officer Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin (1652-1707) married Pidianske (or Pidiwamiska), the daughter of the Penobscot sagamore Madockawando;²⁷ in 1684 the union was sanctified according to the Catholic rite. This had the effect of winding down the traditional hostility between Eastern Abenaki and the Micmac, as both were now allies of the French. The new situation did not produce unanimity within the Abenaki communities, however, and splits developed between pro-French and pro-English factions, leading to a new set of internal tensions that would increase with the quickening tempo of frontier warfare.

The exodus of the Western Abenaki to Canada began as a trickle about this time.²⁸ It swelled into a major movement as a consequence of King Philip's War, 1675-76, "that cataclysm in New England history"²⁹ that destroyed the Amerindian presence in southern New England (the war was fought principally in Massachusetts and Connecticut) and helped to ignite the Maine War between the English and the Abenaki, despite the efforts of the latter to prevent it. Penobscot historian Frank T. Siebert has pointed out that this war, 1675-76, although coincidental in time with King Philip's War, was actually a separate event. The Abenaki fought for their own reasons and not in alliance with King Philip.³⁰ William Hubbard (c.1621-1704) reflected contemporary colonial opinion when he wrote "there was a Design of a general rising of the Indians against the English, all over the Country"; however, Samuel G. Drake (1798-1875) in his later reassessment of the evidence did not agree.³¹ Although opinions still differ, today there is growing support for Drake and Siebert's conclusions.³² The Abenaki were in a difficult position: faced with

English intransigence, particularly in regard to settler encroachments upon their lands and the steady attrition of their subsistence base, they were forced to take sides. When the French-English colonial wars were added in 1689 to the ongoing English-Amerindian wars, it was the Abenaki who, with the French, laid waste New England's northern frontier. However, according to Thomas Charland, when the Iroquois began to intensify their attacks on the Abenaki, not all of the latter were pro-French; indeed, one group, considering itself allied with the English, turned to them for help. But the English proved reluctant, and so this opportunity for splitting the Abenaki was lost.³³ If that actually happened, the Abenaki had been at the very least misinformed, as the English were already in league with the Iroquois.

After the Maine War mention appears in the record of Abenaki and Loup presence on Lake Champlain; in French sources this begins in 1680 when Louis de Buade, Comte de Frontenac et de Palluau (1622-1698), governor-general of New France 1672-1682 and 1689-1698, reported a clash between Mohawk and Sokoki in the region.³⁴ By 1682 the French had a mission on the lake.³⁵ This was not a movement into uninhabited lands, as some historians have maintained, although the region was a border area where hostilities had been active for some time; however, it is clear from the archaeological record that Amerindian presence was far from recent. When Champlain visited the region in 1609, he had found fields "rich in corn such as I have eaten in that country, along with other products in abundance."³⁶ The Sokoki were only one of several Abenaki bands in the area (the Sokoki appear to have been on the south shore of the St. Lawrence in the vicinity of St. François River at least since mid-seventeenth century, and perhaps much earlier).³⁷ They were preceded by Pennacooks filtering into Vermont and New Hampshire from the lower Merrimack River, in some cases resettling abandoned villages, such as Coos on the upper Connecticut.³⁸ Some groups scattered as far westward as Chambly, southeast of Montreal, where their settlement on the Richelieu River, an historic invasion route, helped secure New France against both Iroquois and English. Eastern as well as Western Abenaki also took refuge in the eastern reaches of the St. Lawrence Valley in what had once been their hunting territory. The White Mountains were another favored refuge, as the region allowed the Abenaki the freedom to harass their enemies from all directions because of its access to such rivers as the Connecticut, Saco, Merrimac, and Androscoggin, as well as a series of minor streams. It was also within easy reach of the Hudson and the St. Lawrence rivers as well as Lake Champlain.³⁹ The flow of refugees continued in waves until the final defeat of New France in 1760, with especially heavy influxes in 1722-1724 (English-Indian War) and 1744-1745 (King George's War).

As Sillery, next to Quebec, began to fill up, the Jesuits established a new mission-refuge in 1683, Saint-François-de-Sales on the Chaudière River (as distinct from Saint-François mission on the St. François River). The site was on an ancient north-south trading route still in use. Capitalizing on this, Jesuits Jacques Bigot (1651-1711) and his brother Vincent (1649-1720), both missionaries, were so successful in recruiting Abenaki that by 1689 the village counted six hundred inhabitants.⁴⁰ Sometime before 1700, the mission at Saint-François-de-Sales was transferred to join the mission of St. François on the St. François River; the river was also an ancient trade route that had the added advantage of leading to favorite hunting grounds. Odanak, the Amerindian village at St. François, mushroomed; in 1706, for example, Atecouando (fl. 1701-1726), principal chief of the Pigwackets,⁴¹ led his entire village there. By the first decades of the eighteenth century, it was the largest Abenaki settlement in New France, numbering an estimated 1,300 in 1711.⁴² The French would have liked to unite all the Abenaki at Odanak, which would have made it easier for them to control their not-always-complaisant allies; but the Abenaki were not amenable. Even so, by 1690, Jacques-René de Brisay, Marquis de Denonville, governor-general of New France 1685-1689, reporting to Versailles, attributed French military successes on the New England frontier to the recruiting campaign of the Bigot brothers. The village would become a major source for Abenaki warriors for the border raids of the 1740s and 1750s.⁴³

As has already been noted in the case of Chambly, not only humanitarian or missionary considerations led the French to welcome the refugees; by encouraging the new arrivals to settle in villages situated to act as buffers against invading Iroquois and English, they strengthened the defenses of New France.⁴⁴ An inadvertent side-effect of this policy was to facilitate the growing contraband fur trade between New France and the English colonies in which both the Abenaki and the Iroquois of Kanawaké (Caughnawaga) were active participants.⁴⁵ By this time, however, officialdom was more immediately concerned with the exigencies of war. Thus the goals of church and state now coincided, and the old objections that the Abenakis competed with the French in the fur trade and even deflected furs to the English were no longer seen as important. Instead, Versailles urged the colony to make every effort by whatever means necessary to lure the Abenaki away from the English and to encourage raids against the latter.⁴⁶

The success of the missionaries in developing Amerindian alliances illustrates how effectively the French enlisted the religious sentiments of the Amerindians in their cause. Jesuit Joseph Aubery (1673-1756) wrote: "Religion has up till now been the only motive that has made the Abenaki French, and as soon as there are no more missionaries they will

become English and will be capable by themselves of putting the English in possession of the whole country at the first war." Among other missionaries who voiced this sentiment was Pierre-Antoine-Simon Maillard (c.1710-1762), "Apostle to the Micmacs," who observed that "religion is the only thing capable of making them [Amerindians] tractable and docile." Charlevoix concurred, even as he remarked that this flew in the face of the general belief that Amerindians were incapable of fully converting to Christianity.⁴⁷ High officials, such as Joseph de Monbeton de Brouillan *dit* Saint-Ovide, governor of Ile Royale, 1718-1737, shared this conviction.⁴⁸

More than missionary enterprise was needed, however, to ensure Amerindian support: as the French were keenly aware, it also meant not disturbing their allies on their lands. In 1665 Louis XIV (1638-1715) had instructed Daniel Rémy de Courcelle (1626-1698), governor-general of New France, 1665-1672, "not to usurp the lands on which they [Amerindians] habitually reside on the pretext they would be improved by the French."⁴⁹ In the colonies and especially in the case of the Abenaki, maintenance of their alliance meant that the French had "to admit or pretend to admit their right to the country they occupy."⁵⁰ That this was not extended to recognition of Amerindian sovereignty internationally would become clear in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) when the French ceded Acadia to the English without defining its borders and without mentioning its aboriginal inhabitants.

In the meantime, some of the practical exigencies of maintaining alliances aroused concern. Particularly contentious was the extent to which the French should adapt to Amerindian ways of doing things. According to an eighteenth-century observer, "what has, at least, an equal share in attaching the savages to our party, is the connivance, or rather the encouragement the French government has given to the natives of New France, to fall into the savage way of life, to spread themselves through the savage nations, where they adopt their manners, range the woods with them, and become as keen hunters as themselves."⁵¹ Such adaptability caused concern in some circles about losing sight of *la mission civilisatrice*, particularly during the early days of the colony when intermarriage between French and Amerindian was frequent.⁵²

The French were successful enough in luring Amerindians to their side that the English began a counter campaign. They had two effective weapons in their diplomatic armory: the promise of better deals in trade than the French could provide, and, of more importance, the fact that the French had ceded Amerindian lands in the Treaty of Utrecht without consulting or even informing their native allies. Spreading the word about the treaty's terms as much as they could, the English invited Abenaki who had migrated to New France to return to their ancestral lands. For

example, in 1713, at a conference with delegates from the Penobscot and Kennebec rivers, the English told the gathering, "We expect you will draw your remaining Indians from Canada into their own places upon English grounds, where they will be dealt with fairly."⁵³ Such appeals fell upon receptive ears, as the Abenaki shared with the Micmac a stunned disbelief of the actions of their French allies. In words that would become all too familiar in later confrontations, the Amerindians asked, "by what right did the French give away a country that did not belong to them" and which the Amerindians had no intentions of quitting?⁵⁴ The English thus were able to persuade some refugees to return, particularly those who hoped that accommodation was possible, or at least worth a try. Among these were the Eastern Abenaki chiefs Mog (c.1663-1724) of Norridgewock and Atecouando; their efforts led to the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1713 and the beginnings of the counter-migratory movement from Canada. Atecouando set an example, bringing his people back to Pigwacket a decade after they had left for the St. François River.

French colonial officials, for their part, regretted the Treaty of Utrecht; in the words of Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil (c.1643-1725), governor-general of New France, 1703-1725, "war with England was more favorable to us than the peace."⁵⁵ They tried to recoup lost ground by arguing that the English in New England were "encroaching on their [Abenaki] territory and establishing themselves contrary to the Law of Nations, in a country of which the said Indians have been from all time in possession."⁵⁶ As for their own presence in Amerindian territories, the French pointed to their alliances to claim that they were there with the permission of the natives. This was an argument they had once used against Portuguese claims in Brazil. With this type of encouragement, chiefs such as Wowurna (fl. 1670-1738) of Norridgewock rejected the British claim to sovereignty over his people; others who had gone to Canada reacted by returning to their ancestral homes and reasserting their sovereignty, even in the midst of growing English settlement. This was at least partly what the British were working for, although they never accepted Amerindian claims to sovereignty, as they considered the Abenaki to be subjects. It was certainly not what the French were aiming at: they would have preferred to keep the Abenaki as a fighting force within their colony, where they would have been easier to control.

The French, with strategic reasons in mind, and also concerned with countering English maneuvers, tried to attract Micmac and Eastern Abenaki to settle at Ile Royale (Cape Breton). They had no success, however, despite the efforts of the younger Saint-Castin, Bernard-Anselme (1689-1720), the half-Abenaki son of Jean-Vincent. Quite apart from the fact that the Amerindians did not consider the island good hunting territory, the Abenaki took strong exception to the proposal that they

be dislocated for the political expediency of their allies.⁵⁷ In another instance, the French sought to play on the Abenaki's desire for vengeance to get them to settle on the Nicholas River, in Canada but within easy striking distance of the English. The answer was a firm rejection, on the grounds that the Abenaki had already been hit hard by the English, and that if vengeance were to be sought, it would be from their traditional villages.⁵⁸

From all this it is evident that although the French did their best to transform the Abenaki into agents for their imperial interests, the Amerindians were far from being mere pawns in their hands. When the English accused Sauguaaram (also known as Loron or Loron Arexus, fl. 1724-51), a Penobscot chief, of taking up the hatchet at the instigation of the French, he replied, "We are a free people." And indeed, Sauguaaram's record was one of persistent attempts to balance the interests of his own people against those of both English and French.⁵⁹

The French also intensified their efforts to neutralize English commercial superiority. Their most effective means for achieving this was by carefully observing the annual distribution of "gifts" (food, merchandise of all sorts, as well as guns, ammunition, and other weaponry) by which their alliances were maintained; according to Vaudreuil, "we treat our Indians as Allies, and not as subjects."⁶⁰ In 1725 they budgeted 4,000 livres for this purpose, and the figure grew steadily each year until the final defeat of France in North America. The village of Nashwaak (Naxouat, Natchouak, originally Micmac but at this epoch Maliseet) at the confluence of the Nashwaak and St. John rivers, where the French built Fort Saint-Joseph (c. 1692), became a principal center for these occasions. After the final fall of Acadia to the English in 1710, distributions took place at such nearby locations as Port-la-Joie (Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island) to ensure that those allies now under English domination could come for their share. These events, essentially Amerindian in their ritual character, were often combined with awards of titles and medals by which the French enlisted the Amerindian penchant for honor and prestige. It would be difficult to overstate the importance the French attached to these ceremonies. Vaudreuil had no doubt that France's ability to maintain a presence in the Northeast was due to the Abenaki, and Versailles agreed.⁶¹ Without such measures to maintain the alliance, it was feared that it would "not be long before they were wholly attached to them [the English]."⁶² As the colonial wars progressed, the French became steadily more dependent upon their allies, especially the Abenaki.⁶³

This situation meant that at times Abenaki goals were paramount. For instance, a Penobscot delegation to Quebec in 1702 was more interested in obtaining goods at a fair price than in taking up arms against the English, which was the concern of the French; they won their trade concessions.

On the other hand, some of the Abenaki battles against the British concerned the French only in a general way. We have already seen this in the case of the Maine War, 1675-1676; the situation was repeated during the virulent three-year struggle that preceded the English destruction of the Eastern Abenaki town of Norridgewock (Narantsouak) in 1724⁶⁴ and the defeat of the Pigwacket in 1725. That conflict is variously labeled the English-Indian War, Dummer's War, Rale's War, or Lovewell's War. Its opening can be dated to an ultimatum issued in 1721 by the Abenaki to Samuel Shute (1662-1742), governor of Massachusetts, 1716-1727, in which the Amerindians asserted their sovereignty over the territories east of the Connecticut River, but said the English who were there could remain, provided no more came.⁶⁵ Rather than seeing this as an effort at compromise, the English regarded it as insolence that had been encouraged by French missionaries, especially Rale; the response of Massachusetts was to declare war in 1722.⁶⁶ Some recognized that the Abenaki had a legitimate position; for example, Col. Samuel Partridge of Hatfield, in a letter dated 20 April 1724, urged that justice be done to the Abenaki and the war stopped.⁶⁷ The signing of the treaty at Boston in 1725 and its ratification at Falmouth in 1727 proceeded despite belated French attempts to prevent it.

Although Norridgewock soon rose again from its ashes (in 1725 fifty Abenaki were reported to be living there), its burning had been a turning point. This was exactly what the French had feared when they did their best to prevent the Abenaki from returning to a place so close to the English.⁶⁸ Their defeat had been a bitter pill for the Abenaki to swallow, particularly as they felt that their French allies had let them down; since Utrecht they had been effectively on their own. When they sought help in 1720 from Vaudreuil, the French governor had been constrained by his instructions (England and France being officially at peace) from responding with the wholeheartedness that the Abenaki expected, causing them seriously to doubt his good faith.⁶⁹ The French had sent guns and ammunition, as well as Amerindian allies, but not troops, as the Abenaki had requested. This was not the only occasion when the Abenaki were less than impressed with their treatment at the hands of the French; for instance, a group complained to Vaudreuil that Louis Joseph, Marquis de Montcalm (1712-1759), lieutenant-general of the French forces in New France, 1758-1759, had been rude to them.⁷⁰ Such a charge could be serious, as the allies were quite capable of refusing to join French war expeditions if they did not like the treatment they received. One such occasion, involving Maliseet warriors, was reported in 1757.⁷¹ The English, not perceiving the delicacy of the French position, did not take advantage of it; instead pursuing an aggressive policy vis-à-vis the Abenaki, they tricked one of their chiefs, Joseph d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin (fl.

1720-1746), an older brother of Bernard-Anselme, and carried him off captive. Five months later the English had to release the prisoner to calm the angry Abenaki reaction.⁷²

It was not surprising that in this tangle of actions and reactions there were those, such as Gray Lock of Missisquoi (fl. 1675-1740), who refused to agree to the 1725 peace and continued fighting, although on a reducing scale, until the final defeat of the French was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris in 1763.⁷³ The reduction in active hostilities was due to the Amerindians' war-weariness rather than to loss of conviction as to their rights. For example, Atecouando (fl. 1749-57) of Odanak in 1752 challenged the authority of the British to survey Abenaki lands without the natives' permission, adding: "We forbid you very expressly to kill a single beaver or to take a single stick of wood on the lands we live on. If you want wood, we will sell it to you, but you shall not have it without our permission."⁷⁴ But the direction of events was clear, and ratifications of the 1725 peace had continued as one group after another laid down arms despite continued violations of their lands. Such an act did not guarantee that the violations would cease or even that their persons would be respected; the Norridgewock sachem Nodogawerrimet (d. 1765), for instance, was killed and robbed by English hunters who were never apprehended, despite the fact he had persistently worked for peaceful coexistence.⁷⁵

The two colonizing powers, France and England, had come to North America with different sets of goals. The French had commercial enterprise on their minds and began developing the fisheries and the fur trade. Although the coastal Abenaki had been as skilled sea-hunters as the Micmac and Maliseet, their territories had been too far distant from the fishing grounds frequented by Europeans for a significant cooperative commercial enterprise to develop in that regard; and the fur trade, except for a brief period, was of secondary interest that far south.⁷⁶ The English had come as farmers and found Abenaki agricultural lands attractive. As a result, there was an almost immediate collision between the two types of agricultural communities, English farmer-colonizer and native farmer-hunter; there were no ameliorating circumstances to prevent it.⁷⁷ In the meantime the French, who had not found the Abenaki particularly interesting commercially, realized the military value of their unique strategic position vis-à-vis themselves and their two principal rivals, the English and the Iroquois. Vaudreuil put it succinctly: "By uniting with the Abenakis and Micmaks, we should be in a position to recover . . . all we have lost in the East by the Treaty of Utrecht." Further, by winning the cooperation of the Abenaki, the French "shall have completely provided for the security of Canada."⁷⁸

Charles de Beauharnois de La Boische, governor-general of New France,

1726-1747, described the role of the Abenaki in French colonial policy: "It is highly important to preserve the Indians attached as they have always been to France; the English have been deterred from forming any settlement in Acadia solely to the dread of these Indians; and though the latter do in one respect embarrass the French, whose cattle they from time to time even publicly carry off for their support, the French are not sorry to see them residing in the Province, and themselves, as it were, under their protection."⁷⁹ Thus, it is apparent that the French were not as certain of their Amerindian alliances as historical legend would have it. Historian Hubbard was more perceptive than most of his New England compatriots: "As for the French in Canada . . . they are not themselves so secure of the Indians they deal with as to be forward to set themselves against us."⁸⁰ What had started out as a commercial venture for the French ended up as the most politically important of all their Amerindian alliances in New France.

There were those among the Abenaki who were clear-sighted enough to realize that neither warfare nor taking sides with one colonial power against the other was the answer to their difficulties and who worked for a peaceful resolution of their situation.⁸¹ An outstanding example was Wenemouet (d. 1730), a Penobscot chief, described as "a well looking man, more like a frenchman than an Indian," who sought to avoid special arrangements with either of the colonizing powers and to negotiate working relationships with both. Unfortunately, such efforts were undermined by continuing settler encroachments, which were playing into the hands of the French working to maintain their Abenaki alliance on a war footing. Because of such goals the French reacted violently to an Abenaki initiative to establish relations with the Fox of the Great Lakes area. The Pigwacket chief Nescambiouit (c. 1660-1722), who had been taken to France and honored by Louis XIV for his efforts in the French cause, in 1716 went to live with the Fox, whose recent defeat had not reconciled them to French penetration into the West. Nescambiouit was one of several Abenaki chiefs who had realized that the Amerindians' only hope of curbing European expansion lay in united action — a conclusion that would later be arrived at by such leaders as Pontiac of the Ottawa (1712/25-1769) and Tecumseh of the Shawnee (c.1768-1813). The French were able to abort Nescambiouit's initiative, as well as those of his associates, but were so worried by them that they curtailed Abenaki travel into the *pays d'en haut*, unless with French.⁸² The Abenaki had played important roles in voyages of exploration, such as those of René Robert Cavelier de La Salle on the Mississippi in the 1670s and 1680s, and in military expeditions such as those of Joseph-Antoine Le Febvre de La Barre (1622-1688) in 1684 and Denonville in 1687, both to the region of the Great Lakes.⁸³ In fact, it appears that the Abenaki were almost as active in the colonial wars of

the Old Northwest as they were in the northeast. In 1720, when the Abenaki and the Iroquois exchanged wampum belts, the French moved quickly to stop the peace negotiations, as they believed that otherwise "the colony would be lost,"⁸⁴ even though they themselves had signed a peace with the Iroquois in Montreal in 1701. A pan-Amerindian alliance could only have worked against the French, as indeed it would have done against any European colonizer.

For the Abenaki, the French connection meant making the best of a bad predicament. Caught as they were in circumstances that defied their most creative efforts in war and in peace, it is not surprising that they were eventually overwhelmed. Until recently, it was believed that the only Eastern Abenaki to survive in their traditional territories was a remnant of the Penobscot. It has become apparent, however, that not all Abenaki withdrew into the interior as English settlers preempted their lands; some chose to remain. But the cost was high, as they could only do so through an anonymity that amounted to a loss of identity. It was in Canada, outside of their ancestral lands, where they were drawn by their French alliance, that most Abenaki were able to maintain their identity and to survive as a people today.

NOTES

¹ My thanks to Dr. Nicholas Wickenden, University of Alberta, for his critical editing of this paper and to Dr. Jay Miller, D'Arcy McNickle Center for the History of the American Indian, Newberry Library, Chicago, for his generosity in sharing his computer expertise.

² This opinion, expressed by Jesuit Jean-Baptiste Loyard (1678-1731) in a letter dated 1721, reflected the prevailing French attitude. Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, 73 vols., Cleveland, Burrows Bros., 1896-1901. LXVII: 121.

³ One of the earliest descriptions of Abenaki is that of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 1524, who sailed from south to north, and is presumed to have reached Maine. Verrazzano's voyage was not followed up officially until the voyage of Jacques Cartier in 1534, which did not go far enough south to meet Abenaki, although it did meet Micmac. During this period there appear to have been some French trading voyages along the Atlantic coast, but it is not certain exactly where they went, although there is some reference to the Chesapeake Bay area, and in any event they were sporadic. On English first meetings, see Gordon Day, "English-Indian Contacts in New England," *Ethnohistory* V (1958), 24-29.

⁴ Abbé Joseph A. Maurault, *Histoire des Abenakis depuis 1605 jusqu'à nos jours*, Sorel, Atelier Typographique de la Gazette de Sorel, 1866 (reprint S. R. Publishers, 1969), 6-8. Maurault excludes the Micmac from the Abenaki group, as do some other historians; however, others disagree and include the peoples of the Canadian maritime provinces of Wabanakia. The French referred to the Maliseet by their own name, rather than as Abenaki; the English called them St. John River Indians. Similarly to the Micmac, the Sokoki are often referred to separately.

⁵ The Merrimack River was an ecological boundary, making it possible for the Pennacooks of that river to use both the birch bark and the dugout canoes. To the north, birch bark took over; to the south, the dugout.

⁶ In Samuel Purchas, *Purchas his Pilgrimage*, London, W. Stansby and H. Fetherstone, 1613.

⁷ John R. Swanton, *Indian Tribes of North America*, Washington, Smithsonian Institution, 1968 (first published 1952), 13, 14; Dean R. Snow, "The Ethnohistoric Baseline of the Eastern Abenaki," *Ethnohistory* 23 #3 (1976), 291-306.

⁸ Dean R. Snow, "Eastern Abenaki," *Handbook of North American Indians*, Washington, Smithsonian Institution, 1978, Vol. 15: 137-147; Olive Patricia Dickason, *The Myth of the Savage and the Beginnings of French Colonialism in the Americas*, Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, 1984, 105-7. Snow, in "Ethnographic Baseline," says there were twenty-five sagamores and twenty-two villages, p. 303.

⁹ Demographers now believe that the New World's prehistoric population was greater (perhaps much greater) than originally thought. Henry F. Dobyns, *Their Number Become Thinned*, Knoxville, Univer-

sity of Tennessee Press, 1983, and Russell Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival*, Norman and London, University of Oklahoma Press, 1987. Also, Dean R. Snow, *The Archaeology of New England*, New York, Academic Press, 1980.

¹⁰Marc Lescarbot, "La Deffaitte des Sauvages Armouchiquois," *The History of New France*, 3 vols., ed. W.L. Grant, Toronto, The Champlain Society, 1907-14 (based on the third edition, Paris, 1618), III: 497-508. An English version of the poem, translated by Thomas Goetz, is in *Papers of the Sixth Algonquian Conference*, 1974, ed. William Cowan, Ottawa, National Museums of Canada, 1975, 159-177. See also Pauline MacDougall Seeber, "The European Influence on Abenaki Economics Before 1615," *Papers of the Fifteenth Algonquian Conference*, ed. William Cowan, Ottawa, Carleton University, 1984, 203-214; and Neal Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643*, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1982, 68-70.

¹¹According to Seeber, this was a Micmac term meaning "dog" with a French suffix. "European Influence," 203. Other peoples to the south appear to have also been included under this label, which later on was subsumed by another catch-all, "Loups," wolves, a translation of "mahikan."

¹²H. P. Biggar, ed., *The Works of Samuel de Champlain*, 6 vols, Toronto, The Champlain Society, 1922-36 (reprint, University of Toronto Press, 1971), I: 326, 355-357.

¹³Pierre-Victor-Palma Cayet (1525-1610) *Chronologie septenaire de l'Histoire de la Paix entre les Roys de France et d'Espagne*, 2 vols., Paris, J. Richer, 1605, 2:423. This description was repeated by Marc Lescarbot, *History of New France II*: 169. He attributed it to Champlain, but later said that Champlain had admitted that it was "fabulous," and that the Armouchiquois really were "as good-looking . . . as ourselves, well built and agile." *Ibid.*, 172. Interestingly enough, Tartars were described in the same way.

¹⁴Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain I*:356-357; Marc Lescarbot expresses the same sentiments in *History of New France II*:327.

¹⁵Thomas Corneille, *Dictionnaire universel, géographique et historique . . .*, 3 vols., Paris, Jean-Baptiste Coignard, 1708, I, s.v. "Armouchiquois"; Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations II*:73.

¹⁶Seeber, "European Influence," 210.

¹⁷Lescarbot, *History of New France*, II:356. According to Lescarbot, Chkoudon was one of those provided with muskets in the 1607 battle with the Armouchiquois "autant que les François il ayme" (because the French liked him so much). *Ibid.* III: 506. See also Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations I*:79-81; III:298; Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain I*:267, 374-5, 381-2, 436, 442.

¹⁸Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, I:103, 109; V: 313-16; P-André Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis: habitat et migrations (17e et 18e siècles)*, Montreal, Bellarmin, 1976, 64-65.

¹⁹Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations*, XII:187.

²⁰*Ibid.*, XXXIV: 57; XXXVIII: 41.

²¹*Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1966-, I: s.v. "Druillettes, Gabriel."

²²Gordon M. Day, "Western Abenaki," *Handbook of North American Indians*, Washington, Smithsonian Institution, 1978, Vol. 15: 148-159 at 150. See also Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations*, XXIV: 183-185; XXXVI: 103.

²³Day, "Western Abenaki," 150. Jesuit Pierre-François-Xavier Charlevoix (1682-1761) reported that the Abenaki were the only Amerindians in New France whom the Iroquois dared not attack in their villages. He said that once the Abenaki experienced war, they became like lions with an insatiable thirst for blood. *Histoire et description générale de la Nouvelle-France*, 6 vols., Paris, Nyon, 1744 (facsimile in 3 vols., Montreal, Editions Elysée, 1976), III: 202-203.

²⁴This point was made by Charlevoix: "Que cette nation est l'unique nation de cette colonie contre les Anglois et les Iroquois." *Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres, mémoires et autres documents historique relatif à la Nouvelle-France*, 4 vols., Québec 1883-85, III: 49-54, "Mémoire sur les limites de l'Acadie envoyé à monseigneur le duc d'Orléans par le Père Charlevoix, Québec, 29 octobre 1720." This document, with variations in translation and some material added, is the same as the document that appears in English under the title "Memoir respecting the Abenakis of Acadia, 1718" in E. B. O'Callaghan and J. R. Brodhead, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York* (hereinafter *NYCD*), 15 vols., Albany, N.Y., Weed Parsons, 1853-57, IX: 878-81; and in J. H. Temple and George Sheldon, *History of the Town of Northfield for 150 Years*, Albany, N.Y., Munsell, 1875, 189-190. One of the translation differences concerns the above quotation, which in *NYCD* reads that the Abenaki were "the only support of the Colony against the English or the Iroquois."

²⁵The English had long complained that the French and Dutch were both supplying coastal Amerindians with guns, powder, and shot. See, for example, Thomas Lechford, *Plain Dealing; or News from New England*, London, 1642, 104.

²⁶Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis*, 101, 108-9. It was also during the 1670s that the English-Iroquois alliance was solidly established.

²⁷The English believed that Madockawando was the paramount chief of all the Abenaki tribes. They were mistaken, according to Kenneth M. Morrison, who says the chief had little influence beyond the Penobscot river. *The Embattled Northeast*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984, 110. However, the Penobscot were reputed to be the most powerful of the Abenaki tribes.

²⁸ In 1662-64, the Jesuits reported Abenaki fleeing to Quebec to escape the ravages of the Iroquois. Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations*, XLVIII:61. The war had been escalating for more than a generation.

²⁹ The phrase is used by Gordon Day, "English-Indian Contacts in New England," *Ethnohistory* 9 (1962): 28.

³⁰ Siebert, "The First Maine Indian War: Incident at Machias (1676)," *Actes du Quatorzième Congrès des Algonquinistes*, ed. William Cowan, Ottawa, Carleton University, 1983, 137-52.

³¹ William Hubbard, *The History of the Indian Wars in New England*, ed. Samuel G. Drake, 2 vols., Roxbury, Mass., 1865 (Kraus Reprint, 1969). II: 92-93, n. 108. This line of thought was traced by Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis*, 119-20.

³² For a few examples, Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, 89, 102-32; Alden T. Vaughan, *New England Frontiers; Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675*, Boston, Little Brown, 1965; David Bushnell, "The Treatment of the Indians in Plymouth Colony," *New England Quarterly* 26 (1953): 193-218; Lyle Koehler, "Red-White Power Relations and 'Justice' in the Courts of Seventeenth-century New England," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 3 (1979): 1-32; James P. Ronda, "Red and White at the Bench: Indians and the Law in Plymouth Colony, 1620-1691" *Essex Institute Historical Collections* 90 (1974): 200-15. The opposing view is expressed by Pierre Daviault, *Le Baron de Saint-Castin, chef abénaquis*, Montreal, I.A.C.-F., 1939, 53-54.

³³ T. M. Charland, *Histoire des Abénakis d'Odanak (1675-1937)*, Montreal, Lévrier, 1964, 11.

³⁴ Public Archives of Canada (hereinafter PAC), Archives des Colonies (hereinafter AC), C11A 9:373, Frontenac au roi, Québec, 14 novembre 1680; cited by Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis*, 161. See also Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations*, LXII:159-61.

³⁵ Gordon M. Day, "The Indian Occupation of Vermont," *Vermont History* 33 (1965): 365-74. An oblique reference is in Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations*, LXII: 161.

³⁶ Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain* II: 93.

³⁷ Gordon M. Day, *The Identity of the St. Francis Indians*, Ottawa, National Museums of Canada, 15.

³⁸ O'Callaghan and Brodhead, eds., *NYCD* VI: 886, "Proceedings of the Congress held at Albany by the Commissioners of the several Provinces," Albany, 9 July 1754. See also Temple and Sheldon, *History of Northfield*, 194.

³⁹ Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis*, 204-206.

⁴⁰ Maurault, *Histoire des Abenakis*, 234-37; see also *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* II, entries for Jacques and Vincent Bigot; and Charland, *Histoire*, 11-24.

⁴¹ Not to be confused with a later chief of the same name, Atecouando (fl. 1749-1757).

⁴² James F. Kinney, "A British Secret Service Report on Canada 1711," *Canadian Historical Review* 1 (1920): 52.

⁴³ Odanak was the scene of the raid of Robert Rogers (1713 O.S.-1795) which destroyed the village, 1759. Rogers's claim to have killed two hundred of its inhabitants was disputed by French reports, which set the death toll at thirty. Rogers also claimed to have found more than six hundred English scalps hanging as trophies in the village. On his return from the raid, he lost more than fifty men, some through enemy action, but mainly because of exposure and fatigue. Temple and Sheldon, *History of Northfield*, 306-307; Charland, *Histoire*, 107-118.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 41, 78-99. Also Charlevoix, *Histoire de la Nouvelle-France* II: 294-95.

⁴⁵ Charland, *Histoire*, 44, 75-76. See also Berne A. Pyrke, "The Secret Compact of Albany and Montreal Fur Traders, 1701," *Galleon* XI (1953), 3-7; and Jean Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 1713-60," *Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1939*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1939, 61-76.

⁴⁶ PAC, AC, C11A 10:395, Champigny au ministre, Québec, 16 novembre 1689; *Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Québec, 1947-48*: 222, Pontchartrain Vaudreuil, 4 juillet 1713. Both cited by Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis*, 164, 171. Also, Charland, *Histoire*, 80-81.

⁴⁷ *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* III, s.v. "Aubery, Joseph"; PAC, MG11, CO, Nova Scotia A, vol. 32: 322, Maillard to Hopson, 11 September 1748; Charlevoix, *Histoire de la Nouvelle-France* II: 317.

⁴⁸ PAC MG1, C11B, vol. 12: 37v, Saint-Ovide to Maurepas, 25 November 1731. See also *An Account of the Customs and Manners of the Micmaks and Maricheets, Savage Nations, Now Dependent on the Government of Cape Breton*, London, 1758, 85, "Letter from Mons. de la Varenne."

⁴⁹ *Collection de manuscrits* I:175, Instructions pour le Sieur de Courcelle au sujet des indiens. See also Olive Patricia Dickason, "Louisbourg and the Indians: A Study in Imperial Race Relations," *History and Archaeology* 6 (1976): 38, 109-125.

⁵⁰ *Collection de manuscrits* III: 49, Memoire sur les limites de l'Acadie; O'Callaghan and Brodhead, eds., *NYCD* IX: 878, Memoir respecting the Abenakis; PAC AC C11A 10: 535, Observations sur l'etat des affaires de Canada, 18 novembre 1689. Cited by Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis*, 164.

⁵¹ *An Account of the Customs and Manners*, 89, "Letter from Mons. de la Varenne."

⁵² Maurault held that intermarriage in New France was at its peak during the first three-quarters of the seventeenth century. *Histoire des Abenakis*, 75.

⁵³ *Baxter Mss., Documentary History of Maine*, Maine Historical Society Collections, 2nd series, Conference with five of the Eastern Indians, Boston, 11 January 1713, 23: 56.

⁵⁴O'Callaghan and Brodhead, eds., *NYCD IX*: 868-72 at 871, M. de Vaudreuil to the Duke of Orleans, 1716; PAC CO 217 / 1: 364-66, "Answer of Indians of Penobscot to the Commissioners," April 1714; PAC AC C11B 1: 340v-342, lettre de Bégon, 25 septembre 1715, dans les délibérations de Conseil, 28 mars 1716; *ibid.*, lettre de Costebelle, 7 septembre 1715, 335-336; Charlevoix, "Mémoire sur les limites de l'Acadie," *Collection de manuscrits III*: 50-51. Also, *idem*, *Histoire de la Nouvelle-France II*: 377.

⁵⁵*Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Québec, 1947-1948*, 269, Vaudreuil au ministre, Québec, 16 septembre 1714. Cited by Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis*, 177.

⁵⁶O'Callaghan and Brodhead, eds., *NYCD IX*: 940, "Memoir on the present Condition of the Abenakis, 1724."

⁵⁷Olive Patricia Dickason, "Louisbourg and the Indians: A Study in Imperial Race Relations, 1713-1760," *History and Archaeology* 6 (1976), 66-69; also, the warning of Jesuit Pierre de La Chasse (1670-1749) concerning what the Abenaki reaction to such a proposition would be, in *Collection de manuscrits III*:51, Memoire sur les limites de l'Acadie.

⁵⁸Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis*, 160-61.

⁵⁹*Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, III, s.v. "Sauguaram." He led in denouncing the Boston Treaty of 1725, several versions of which had been circulating in French as well as in English before the final text was signed. Apparently none of them accorded with what had been said during negotiations. Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, 188-90; and David L. Ghere, "Mistranslations and Misinformation: Diplomacy on the Maine Frontier, 1725 to 1755," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 8, #4 (1984): 6-11.

⁶⁰O'Callaghan and Brodhead, eds., *NYCD IX*: 902, Vaudreuil to Governor William Burnett, 11 July 1721.

⁶¹"qui seul nous avoit donné pendant les deux dernières guerres la supériorité sur les Colonies Angloises." Charlevoix, *Histoire de la Nouvelle-France II*: 404.

⁶²*Ibid.*, and I: 541.

⁶³Charland, *Histoire*, 27.

⁶⁴The Jesuit Sebastian Rale (Râle, Rasle, Rasles, 1657-1724) had founded a mission at Norridgewock (today's Old Point, South Madison, Maine) in 1694. Both he and Mog were killed there in 1724.

⁶⁵*Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, second series, 8 (1926), 260, Eastern Indians' letter to the Governor, 27 July 1721.

⁶⁶Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, 155-193; *Dictionary of Canadian Biography II*, s.v. "Rale, Sebastian."

⁶⁷Temple and Sheldon, *History of Northfield*, 189.

⁶⁸O'Callaghan and Brodhead, eds., *NYCD IX*:1014-15, Abstracts of Messers de Beauharnois and Hocquart's Despatches.

⁶⁹Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, 182-83.

⁷⁰Charland, *Histoire*, 83.

⁷¹PAC, MG 11, CO 5, Letter to Monckton, 26 July 1757, ff 480-1.

⁷²Charlevoix, *Histoire de la Nouvelle-France II*: 379; Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations LXVII*:109-111. See also Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, 184-85. Thwaites identifies the prisoner as Bernard-Anselm. *Jesuit Relations LXVII*: 336. However, he was in France at the time.

⁷³Temple and Sheldon, *History of Northfield*, 190, 214.

⁷⁴*Dictionary of Canadian Biography III*, s.v. "Atecouando." This chief is not to be confused with the earlier one of the same name, fl. 1701-26.

⁷⁵*Dictionary of Canadian Biography III*, s.v. "Nodogawerrimet."

⁷⁶For a survey of the trade, see Francis X. Moloney, *The Fur Trade in New England 1620-1676*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1931 (Reprint, Hamden, Conn., Archon, 1967).

⁷⁷A good study of one decade during the determined attempt of the Abenakis of Maine to retain their lands and independent is that of David Ghere, "The Twilight of Abenaki Independence: The Maine Abenaki during the 1750s," MA thesis, University of Maine, Orono, 1980.

⁷⁸O'Callaghan and Brodhead, eds., *NYCD IX*: 948-49, Abstract of M. de Vaudreuil's Dispatch; *ibid.*, 939-40, Memoir on the Present Condition of the Abenakis, 1724.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, X:14, Beauharnois and Hocquart to Maurepas, 12 September 1745.

⁸⁰*The Present State of New England, being a Narrative of the troubles with the Indians From the First Planting thereof, to the present time*, London, Thos. Parkhurst, 1677, 82.

⁸¹Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, 193.

⁸²S.G. Drake, *Biography and History of the Indians of North America*, Boston, Benj. B. Mussey, 1851, 323-324; R.G. Thwaites, ed., *Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin*, XVI: 434-40; XVII:192-200. Maurault wrote that Nescambiouiit's name translated as "he who is so important and so highly placed because of his merit, that one cannot attain, or even conceive, of his greatness." *Histoire des Abenakis*, 330.

⁸³Early accounts of the two military expeditions are to be found in Maurault, *Histoire des Abenakis*, 178-84, and 186-93; however, the episodes are regularly included in histories of New France. Le Febvre de La Barre was governor-general of New France, 1682-85.

⁸⁴"D'ou il ne peut s'ensuire que la perte de la colonie." *Collection de manuscrits II*:54, Mémoire sur les limites de l'Acadie. The English version reads "from which nothing can follow but the ruin of the colony." O'Callaghan and Brodhead, eds., *NYCD IX*: 881, Memoir respecting the Abenakis.