VERMONT History

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"Winning the Green Mountain State entailed more than simply settling the land; it required the dispossession and expulsion of the native inhabitants."

The Conquest of Vermont: Vermont's Indian Troubles in Context

By Colin G. Calloway

In the final years of the fifteenth century Europe embarked on a program of expansion which, in the course of subsequent centuries, saw Europeans established in positions of dominance in Africa, India, the Far East, Australia, and the Americas. The North American phase of this process involved the defeat and dispossession of the native Indian inhabitants in some three hundred years of conquest and coercion.

These titanic global and continental clashes dwarfed the penetration and occupation of the area which became the State of Vermont. The relative sparseness of the native population meant that the advance of the frontier here was accompanied with seemingly little of the bloodshed and genocide which marked European expansion elsewhere in America; and Vermont's Indian troubles were comparatively sporadic, small-scale, and short-lived. However, viewed in a wider context, these troubles emerge as part of a common response by Indian peoples to the European invasion of America.¹ General studies of Indian-European conflict tend to ignore the struggles waged in the Vermont region; local accounts run the alternative risk of losing a sense of the larger picture. Indian-European skirmishes concerning Vermont were part of a larger war, and Indian hostility was essentially a reaction to the European invasion. The Indian defeat in Vermont occurred because of forces of destruction which operated throughout North America.

The nineteenth century's most prolific historian of Indian-European conflict, Bostonian Francis Parkman, declared that, prior to the European penetration, Vermont, together with northern New Hampshire and western Massachusetts, "had no human tenants but the roving hunter or
prowling warrior." The inaccuracy of this long-accepted view of Vermont’s aboriginal population has since been demonstrated. Archaeological excavations have revealed evidence of a significant Indian presence in the area between Lake Champlain and the Connecticut River. The tendency of early writers to name each group according to the location of their village rather than by tribal affinity has confused the identity of many of these peoples. In fact, Vermont was inhabited by the western Abenaki—such as the Sokokis and Cowasucks of the Connecticut Valley, with other bands in the Champlain Valley—and by the Mahican in the southwest. Immediate neighbors who infringed on the area at one time or another included the Iroquois tribes (in particular the Mohawk) to the west, the Pocumtuck to the south, and the Penacook (also western Abenakis) to the east. In recent years traditional estimates of aboriginal population throughout North America have been subjected to substantial upward revisions with far-reaching implications for assessing the catastrophic effects of European invasion on native populations in every region.

The fact that the mountain ranges and major waterways ran north and south governed movement and conflict in the Vermont region. The Green and White Mountains presented obstacles to easy east-west movement, while Lake Champlain and the Connecticut River provided highways for invasion and retreat between New England and Canada. Lake Champlain marked the boundary between the Algonquian peoples of New England and the Iroquois tribes to the west; although some have suggested a period of Iroquois occupation of the Vermont shore. Indian war parties frequently filtered through the Green Mountain-Berkshire range to raid their enemies or levy tribute from weaker tribes. By the seventeenth century the Iroquois and the French contested control of the rich Champlain Valley and of the entire St. Lawrence region. Iroquois warriors paddled their canoes down the lake on their way to raid French settlements along the St. Lawrence, and the French retaliated with expeditions into the heart of the Iroquois country. Fifty-eight years before the first permanent English outpost in Vermont, the French began construction of Fort St. Anne on Isle La Motte, an established port-of-call for war parties heading in either direction. The English frontier elsewhere generally tended to push westwards, but in Vermont the main thrust of settlement was northwards, up the Connecticut River. English pioneers advanced in a hesitating and halting march of occupation which reached southern Vermont early in the eighteenth century and saw settlements begun at Brattleboro in 1724, Westminster in 1736, Putney in 1744, and Rockingham, briefly, in 1753.

In other areas of North America Indian “tribes” migrated westwards before the advancing white frontier; in New England, Indian refugees fled northwards. The Pequot War (1637) and King Philip’s War (1675-1676)
witnessed the defeat and dispersal of "tribes" in southern New England and drove scattered bands of survivors to seek asylum in the north. Some congregated at Schaghticoke on the Hudson River, but eventually they also moved northwards. Other tribes who ventured westwards fell into the hands of Mohawk wolf packs. Before long many of these refugee warriors had begun to engage in fleeting raids of revenge, traveling south along familiar trails. Frontiersmen in Vermont found themselves fighting not to drive Indians from their lands but rather to protect their homes and families against war parties which swept down through the wilderness from the north. As the struggle for supremacy in North America intensified, French Catholics joined their Indian converts in expeditions against the settlements of the Protestant English, while English scouting parties and punitive missions ventured northwards. The route which ran from Lake Champlain, up the Winooski River, across the Green Mountains and down the Black River to the Connecticut and the English settlements was traveled so frequently by Indian war parties—and, in reverse, by their white captives—that it became known as simply "the Indian Road," and it was only one of many such routes through Vermont. The north-south ebb and flow of conflict saw the Indian population retreat farther and farther. Only in the northern portions of the territory which became Vermont did the Indian population continue at close to the levels before European penetration. The war for America brought Vermont into the mainstream of intertribal, international, and interracial tensions which made the region a thoroughfare of war and migration and long rendered permanent settlement by Iroquois or Algonquian, French or English, Indian or white a dangerous proposition.

Settlers in Vermont from the American colonies faced problems common to frontiersmen throughout North America: settlement meant contending with the rugged land with its few cleared areas and crude paths and with the native inhabitants. The Indians' presence and attunement to the environment created a source of anxiety for European colonists and made them conscious of their own vulnerability in the New World. Survival necessitated adaptations of European ways to the American environment and adoption of Indian methods of travel and subsistence. The Green Mountain "wilderness" was very much an Indian world and the white man knew it. When Europeans penetrated that world, they went either as captives, powerless in Indian hands, or as tentative trespassers, armed and cautious. New England Puritans regarded the Indian in his savage habitat as the antithesis of the civilization they strived to create in the New World. Puritan authorities looked with distaste and distrust upon any intermingling of English Christians and Indian heathens in the wilderness and took measures to prevent their people "taking to the woods." Among the first
English people to see Vermont were a group of captives abducted from Deerfield and Hatfield when Narragansett and Pocumtuck warriors raided those towns in 1677 at the end of King Philip’s War. They preceded hundreds of other unfortunate settlers who, in the course of the next century, made the grueling trek up the Connecticut River, past towering Mount Ascutney and over the Green Mountains to Lake Champlain and French Canada, as prisoners of the Indians. The Indian country threatened these people both as a physical wilderness and as a source of spiritual danger. Puritans regarded the horrors of Indian captivity as God’s punishment for His erring people. When Rev. John Williams preached to his fellow captives in 1704, at the mouth of the river which bears his name, he chose Lamentations as an appropriate text for the first recorded Protestant sermon delivered in Vermont:

The Lord is righteous, for I have rebelled against his commandments; hear I pray you, all people, and behold my sorrow; my virgins and my young men are gone into captivity. 19

That some captives actually grew to prefer life among the Indians or the French only increased the sinister threat posed by the savage wilderness to God-fearing Englishmen.

For early New Englanders the Vermont region was not only a forbidding wilderness, it was also an Indian stronghold. In 1676 the Wampanoag chief, Metacom or King Philip, regrouped his forces in the Squakheag or Sokoki country around Vernon on the Connecticut River prior to launching a final onslaught against the English settlements to the south. Mary Rowlandson, taken captive during an Indian attack on the town of Lancaster, saw the assembled warriors and regarded them as “a numerous crew of pagans.” The Indian army numbered perhaps 3,000 and included warriors from the Narragansett, Wampanoag, Pocumtuck, Sokoki, Natick, Nashaway, Nonotuck, Nipmuck, Agawam and Hassanamesett. 11

The first English settlement in Vermont, Fort Dummer, was built in 1724 by Captain Timothy Dwight on the orders of Massachusetts, which planned the fort less as an advance post into the Indian country than as a defensive structure designed to protect settlements farther south from Indian raids emanating from Canada and northern Vermont. Located near the junction of the Connecticut and West Rivers, the fort attempted with indifferent success to blockade two Indian war trails, from the north and northwest respectively. It also functioned as a dispatch point for scouting parties sent upriver to look for “smokes” and other signs of impending Indian attack. One such party, leaving the fort in 1748 when Indian activity in the region was at its height, barely penetrated the wilderness before it lost five men and their scalps in an ambush. 12 In the early 1740s Fort Number 4 was constructed at Charlestown on the New Hampshire
side of the Connecticut, again at a known crossroads of Indian trails, to give the downriver settlements warning of raids coming down the Black River and the Connecticut. When, by 1749, the French and Indians had driven virtually every settler out of Vermont, only Fort Dummer and Fort Number 4 remained in English hands.

This Indian barrier was breached and the way cleared for permanent European occupation of Vermont by an interplay of the same forces which operated to effect displacement of Indian peoples throughout North America. Disunity and conflict among the tribes, upheavals produced by European fur trade and firearms, demographic disaster wrought by epidemics of killer diseases, and involvement in European wars for empire all ensured that Indians in the Green Mountain region shared the fate of native Americans across the continent. Despite winning many of the battles, the Indians lost the war, a desperate rearguard action doomed to failure.

Everywhere in North America debilitating intertribal feuds reduced Indian powers of resistance to European invasion. The defense-oriented locations of many Indian village sites on river banks and elevations indicates that defense and survival were familiar concerns in Vermont long before European men arrived. Indeed, by the sixteenth century, the area between Lake Champlain and the Connecticut River suffered from the hostilities between the Iroquois and Algonquian warriors in contests waged for glory and revenge as much as for control of hunting grounds. However, as happened throughout North America, this intertribal warfare altered and intensified under the impact of the European fur trade and firearms. Trade goods undermined native craft production; competition for those goods, and for guns in particular, transformed native warfare from a seasonal pastime fought for cultural and personal reasons into a constant battle for supremacy and survival. Caught up in a vicious economic and military cycle which revolved around furs and guns, tribes now devoted their utmost energies to maintaining a tenable strategic position in a world thrown into dangerous upheaval by the intrusion of European goods and culture.

When Samuel de Champlain joined his Algonquian and Montagnais allies in a skirmish against an Iroquois war party at the head of the lake which bears his name in 1609, he not only alienated the Iroquois against the French but also initiated drastic changes in the Indian mode of warfare. The two parties which met on the lake fought and behaved according to time-honored patterns. There was much ritual, threatening behavior and preparation for combat but, in the actual battle, both sides adopted essentially defensive positions and engaged in a long-range exchange of arrows and insults which rarely produced serious casualties or decisive
results, particularly since the participants often wore woven and leather body armor. Champlain’s decisive interference in this native contest, gunning down a number of Iroquois and putting the rest to flight, set in motion dramatic changes in the style and purposes of intertribal conflict, much as the English actions like the Pequot Massacre were to do in southern New England. Within a generation woven shields and defensive tactics disappeared, replaced by deadly guerilla warfare geared to and governed by possession of firearms. 15

Nowhere did the European fur trade and firearms exert more telling effects than among the Iroquois Confederacy infringing upon Vermont’s western border. The exact role of economic motivation in the Iroquois wars of the seventeenth century remains the subject of considerable controversy, but the fur trade certainly created the circumstances which enabled or compelled the Iroquois to embark on a program of expansion and conquest which sent shock waves reverberating throughout eastern North America. 16 In the early years of the century the Iroquois suffered as much as they inflicted, and rival groups pushed them back on several fronts. The Mahican on the Hudson River considered them fair game for both raids and the levying of tribute, and the Mahican-Mohawk war of 1626-1628 swung back and forth before the Mahican fled across the Hudson into northwestern Massachusetts and southeastern Vermont and were themselves subjected to payment of tribute. 17 Then, in mid-century, Iroquois power burst its bounds. The Seneca, keepers of the western door of the Confederacy, led the drive into the west which destroyed the populous Huron nation, scattered the Erie, Neutral and Petun, and brought about a lengthy war with the Susquehannack. In the east the Mohawk stepped up their raids into New England. Fortunately for the infant English colonies, the Mohawks directed their aggression against the Indian rather than white inhabitants of the area. In 1651 under the auspices of the French, also locked into a vicious struggle against the Iroquois, the Pennacook, Sokoki, Pocumtuck and Mahican united to present a solid front to their enemies from the west. Sokoki and Mahican war parties from Massachusetts and Vermont raided into Mohawk territory but, by the 1660s, Iroquois power began to tell. Following the murder of a Mohawk peace ambassador on his way to the Pocumtuck, the Iroquois launched a devastating war of revenge. Mohawk, Onondaga and Seneca warriors crushed the Pocumtuck confederacy, swung north against the Sokoki, then swept eastwards across Vermont and New Hampshire to punish the Pennacook. The Pennacook never recovered from the mauling they received and subsequently could muster little resistance to English invaders who pushed into their lands. In August, 1669, some 300 Mahican and other Hudson River Indians, together with warriors from New England retaliated
and launched what they intended as a pre-emptive strike into Mohawk territory. The Mohawk drove the invaders back, caught them in an ambush, and inflicted crippling casualties. Such escalating intertribal warfare significantly weakened Indian military power in a region which soon became the scene of racial and international conflict. The outbreak of King Philip's War in 1675 caught many of the Indians of New England between the English in the east and the Mohawks to the west, and, defeated and broken, they had no alternative but to retreat northwards. However, the old enmity persisted. In 1696 when the French Governor, Count Frontenac, led an expedition into the heart of the Iroquois country, he was accompanied by Algonquins, Sokokis and other Abenakis. Intertribal warfare, with the Iroquois as leading participants, proved suicidal to Indians throughout the northeastern woodlands in view of the mounting European invasion; the dispersal of the tribes in and around southern Vermont was but a part of a much wider catastrophe. The intertribal divisions presented a situation ripe for implementation of the classic European tactic of divide and rule. That these divisions were not exploited with even more devastating effect was due to the fact that the European invaders were themselves contending for supremacy in North America. The English colonies could rarely manage to unite in pursuit of a common policy, and the conflict of European against European continued, in some form, until 1783, allowing the Iroquois — and to a lesser extent the Abenaki — to buy time by skillful diplomatic maneuvering between rival groups.

Disease worked alongside intertribal warfare in shattering Indian potential for resistance. With no immunity to European diseases, Indian populations were ravaged time and again by smallpox, typhus, measles and other plagues which raced ahead of the men who introduced them. In many areas of North America — and probably in New England — epidemics wiped out as much as ninety per cent of the native population. European invaders had to contend with only the remnants of the original tribes: as Francis Jennings phrases it, they found not a virgin land but a “widowed land.”

New England suffered epidemics in 1616-1617 and 1633-1635, while tribes to the north along the St. Lawrence were struck in 1639 and again in 1669. In Vermont itself disease certainly hit the Sokoki; the Cowasuck and other Abenaki probably suffered in the 1630s; the Abenaki were ravaged again in 1648, and the Mahican were visited three times by disease, contributing to that tribe's decline from an estimated aboriginal population of 4,000 to a mere 500 by 1700. Coinciding with increased Mohawk pressure from the west, these epidemics would have virtually denuded Vermont of Indian inhabitants by the time the English arrived had not the refugees from the south replaced much of the population. The village at
Missisquoi near Swanton, the Sokoki village near Vernon and the Cowasuck settlement at Newbury constituted the most significant centers of population. Elsewhere, the region was lightly inhabited and used mainly as hunting grounds. Nor did the hammer blows of disease cease when the Indians withdrew beyond their enemies' reach. In 1725 plague reduced the population of Missisquoi to about 800; five years later the Indians there again suffered the ravages of a mortal sickness.

In the wake of these catastrophes the Indian tribes of New England had to contend with the military might of the English colonists. The Puritans' ruthless extermination of the Pequot, Narragansett, and other tribes in the south sent the survivors retreating northwards. The march of the English frontier and with it the inevitable repetition of Indian-European conflict followed not far behind. In 1698 an Indian war party which raided Hatfield was pursued and ambushed along the river at Vernon in one of the first clashes between Indians and English on Vermont soil.

The French in Canada provided the refugees with missionaries and supplies and made every effort to keep the Indians fully aware of the difference in the treatment they received at the hands of Protestant English and Catholic French. Given the Puritans' reputation for cruelty and repeated instances of English treachery towards the Indians, the French had a relatively easy task. As rivalry between England and France increased, the Algonquian tribes came to regard the French as their natural allies against both English land hunger and Iroquois expansion. The French, for their part, viewed the Abenaki as a buffer between themselves and the English and the Mohawk raiders. These alliances set the stage for seventy years of French and Indian border warfare which characterized the English conquest of northern New England. French policy was geared toward keeping the Abenaki actively hostile against the English, even to the extent of supplying French officers to assume the role of war chiefs. Whenever Old World rivalry spilled over into New World conflict—as happened in 1689-1697, 1702-1713, 1744-1748, and 1754-1763 where the conflict in America began two years ahead of the European declaration of hostilities—as well as in between these wars, New England suffered French and Indian raids on its northern borders.

Just as Anglo-French relations affected Indian-European hostilities, so relations with the Iroquois influenced French military policy towards northern New England. In August, 1689, a huge war party of 1300 Mohawks in 250 war canoes fell upon the French settlement of La Chine near Montreal, massacred the inhabitants, burnt houses and crops, and carried off 130 prisoners. Frontenac, the Governor of New France, badly needed to restore French morale and revive French prestige among the Indian tribes. Earlier expeditions into the heart of the Iroquois country, under De
Courcelles and De Tracy in the 1660s, had proved extremely costly and produced little in the way of concrete achievement. Instead, therefore, of mounting a punitive campaign against the Mohawk, Frontenac organized a three-pronged attack on the English colonies to the south. This thrust marked the beginning of the North American phase of King William's War, known in Europe as the War of the League of Augsburg. In 1690 one party of French and Indians went up Lake Champlain, across the Hudson, and sacked Schenectady; another crossed Lake Memphremagog to the Connecticut river and, after three months of hard traveling, attacked Salmon Falls (Dover), New Hampshire; a third struck Casco Bay in Maine. Vermont Abenakis participated in both the Schenectady and the Salmon Falls attack. These raids restored French prestige among their Indian allies and set a precedent for a systematic policy of French-directed Indian expeditions against northern New England. The English colonies could not mount adequate defensive cooperation; their efforts to secure Indian auxiliaries proved unsuccessful, and, as long as the northern frontier remained exposed, English settlements on or near the Connecticut River remained vulnerable to attack by fast-moving raiders. In 1703-04 Hertel de Rouville led a war party of 200 French and 142 Indians—mainly Caughnawagas but with some Abenakis from Vermont—southwards in dead of winter against the English frontier settlements. Leaving their supplies near Brattleboro at the junction of the West River and the Connecticut, the raiders pushed on to Deerfield. Just before dawn on February 29, 1704, they surprised the sleeping Massachusetts town, killing 47 people and taking more than 100 prisoners. The raiders then escaped back up the frozen Connecticut and across Vermont with their captives. This historic raid was the largest and most famous of a series of attacks which continued to plague northern New England throughout the French and Indian wars.

The Indians who fought in Vermont, however, were not simply the willing tools of French policy. They fought in their own interests and for their own reasons. Correctly identifying the English as the main threat to their survival, they waged war against them with or without French allies. The years 1712-1726, a time of formal peace between England and France, saw some of the most severe Indian fighting in the region. During this period, and particularly from 1723-1726, the war chief Grey Lock battled without respite against those who encroached on his homeland. Probably a Woronoco Indian and certainly a refugee from English pressure in the south, Grey Lock established his base of operations at the Missisquoi village in northern Vermont and launched raids against the English settlements on the Connecticut River almost at will. Even when the rest of the Abenaki had had enough and made peace, Grey Lock remained intransigent; the
Abenaki of Missisquoi and St. Francis did not sign the treaty which their eastern relatives concluded. Those two villages remained centers of Indian hostility, constantly furnishing warriors for raids against English settlements along the Connecticut River and northern Massachusetts frontier.

When Anglo-French hostilities resumed in King George's War (1744-1748), so did the border warfare. In July, 1745, Indians attacked the Great Meadow fort at Putney; the following October, warriors from St. Francis seized Nehemiah How at the same place and carried him off into captivity. They attacked Fort Number 4 five times in the space of two months in the spring of 1746, and some 700 French and Indians besieged it in 1747. By the end of the decade the Indians and their French allies had virtually cleared Vermont of the few English settlers.

The raids and skirmishes which occurred in Vermont throughout the 1740s and 1750s constituted the Green Mountain phase of the struggle for supremacy in North America known as the French and Indian wars. While Braddock, Amherst, Wolfe and Montcalm fought those historic clashes which helped decide the fate of the continent, their less well-known counterparts—Colonel Benjamin Bellows of Walpole, New Hampshire, and Captain Phineas Stevens of Fort Number 4—worked to establish the English hold on the upper Connecticut Valley. Abenaki warriors fought with the French at the battles of Monongahela, Oswego, Lake George, Fort William Henry and Quebec; they also conducted their own raids against northern New England. Indian raiders attacked Charlestown in 1754 and Vernon, Hinsdale, and Walpole in 1755. In August, 1755, Benjamin Bellows and his men clashed with an Indian war party at the mouth of the Cold River and drove the raiders back to Canada. However, the little forts on the Connecticut could not always prevent Indian raiding parties from slipping by and harassing settlements farther south. In 1758 a group of seven Abenaki warriors from “Misiskoui” penetrated to within twenty leagues of Boston, killing three men and taking several women and children captive.

Taking of captives became a common, if not constant, feature of Indian warfare in Vermont as elsewhere on the American frontier. The conflict of Indian and Europeans was more than simply a military contest for the land. The collision of societies in North America generated a struggle for supremacy between opposing cultures. From the first, the English tried to preserve their racial and cultural purity from “contamination” by Indians. Indian tribes were far more receptive of outsiders and sought to guarantee the survival of their group by assimilation rather than exclusion. The adoption of captives taken in war was a long-established practice among North American Indians. With the increase in intertribal and racial war, the need for captives to replace relatives lost in battle became
acute. By the eighteenth century adoptees outnumbered tribal full bloods among some of the Iroquois groups to the west. The Indian bands which fought in Vermont likewise attempted to bolster their declining strength by the assimilation of enemy captives. During the era of the French and Indian wars the Indians abducted over 1600 people from New England and carried them to Canada. Hundreds of these followed the “captives’ trails” through Vermont. Those who survived the tomahawks of their captors and the grueling trek northwards might be sold to the French, ransomed, or exchanged. A few even escaped. A considerable number, however, remained with their Indian captors, either by force or by choice. The ease with which some white people adjusted to life with the Indians and the frequency with which they opted to remain in Indian society caused anxiety and doubt among English colonists who assumed the superiority of their own way of life and the existence of an impassable gulf between “savagery” and “civilization.” The reasons for the extraordinary magnetism of Indian culture have engendered over two hundred years of debate. A major factor in winning the allegiance of captives selected for adoption was the considerate treatment shown by Indian families which adopted them. From the moment of capture white prisoners underwent a process of education, sharing the hardships of Indian life, experiencing the taste and irregularity of Indian food, and receiving instruction in Indian techniques of travel and survival. On their arrival at the Indian villages in northern Vermont or Canada captives ran the risk of being tortured and killed by the grief-striken relatives of deceased warriors, but more commonly they were initiated into the tribe by a ceremony of adoption. The ceremony involved running a gauntlet of Indians armed with sticks and clubs, bathing in the river, and finally dressing in Indian clothes—all designed symbolically to cleanse the captives of their whiteness so that they could be “reborn” as Indians. Every frontier in North America had its crop of individuals who “went Indian,” refusing or resisting redemption and preferring to remain with their adopted Indian families. The Indian process of assimilation achieved particular success among younger captives. As the Europeans won the military, economic, demographic and political war against the Indians, they seemed to be in some danger of losing the battle of cultures. The establishment of European “civilization” in Vermont and throughout the New World resulted from military conquest and demographic dominance rather than inherent superiority or even attractiveness.

Across North America the pattern and outcome of Indian-European warfare was the same. Indian war parties, incensed by continual encroachment on their lands, launched lightning raids against the new settlements, enjoyed initial successes born of mobility and surprise, and escaped with
scalps, plunder and captives. But superior numbers, resources, organization, military power and purpose took their toll. European, and later American, armies pursued the Indians to their villages, destroyed their families, homes and crops, and wore down resistance in sustained campaigns and wars of attrition. The massacre of the Pequot at their village on the Mystic River in Connecticut in 1637, General John Sullivan's devastation of Iroquois crops and villages in 1779, and George Armstrong Custer's winter campaign against the Cheyenne in 1868 all contained the same elements of a continent-wide process of defeating the Indian by "search and destroy" tactics. These tactics were employed against the Indians in Vermont, although not always with the same degree of success. Indian raiders from the north usually eluded pursuit in the Green Mountains. In 1724 Captain Benjamin Wright's attempt to put a stop to Grey Lock's raids by marching against Missisquoi proved a fiasco. In 1759 Major Robert Rogers led his famous Rangers, trained in Indian fighting and wilderness survival, in an expedition to destroy the Indian village at St. Francis, south of the St. Lawrence. For decades New Englanders had loathed the St. Francis Abenaki as the scourge of their frontier, and the Rogers' raid was designed to end the Indian incursion once and for all. Rogers' command succeeded in destroying the village but, pursued by Indian warriors and French troops, suffered over thirty per cent casualties on their 230 mile odyssey back through the Vermont wilderness. Rogers himself claimed that the raid killed 200 Indians and terminated the menace from the north, but he almost certainly exaggerated the extent and significance of his victory. The raid did not obliterate St. Francis; indeed, warriors from that same village executed a successful retaliatory raid against Charlestown, New Hampshire, the following year, carrying off more scalps and prisoners.

Such was the complex interplay of forces operating on Vermont that the cessation of Indian raids stemmed from continental and global events as much as from local harassment of the natives. The year 1759 which marked Rogers' campaign against the St. Francis Abenaki was also Great Britain's "annus mirabilis" when English arms won victories on the ocean, in India, Africa and the West Indies as well as in North America. The British successes at Crown Point, Ticonderoga and Quebec represented the North American phase of a world-wide struggle which saw France defeated and humiliated on every front. The fall of New France left the Indians without allies to face the victorious English. The Indians of northern Vermont bowed to the inevitable. A number of the Missisquoi, fewer than often thought, moved north to join their relatives at St. Francis and other mission villages in Canada. The removal of the French
and Indian threat opened Vermont to a flood of immigration which resulted in the settlement of many new towns between 1760 and 1776.43

However, as long as war plagued America's northern frontiers, Vermont bore a share of the conflicts and found itself embroiled in clashes of global importance. The outbreak of the American Revolution found many Indian tribes divided over the question of which side, if either, to support, and the Vermont Abenaki were no exception. Fear of continued American expansion on the one hand and promises of British help on the other convinced many Indians that their best interests lay in siding with King George's redcoats.44 Consequently, the border warfare of the Revolution saw British officers and Tory Rangers leading Indian war parties into Vermont just as Frenchmen had done a generation earlier, though the main thrust of this round of raids was farther west. Iroquois war parties devastated the Mohawk and Susquehanna valleys, while Senecas, Shawnees and Delawares raided across the Ohio into Kentucky.45

Tradition has it that the Upper Connecticut Valley fell under the protection of the influence of the Mohawk war chief, Joseph Brant, because of his connection with Dr. Wheelock's Indian school at Hanover, New Hampshire.46 Nevertheless, the Vermont Republic suffered a recurrence of the old Indian alarms. General Burgoyne had a vanguard of Indians in his army which tried to sweep the Champlain Valley clear of rebels in 1777, and Brandon suffered an attack by Indian raiders. Burgoyne's proclamation to the inhabitants of the Valley contained the usual threat of Indian atrocities and caused considerable consternation, even if fears of savage atrocity was not the driving force in rousing the Vermont militia to participate in the Battle of Bennington.47 Burgoyne's army met disaster at Saratoga, but the subsequent withdrawal southwards of the Continental Army and the disbanding of the Green Mountain Boys exposed the self-proclaimed Republic to continued danger. Vermont's defense now rested on a thin line of outposts at Newbury, Peacham, Corinth, Bethel, Barnard, Pittsford and Castleton. A garrison and stockade at Rutland served, as had Fort Dummer half a century before, to give warning to settlers on the west side of the Green Mountains of raiders from the north. The old invasion route up Lake Champlain and the Winooski River remained open throughout the war. Shelburne was attacked by about 60 Indians and Tories in March, 1778. In October of the same year a force of 1,000 British Regulars, Tories, and Indians came up the lake to create a diversion for British activities farther west. Tories and Indians penetrated the Otter Creek Valley, and Barnard and vicinity received visits by Indians three times in 1780.48 Then, in October, 1780, the Indian forays into Vermont climaxed in an attack which re-enacted the horrors of the old Indian
raids in full. A raiding party of Indians and Tories under the command of British Lieutenant Richard Horton, originally aimed at Newbury, came from Lake Champlain along the Winooski River and made its way to Royalton. The town awoke to find itself attacked by over 300 "Men and Devils," who killed two men, put barns and houses to the torch and destroyed large quantities of livestock. The hastily-organized pursuit by local militia proved ineffective, and the raiders escaped with twenty-six prisoners.49 The Vermont frontier remained exposed to Indian danger and British intrigue until at least the end of the Revolutionary war.50

However, those Indians who sided with the British, like their forebears who fought alongside the French, backed the losers. The Peace of Paris of 1783, like that of 1763, was concluded by men concerned with global and imperial questions who readily sacrificed, or simply neglected, the interests of Indian allies in the North American wilderness.51 When their European allies accepted defeat, the Indians fighting in Vermont automatically became a defeated people and were left with no protection against the subsequent onrush of white settlement. Elsewhere, at the end of the Seven Years War and the American Revolution, Indian groups took the time-honored path of westward retreat; in Vermont where some remained, that path led northwards. Some Abenaki had abandoned their Vermont lands and retired to Canada by the end of the Revolution, while the majority remained in Vermont and went "underground." By the time Vermont became the fourteenth state, the settlers regarded the state as virtually empty of organized Indian groups. The War of 1812 again brought the ravages of war to the Champlain Valley and a few Abenaki joined the British in that conflict.52 But, from the Indian point of view, their action in the War of 1812 amounted to little more than a final gesture of defiance; the conquest of their Vermont homelands was all but complete.

For two centuries Vermont's geographical position placed it in a maelstrom of tension between competing groups of Algonquians, Iroquois, French, and English. Its fate and ultimate occupation were assured by events occurring far beyond its borders. The Indian wars which sputtered and died in the Green Mountains displayed some regional variations as conflicts advanced along different directions and involved fewer numbers than elsewhere in America. Otherwise, the conquest of Vermont by colonial settlers from the south was accomplished by the same combination of forces, and accompanied by similar military, cultural, and racial clashes as marked the advance of "civilization" westwards across the continent. Vermont's Indian troubles were details in a larger picture and governed by scenes elsewhere on the canvas; but they were an integral part of the whole panorama. The Indian raids which permeated Vermont's frontier history belong to a continent-wide experience of invasion and Indian retal-
tion. Winning the Green Mountain State entailed more than simply settling the land; it required the dispossession and expulsion of the native inhabitants, however few their numbers or tenuous their hold. The process was bloody and brutal, but the outcome was inevitable. All the Indians could do was to slow the progress of the occupation which edged northwards in an exorable march of conquest.

NOTES

1 The most provocative and stimulating treatment of this subject in recent years is Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism and the Cant of Conquest* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975; reprinted New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976). Jennings destroys some time-honored assumptions about the settlement of colonial America and establishes it as a process of resettlement of regions whose previous inhabitants were wiped out by the destructive forces unleashed by the invading Europeans.


The most famous incident in a history of reluctance on the part of captives to accept redemption from Indian hands occurred in 1764 when the Delaware and Shawnee were obliged to deliver up all prisoners to the victorious Henry Bouquet. Observers were impressed not only by the marked difference in the way white persons returned to "civilization" but also by the signs of grief and genuine affection shown by Indians and whites at their separation. William Smith, Historical Account of Bouquet's Expedition against the Ohio Indians in 1764 (Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Co., 1907), pp. 62-67.


Brian Burns, Massacre or Muster? Burgoyne's Indians and the Militia at Bennington, Vermont History, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer, 1977), 133-44.

The only complete first hand account of the sack of Royalton and the subsequent experiences of the captives is that of Zadock Steele, in Indian Narratives, pp. 209-76. Part of Steele's account is reprinted in Evelyn M. Wood Lovejoy, History of Royalton, Vermont (Burlington: Free Press Printing Co., 1911), ch. 11. See also: Herwig, "Indian Raid on Royalton;" George Avery Journal of the Royalton Raid, 1780, Manuscript 780900.5, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.; "The Destruction of Royalton, 16th Octr. 1780," Ms. 780566, Dartmouth College; and Alice Clark McEwan, "Excerpts from 'The Burning of Royalton,'" 1965, Ms. 965900, Dartmouth College.

