

VERMONT

*The
Proceedings of the
Vermont Historical Society*

HISTORY



SUMMER 1990

VOL. 58, No. 3



The Canadian Rebellions and the Limits of Historical Perspective

American historians have not taken the rebellions seriously, and Canadian historians have refused to follow the story beyond Canada's border.

By STEPHEN KENNY

This paper is about a border, not the line so easily crossed by the Canadian patriots in 1837-1838, but the one dictated by the perspective of Canadian and American historians who have considered the events of those years. The story affected both Canada and the United States. Both leaders and followers who took up arms against the British in Canada fled to what many believed was the land of liberty. By December 1837 they sought refuge in neighboring states such as Vermont, New York, Michigan, and Ohio. They went to towns and cities, like Montpelier and Plattsburgh, Buffalo and New York. There they attempted to win the support of their American friends and concocted counter-invasions and raids that continued for the next year. The porous boundary offered safety to Canadian rebels from both British North American colonies, Upper and Lower Canada, now Ontario and Quebec. It also afforded them the opportunity to continue their struggle. Ultimately, the plans and projects made in the United States failed. Popular support was neither sufficient nor sustained. The Martin Van Buren administration, deeply concerned by worsening British-American relations, was hostile towards the exiles. The reception given the Canadians grew increasingly grudging as it became clear in America that they would not succeed in overthrowing British government in Canada.

An investigation of the historical perspectives of American and Canadian scholars upon these events may illuminate unexamined historical boundaries. How do historians from both countries regard the repercussions of the Canadian rebellions in the United States? There is a simple but provocative answer. American historians have not seriously

examined their impact, and for the most part Canadian historians have refused to follow the story beyond Canada's borders. The dearth of historical analysis presents obvious historiographical difficulties. Why offer a reflection of what historians neglect and consider unimportant? Is the absence of serious historical analysis sufficient indication of the insignificance of these events?

Twenty-five years ago, Mason Wade suggested the limited perspectives of Canadian historians. He was the first and the last American citizen to become president of the Canadian Historical Association. A prolific author of Canadian history, he produced writings that were controversial and provocative.¹ True to form, in his presidential address entitled "A View from the South," he determined to vex his listeners. Calling himself a "damned Yankee," Wade presumed to "sound my barbaric Yankee yawp in an American view of some problems of Canadian history today."²

Some Canadian historians have never forgiven his presumption. He giped at their ponderous probity by making the untested claim that to a great extent they had gotten the story of their country wrong. Their worst blind spot was their refusal to consider the influence of America upon Canadian historical development. Wade declared:

But I remain thin skinned after all these years about what seems to me a wrong headed Canadian tendency to ignore or minimize the American element in Canadian history, in order to argue the thesis that Canadians are North Americans with a difference and a separate identity.³

Certainly, the blind spot has existed when it comes to study of the events in America following the Canadian rebellions.

Not only did Canadian historians ignore the influence of America, they generally dismissed Wade's own work, partly because of his temerity. When he delivered his speech to them in June 1965, he had already spent twenty years examining Canada and writing about its history. Professor Fernand Ouellet, among the most provocative critics of the traditional political interpretation of the Canadian rebellions, characterized Wade's analysis of the rebellions as mistaken and simplistic.⁴ Michel Brunet, neo-nationalist scholar of the earlier post-Conquest period, ignored Wade's writings.⁵ Similarly, in an historiographical study of the writing of Canadian history in English, Professor Carl Berger noted that Wade's history of the French Canadians was the first synthesis in that language. Yet Berger did not comment on its contents.⁶

Ignoring Wade is itself an interesting illustration of the boundaries of historians' minds. Understandably, his irritating and flippant indictment of Canadian scholars was not taken seriously. However, right or wrong, a balanced view should have suggested to Wade that he reflect on the

blindness of American scholars to Canada. Indeed, many Canadians, historians among them, often insist that they know far more about the United States than Americans do about Canada. In fact, Wade did mention the presence of a Canadian thread in the pattern of American historical development. He did not pursue the issue of the nearly total neglect of Canada by historians in the United States.⁷

The views of American historians may be as narrow as those of Canadians. Recently Paul Gagnon of the University of Massachusetts, in an article entitled "Why Study History?" wrote of what he considered the circumscribed perspectives of his compatriots. He emphasized that the investigation of American scholars ought to transcend the limits of their own national borders. This would enable them to discern "the evolution of our role in the world, from that of a cluster of small, quarrelsome colonies in revolution in the 1770s to that of a superpower."⁸

A part of that wider world that ought to interest scholars in the United States and students of American history is Canada. Unfortunately, today as in the past, the content of mainstream American historical literature contains little about Canada beyond slight factual information and is generally devoid of serious analysis on Canadian topics. Yet, there are many reasons why Canada could be of interest to American historians. Contiguity, a different political model, and a distinctive set of economic and social values all provide obvious points of comparison.

Such avenues for research may suggest that mutual investigation of the junctures of shared history would be extensive. Yet, at important points in the intersection of Canadian and American history, scholars from both countries frequently have offered startlingly contradictory versions of the same events. Views of the Canadian rebellions provide one example of this divergence.

A review of United States history textbook treatments of the Canadian rebellions is instructive. Of the five most widely used high school textbooks discussed in Gagnon's article none contained the slightest reference to the Canadian risings.⁹ A random search of some textbooks designed for the university level produced only slightly different results. For example, in John Garraty's *The American Nation* there was no mention.¹⁰ Complete omission might have been better than the skewered accounts of those books that did deal with the subject. In the section he wrote in *A Concise History of the American Republic*, Samuel Eliot Morison dealt with the rebellions under the heading "Anglo-American Relations." Caught between the dangers of provoking Great Britain and displeasing American voters in the border regions who sympathized with the Canadian cause, Martin Van Buren pursued a policy of neutrality. Morison argued that despite the president's neutrality proclamation, most

Americans saw the events in Canada as a sort of new American Revolution. In Morison's account, the major episode was on the night of December 29, 1837, when some Canadians rowed across the Niagara River to board and burn the *Caroline*. That ship from New York state provisioned a group of Canadian radicals, led by William Lyon Mackenzie, who had occupied and set up headquarters on Navy Island. Morison is unclear as to whether the president's first neutrality declaration came before or after this episode. He seems to suggest the former.

As for the long-term results of the rebellions, one British response was to send Lord Durham as governor. Of Durham's administration, Morison wrote:

At his suggestion, the British government granted responsible government to Quebec and Ontario in 1841, and to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick several years later. Canada owes this, in some measure at least, to the disturbing presence of her neighbor.¹¹

Is it nitpicking to remark that the two largest provinces of the new Canadian Confederation in reality received these names twenty-six years later? More importantly, neither colony achieved responsible government until late in the 1840s. What the "disturbing presence" of the United States had to do with its achievement is uncertain.

In *The American Republic*, volume 1, *To 1865*, by Richard Hofstadter, William Miller, and Daniel Aaron, the authors discussed the Canadian rebellions under the heading of "The *Caroline* Affair." Referring to the Canadian events as "petty insurrections," as did Morison, they suggested that the most important and dangerous episode was the destruction of the *Caroline*. They also assert that the subsequent trial in New York state of Alexander McLeod, who participated in the episode, seriously endangered the peace between Great Britain and the United States.¹² Not the Canadian rebellions themselves, but their ramifications upon British-American relations is the usual focus of American historians.

Of course, textbooks are easy to criticize since by their nature they cannot delve deeply. Surely, if the general survey works were not particularly concerned with the Canadian rebellions, studies of foreign policy or of the Van Buren administration would be. In the 1989 edition of *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, volume 1, *To 1914*, edited by Thomas G. Paterson, the rebellions were not mentioned.¹³ Since these events caused serious problems in foreign policy, it seemed certain that biographers of Van Buren and students of his presidency would deal with the issue.

Donald Cole's treatment in his recent study *Martin Van Buren and the American Political System* was surprising. "Late in the fall of 1837, William L. Mackenzie and Louis Jean [*sic*] Papineau led a revolt in the province of Upper Canada across the border from New York."¹⁴ Papineau had

nothing to do with organization in Upper Canada and pairing his leadership with that of Mackenzie is an error. Since both fled to the United States immediately after the rebellions and shared the same platform at many public meetings it is not surprising that an American scholar might presume joint leadership back in Canada. However, even the most rudimentary investigation of Canadian sources would not allow for such a mistake.

Similarly, an earlier study of the Van Buren presidency by John C. Curtis referred to the leadership of William Lyon Mackenzie and Louis Jean Papineau and suggested that the insurrections were widespread in Upper and Lower Canada.¹⁵ In fact, Papineau's name was Louis-Joseph. Moreover, the rebellions were brief and highly localized episodes, in Lower Canada to the south and north of Montreal and in Upper Canada to the north and west of Toronto. Obviously, neither Cole's nor Curtis's research led them across the border to books published in Canada.

Another recent book on the Van Buren presidency by Major L. Wilson and an extensive biography by John Niven contain more accurate, if short, analyses of the repercussions of the Canadian rebellions on Anglo-American relations. Without doubt, the presence of Mackenzie, Papineau, and many other Canadian radicals excited the border regions and caused serious difficulties for the American government, faced with deteriorating relations with Great Britain. Popular reaction in border regions of upstate New York and Vermont was brief but intense. The danger of many ordinary Americans taking up arms in defense of the Canadian cause and crossing the border in illegal raids was apparent. One historical account has compared the danger to a straw fire, brief but menacing.¹⁶ John Niven described the situation with the following words: "In an instant, it seemed the whole frontier was aflame at least with gasconade on both sides of the wilderness borders of New York and northern Vermont."¹⁷ Niven also argued that Van Buren was sensitive to worsening conditions. He noted that the president wrote to the governors of New York and Vermont, requesting they do everything possible to preserve calm along the Canadian-American border.¹⁸ Similarly, Major L. Wilson also stressed how the Canadian rebellions complicated the conduct of American foreign policy with regard to Great Britain.¹⁹

All of the previously cited studies of the Van Buren administration agreed that the primary aim of the American government was to preserve the peace. To this end, the president consistently attempted to dampen the enthusiasm of Americans in the border regions who appeared overwhelmingly and dangerously sympathetic to the cause of the Canadian patriots. Paradoxically, none of these books dealt seriously with the aims or activities of the Canadian radicals in the United States.

In his memoirs President Van Buren reflected specifically upon

Canadian issues that complicated his administration. Two explosive matters that he believed seriously endangered peace were the unsettled northeastern boundary between Maine and New Brunswick and the participation of Americans with the Canadian rebels. He suggested that the burning of the *Caroline* and the trial of Alexander McLeod contributed significantly to tension.²⁰ Van Buren also deeply resented the actions of William Lyon Mackenzie. The Canadian was intimately involved in the organization of raids into Canada and produced an inflammatory newspaper. After eighteen months in the United States, in June 1839 Mackenzie was convicted for breach of American neutrality laws and imprisoned in the Monroe County jail in Rochester, New York. This situation created grave problems for the president. Thousands of Americans signed petitions to the president requesting that he release the Canadian. Van Buren feared that such a pardon would undermine the forthcoming northeastern boundary negotiations between the United States and Great Britain. Clearly, the Canadian rebellions and the activities of the radical leaders in American exile menaced the successful resolution of important Anglo-American problems. Fearful of the implications of such a failure, the president in his memoirs expressed negative opinions of Mackenzie. Of the Canadian Van Buren wrote: "He entertained a high opinion of his own political importance and was rendered very implacable by the course I had felt it my duty to take in the matter . . ."²¹ Many who opposed Mackenzie at the time, as well as later generations of historians, would have agreed heartily with Van Buren's assessment of the character of the Canadian leader.

Yet the importance of the Canadian rebellions and their implications for worsening Anglo-American diplomatic relations rarely have been discussed by American historians. Still the best and most thorough account of Canadian-American relations at the time of the rebellions is Albert B. Corey's *The Crisis of 1830-1842 in Canadian-American Relations*. While Corey confused the chronology of the politics of neutrality, he was quite correct in his analysis of the basic dilemma facing the Van Buren administration, namely how to keep the peace with Great Britain while many Americans in the border regions actively sympathized with the Canadian patriots.²² Corey's book appeared nearly fifty years ago. It was reissued, unrevised, in 1970.

Another study, published in 1956, was Oscar Kinchen's *The Rise and Fall of the Patriot Hunters*. The book contains much interesting and anecdotal information about the famous "Hunters' Lodges." These secret paramilitary organizations were set up in the border regions to provoke Anglo-American conflict by raids and incursions from the United States into Canada. While assessments of their numbers and seriousness varied, the potency of rumors with regard to their plans and objectives contributed

to tension along the Canadian-American line. Kinchen's analysis was flawed by the absence of research with regard to activity of the lodges in Lower Canada. Moreover, his simplistic and dated view of the nature of the causes of the rebellions, seen primarily in terms of political issues, is no longer sustainable.²³ In the thirty-year interval, both English and French-speaking historians have radically revised the analysis of causes, stressing social and economic conditions.

Since the appearance of the books by Corey and Kinchen, no other American historian has taken up the subject to advance the analysis of the impact of the Canadian rebellions in the United States. If the neglect of historians was a true criterion of insignificance, then certainly these were not important episodes. Yet if these events have not entered into the American historiographical mainstream, neither have they been seriously considered by Canadian historians. Canadian scholars of the rebellions have written about the escape of the radicals to the United States and the renewed raids from that country in 1838. For the most part, they carry the story no further and do not comment in any meaningful way upon the later activities of the Canadian exiles.

The narrow limits of Canadian historical analysis of the career of William Lyon Mackenzie are a good example of this point. So, too, the neglect of historians seems to suggest what he did in the United States was trifling. As a young man he came to Canada from Scotland in 1820. In the dozen years before the rebellions he was a key player in the political development of the colony, as editor, politician, muckraker and rabble-rouser. Mackenzie was forty-two years old when he led the rebellions. So quickly were they suppressed that he fled almost immediately to the United States where he remained for the next dozen years. One of his biographers, William Kilbourn, wrote:

But if the rebellion was over and done with in Canada, it had only just begun for the Americans along the border. Mackenzie, once he was among them and had slept his first unharried sleep in a fortnight, was quite ready to join them in their enthusiasm for his cause.²⁴

In the United States, as traveler, speaker, filibusterer, journalist, editor, prisoner, customs inspector, letter-writer, author of almanacs and even a highly critical biography of President Van Buren, Mackenzie endured a long and arduous exile, marked by despair as he realized the failure of his cause and the futility of his presence among the Americans.²⁵

Unfortunately, Canadian historians disregard his years in the United States. A more balanced understanding of Mackenzie and his career could result from a thorough investigation of the evolution of his thinking and the important lessons he learned in exile. So far, no Canadian historian has done so. One example of the limited treatment of Mackenzie's years in the United States was William Dawson LeSueur's provocative reinter-

pretation of the rebellion leader's life, written in 1908. It was not published until 1979. The book contained only two chapters on the exile, one devoted to Mackenzie's participation at Navy Island and the other to his trial for breach of neutrality at Rochester.²⁶ Likewise, in his 1956 biography of Mackenzie, William Kilbourn dealt very briefly with the exile despite his portentous words regarding the enthusiasm of the Americans.²⁷ The only real exception was the study by Charles Lindsey, which was the earliest biography of Mackenzie. Primarily anecdotal, the book leaves a valuable and intimate chronological record of the life of the Canadian radical. However, the material, written only a year after Mackenzie's death, should be read with great care: Lindsey was Mackenzie's son-in-law and had a deep and obvious affection for him.²⁸

Besides Mackenzie, there were many other Canadian rebels who sought refuge and sustenance in the United States. By December 1, 1837, Louis-Joseph Papineau was there. Deeply divided from his more radical supporters, Papineau was not able to control the activities of the more energetic "patriotes," such as Doctors Robert Nelson and C. H. O. Côté. In February 1838, these two organized an unsuccessful raid into Canada from Alburg, Vermont. As a result they were arrested and jailed by the American authorities. In the spring, they were tried for breach of neutrality at Windsor, Vermont, where they were acquitted by a sympathetic jury on May 23, 1838.²⁹ Support in the region for the pair was strong. Perceived as leaders of the cause of freedom, they also had ties with the University of Vermont. Côté received his medical degree from the school in 1832. A graduate of Dartmouth class of 1831, Nelson received an honorary M.A. from the University of Vermont in 1837.³⁰ During the trial of the two men at Windsor, supporters converged on the town from the surrounding districts. It was unlikely that any jury would risk alienating those crowds. On May 25, a great public banquet was held to honor the pair in Montpelier. Spirits were high. The *Montpelier Watchman and Journal* expressed hope that "the winter of discontent" would be followed by "a glorious summer." In the customary fashion of the times, at the banquet there were more than twenty toasts, among them to "Liberty," "Exiled Canadians," "Green Mountain Juries," "Vermont Presses," "Martyrs of St. Denis," and "Vermont."³¹

In this feverish environment, Papineau's leadership was increasingly challenged. The more radical "patriotes" were tired of his moderate approach. They believed that the time for political opposition and verbal sparring was finished. Recourse to arms and violence was necessary. Fernand Ouellet described the difficulties of the "patriotes" in the United States in the following words: "Internal dissension, especially between Papineau and the radicals of the more revolutionary group, made it ex-

.....

tremely difficult to set up an organization capable of planning a military campaign."³²

Having failed in the February raid, Côté and Nelson, after they were released from jail, began organizing "La Société des Frères Chasseurs" or "Hunters' Lodges." Planning future invasions, they hoped secrecy would improve their chance at success. Lodges spread along the American border with important ones at Lockport, Buffalo, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Detroit. Some have estimated as many as 200,000 members, but Albert B. Corey guessed more conservatively and realistically between forty and fifty thousand.³³ In November 1838, Côté and Nelson led another attack into Canada from Vermont. At the same time, other Canadian radicals crossed the St. Lawrence River from New York State to the region near Prescott, an episode often referred to as the Battle of the Windmill. Every attack failed.

Such failures dampened enthusiasm and the raids eventually ceased. The Canadian patriots in America, however, did not disappear. Indeed, they were moored there more certainly than before. They tried other means to win American support. For example, Ludger Duvernay, editor of the most important "patriote" newspaper in Lower Canada, *La Minerve*, fled from Montreal to the United States where he remained from late 1837 until 1842.³⁴ In close contact with the other "patriotes," he participated in the planning of raids and the organization of "Les Frères Chasseurs." After the failures of November 1838, he went to New York City. There, along with Mackenzie, he attempted with little success to stir enthusiasm and win support. Deeply disappointed, he wrote to a friend: "For the most part, public opinion in the large cities is generally against us. The few friends we do have dare not express opinions in our support."³⁵ Thinking chances would be better in the border regions, in spring 1839 he went to Burlington, Vermont. In that town, between August 1839 and February 1840, he published *Le Patriote Canadien: Journal Hébdomadaire, Politique, Historique, Littéraire et Industriel*. This weekly soon folded and after a few hard years Duvernay went back to Montreal to take up *La Minerve* once again.

While short-lived, Duvernay's Burlington newspaper is instructive. Canadian historians have not analyzed it, although a couple have mentioned it. For example, Robert Rumilly described it as politically moderate.³⁶ Historian Jacques Monet, S.J., expressed quite different views regarding Duvernay and his paper. He wrote:

One of the most famous patriots and editor of the equally famous *La Minerve*—a braggart, a coward, a drunkard—Ludger Duvernay surprisingly maintained popular support, managing to escape British troops and join the other exiles in Vermont.³⁷

Noting Duvernay's contribution to "Les Frères Chasseurs," Monet

wrote: "Later he published *Le Patriote Canadien*, an inflammatory sheet, which was a complete financial failure."³⁸

In fact, *Le Patriote Canadien* was not inflammatory. As Duvernay began the paper, he realized that the failure of the earlier raids resulted in diminishing support for the Canadian cause in the border regions. Moreover, the early days of sympathetic juries was over. One important example of that change was Mackenzie's conviction and imprisonment. Consequently, Duvernay was careful and moderate in the writing of his newspaper. An attentive reading of the paper suggests he avoided controversy and feared being too provocative. For example, Duvernay did mention Mackenzie's incarceration and the thousands of petitioners who demanded his release but did not dare criticize or comment upon these matters.³⁹ Together on New York City platforms less than a year before, Duvernay and Mackenzie found the situation had changed for them and for other Canadian radicals in the United States. From his jail cell Mackenzie pitifully wrote to thank Duvernay for his support.⁴⁰ Yet, the mention of Mackenzie's problems was really no support at all. In a long and turbulent career before and after his American exile, Duvernay's most sensible and cautious newspaper was *Le Patriote Canadien*. Unfortunately, such restraint did not sell newspapers.

The remarks of Rumilly and Monet were cursory. The work by historians André Beaulieu and Jean Hamelin was curious for its absence of comment. In their catalogue of the Quebec press between 1764 and 1859, they discussed Duvernay's work on *La Minerve* before and after the rebellions.⁴¹ There was no acknowledgement even of the existence of *Le Patriote Canadien*. This omission is still another example of Canadian historians' failure to treat the story of the rebellions thoroughly. Once again, it seems that what "patriotes" did in America was unimportant. *Le Patriote Canadien* was written in French by a Lower Canadian radical. Duvernay sought a French-Canadian readership and continued support for the cause. He wrote it while in exile in Burlington, Vermont. Clearly, the newspaper is as much Canadian as American. Does it not merit meaningful historical attention? The neglect of Canadian historians suggests the answer is no.

There were other less well-known exiles who tried journalism. For example, H. J. Thomas published the *North American* in Swanton, Vermont. Before fleeing to the United States, Thomas edited the *Mississkoui Post and Canada Record* in Stanbridge, Lower Canada. The front page of the *North American* sported the motto, "Canadian Rights and Canadian Independence," and Thomas declared that his goal was to solicit the support of Canadian and American friends of liberty.⁴² The paper lasted more than two years from April 1839 to August 1841, the final

months of production sporadic. Yet of all of the newspapers produced by Canadian exiles, the little Swanton sheet was the most regularly published. Many years later, Thomas's daughter described her father's escape from Canada.

When the troops were called out, one of their first acts was to suppress the *Mississkoui Post* which they did by drowning the press in the mill pond, and dismembering the office furniture and casting it into the street. The proprietors, Bingham and Thomas, were not at home that day. Business had called them through the woods to Vermont.⁴³

Thomas's effort at Swanton was among his most important achievements as a journalist. In mid-1840, J. B. Ryan, an Irish immigrant, Quebec City businessman, and "patriote" sympathizer, took over the *North American* until its demise in the summer of 1841.⁴⁴

Canadian historians have not attempted to analyze the contents or calculate the impact of the *North American*. Beaulieu and Hamelin did not mention it. They did note Thomas's work on the *Mississkoui Post* and on the equally ephemeral *Canada Times*, which he edited after he returned to Montreal. Similarly, the author of a recent biographical sketch of J. B. Ryan did not mention his work in Vermont.⁴⁵ Despite such neglect the *North American* provides rich illustration of the divisions and differences among Canadian exiles in Vermont. For example, Dr. C. H. O. Côté had a fundamental influence on the paper. In spring 1839, an advertisement announced that he was setting up medical practice in Swanton at Asseltyn's Hotel. He contributed frequently to the newspaper and was an important inspiration for its editorial point of view. Its columns were filled with his articles, which harshly attacked the leadership and character of Louis-Joseph Papineau and excoriated the treachery of the Roman Catholic church in Lower Canada.⁴⁶ Failure to consider these Vermont newspapers is still another indication of the refusal of Canadian scholars to pursue their investigation beyond the border.

Admittedly, this disregard of Canadian historians can be explained by a number of practical factors. As for the Vermont editors, some were obscure characters not in the first rank of the leadership. Their itineraries in exile were vague and not easy to reconstruct. Their newspapers were short-lived. Such factors constitute significant obstructions to research and complicate the understanding of the role and impact of the Canadians in Vermont.

Nevertheless, even when not confronted with such obstacles, Canadian historians have failed to consider the long and complex story of the Canadian rebellions beyond their borders. For example, a 1985 book, *The Rebellion of 1837: A Collection of Documents*, edited by Colin Read and Ronald J. Stagg, contains 442 items. Only fourteen are drawn from

the American side, fully half of these taken from a single early issue of *Mackenzie's Gazette*.⁴⁷ In a lengthy biographical article on Mackenzie, coauthored by Ronald Stagg and Frederick Armstrong ten years earlier, the authors noted that most studies of the man focused on the years between 1824 and 1838 and that the latter part of his career has been "badly neglected."⁴⁸ In the book of documents, Stagg made no effort to fill the void. In the recent *Canadian Historical Association Booklet*, entitled "The Rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada," Colin Read addresses the repercussions, recounting the escape of the rebels, the *Caroline* incident, and various raids during 1838, but without offering any critical comment of their significance.⁴⁹

Indeed, Canadian historians generally have dealt with the American part of the story with rapidity and brevity. For example, in a recent survey by Edelgard Mahant and Graeme S. Mount, entitled *An Introduction to Canadian-American Relations*, the rebellions received a scant two pages. And like their American counterparts, the authors devoted most of their few words to the *Caroline* affair and the subsequent arrest and trial of Alexander McLeod.⁵⁰ Nothing was noted of the important tensions in Anglo-American relations or of the considerable dangers for Canada.

A notable example of this historiographical tradition is the work of Gerald M. Craig, eminent historian of Upper Canada and Canadian-American relations. A large part of one of his most important books, *Upper Canada: The Formative Years, 1784-1841*, dealt with political evolution towards rebellion. Craig covered the story on the American side in a few paragraphs. He claimed that the most important popular feeling of Canadians who lived through the events was the fear of further invasions from the United States.⁵¹ In a later book on Canadian-American relations Craig argued that the rebellions were small and "often assigned a greater importance than they deserve." Of the unsettled Canadian-American frontier, he wrote:

These border troubles require brief mention before we sketch the reorganization of Canadian politics in the dozen years after 1837. . . . Nevertheless, for several years both provinces suffered from the periodic border raids, which in the case of Upper Canada at least, produced more casualties and more destruction than the original rebellions had caused and which produced a sharp chill in Canadian-American relations.⁵²

In the chapter he contributed to a textbook designed to introduce American students to Canada, Craig argued that the raids of Canadian exiles and their American sympathizers disturbed the peace more than the rebellions themselves.⁵³ In fact, Craig never diverged from his opinion stated in his study of Upper Canada:

Intervention from across the American border, lasting over several years, was to bring far more alarm, expense and bloodshed than the rebellion itself produced, and was to complicate seriously the process of political and social transition.⁵⁴

Reflecting on events in Lower Canada, Fernand Ouellet echoed the views of Craig. In *Le Bas Canada, 1791-1840*, he described the second outbreak of violence in 1838 and the raids from Vermont, concluding that: "The results of the second insurrection were much more tragic than those of the previous year."⁵⁵

If such opinions are true, why did Craig and so many others not extend their analysis beyond the border? It is not sufficient merely to note the neglect of historians; it is also important to ask why. Part of the answer derives from Canadian historians' traditional interpretation of the rebellions, which minimizes their importance. The usual adjectives and qualifiers underline the point. Words most often used to describe the rebellions are "tragicomedy,"⁵⁶ "unplanned," "leaderless," "scattered," "short-lived,"⁵⁷ "flash in the pan," "comic opera," "ill-starred,"⁵⁸ "desperate," "ill-organized," "fumbling," "feeble," "foredoomed,"⁵⁹ "unprepared," "incompetent," and "ambivalent."⁶⁰ Both English and French-speaking historians have liked the word "abortive."⁶¹ In French "lamentable," "avortement," "aventure,"⁶² "indiscipliné," "mal dirigé,"⁶³ "vain," "tragique"⁶⁴ and "cuisante défaite"⁶⁵ have been used. One of the most intriguing words was that used by Colin Read, who wrote:

Undeniably, the Rebellion was an important, if uncharacteristic, event in the life of a province [Ontario], whose politics have usually been marked by tranquillity, even somnolence, rather than by violence and strife.⁶⁶

To describe the insurrections as "uncharacteristic" is to suggest that they were an aberration and unCanadian.

In addition to the cumulative sense of insignificance, Canadian historians have quite rightly concluded that the rebellions were a failure. That they were unimportant and unsuccessful explains much of the refusal of Canadian scholars to follow the story over the border. What would be the point? Canadian historical analysis immediately focuses on the new design of government for Canada provided by Great Britain and its first and most extraordinary agent, John George Lambton, Lord Durham. A new generation of political leaders took the stage to fight other battles and to accomplish more moderate reforms. Meanwhile, the silly, erratic, discredited patriots skulked off into exile to lick their wounds and hatch irresponsible and subversive plots, which seemed more episodes of senseless vengeance than the continuation of the struggle for liberty. Who needs to know of these men and of their activities in exile? For the majority

of Canadian historians the answer appears to be no one. Would not subsequent considerations after the rebels' most significant defeat merely be anti-climactic?

This prevailing historiographical wisdom has effectively displaced earlier opinions of historians who perceived the rebellions as desperate acts led by reckless heroes who believed that despite the failure their efforts were worthy all the same.⁶⁷ For the moment, most Canadian historians stress the weakness and ineptitude of the leaders and the unpopular and unrepresentative nature of their cause.⁶⁸ Such perceptions lend weight to the argument that the risings were truly insignificant. Some historians have gone one step further. For example, Gerald M. Craig has suggested that because of their absurdity, the rebellions actually delayed reform rather than accelerating it.⁶⁹

While most Canadian historians have agreed that the rebellions were a failure, some have accepted their legitimacy. The violence of those years spurred the interest of the British government. As a result, important readjustments and reforms of Canadian political structures followed. Colin Read argued that there was no immediate connection between the rebellions and subsequent political reforms. However, he did acknowledge that British government in Canada was oppressive and that those who sympathized with the Canadian patriots could take comfort in the fact that the rebels were men of courage and conviction.⁷⁰

Few scholars have argued that the rebellions were important. One notable exception is Michael Cross who denied they were absurd and contended that they were closely connected to the process of political change in the colonies. Cross also objected to what he referred to as Craig's "standard version." Cross believed that far from delaying reform the results of the rebellions were quite the opposite. The insurrections shattered the political stalemate that for years had effectively silenced and frustrated those who opposed the status quo in Canada. Had the logjam not been broken, the reforms of the following years would have taken even longer. For Cross the rebellions were a necessary failure.⁷¹

In reflecting on the Short Hills raid of June 1838, Cross suggested that the attack from New York State into the Niagara peninsula near Navy Island seemed like another frivolous episode, a fiasco like all the rest. Of the participants' involvement, Cross wrote:

Conventional historical wisdom would suggest they did so because they were misguided and misled. The rebellion in Upper Canada, so this interpretation has run, was an unnecessary event in the political history of the country, a political history which was working itself towards responsible government and eventual democracy. The uprising had a negligible effect upon that political history, beyond the disorder and suffering it caused for those involved. It was, then, the

logical culmination of the career of the mad demagogue, William Lyon Mackenzie, who was chiefly responsible for all the trouble. The simultaneous rebellion in Lower Canada was similarly unnecessary and misdirected.⁷²

Rejecting this perspective, Cross argued that the Canadian rebellions were a quest for liberty fitting into a much larger "liberal" spirit of change, which spread across Western Europe. As examples, he noted the Russian Decembrist Revolt in 1825, the risings in central and western Europe in 1830, the Chartist movement in England in the 1830s and 1840s, and the revolutionary year of 1848. In this larger context, Cross asked: "Why should Canada have avoided the contagion of freedom, why should the Canadian rebellions be evaluated so much more harshly?"⁷³ Of course, such questions are no proof of significance. However, for those sensible to the incredible changes of 1989 and to the ramifications of events in places like Romania and Lithuania, Cross's questions ring truer than previous claims about the unimportance of the Canadian rebellions.

Another recent reflection on the events in Canada in 1837 and 1838 is provided by historian Phillip Buckner who addressed the rebellions in a unique way. In his recent and innovative study of British government in Canada in the first half of the nineteenth century, entitled *Transition to Responsible Government*, Buckner placed the rebellions within a logical pattern, which he characterized as "decolonization,"⁷⁴ the gradual and inevitable movement towards autonomy and independence. Arguments such as those offered by Cross and Buckner lend a greater importance to the process of the Canadian rebellions. Because the patriots were generally considered insignificant, Canadian historians were not inclined to follow their course in exile. What was absurd in Canada could have been no less so in the United States. However, if Cross and Buckner are right, to the extent that the rebellions were important it is equally necessary to discover what happened on the American side of the border.

Fortunately, the historiographical boundaries are not completely closed. Recently, two books have appeared that deal with the exile of Mackenzie and Papineau. One, written by Ruth White, examined the French-Canadian leader. Papineau, who was in the United States for a little more than a year, left for France in February 1839 and returned to Canada in 1845. White was primarily concerned with his years in France. However, the book is a good example of a rare willingness on the part of a Canadian historian to extend analysis beyond Canada.⁷⁵ Hopefully, similar studies of other important Lower Canadian "patriotes" such as Duvernay and Côté, who spent their exile in the United States, will appear. Such serious historical analysis would be most useful in completing the understanding of the American side of the story.

Similarly, in 1988, Lillian Gates published a lengthy study of the life

of Mackenzie after the rebellions.⁷⁶ A work of admirable detail, it was the result of Gates's sympathetic and lifelong commitment to produce a complete biography of Mackenzie. Gates was one American historian who wrote numerous articles on various aspects of his career in the United States.⁷⁷ Like Canadian historians who focused narrowly on the Canadian side, Gates limited investigation to Mackenzie's experience in the United States. In her recent biography, however, she examined the whole period of his exile as well as the final ten years of Mackenzie's life after he returned to Canada in 1851. The author did not deal seriously with Mackenzie's earlier years in Canada or his participation in the rebellions. While useful, the Gates biography was not without fault. Its approach was chronological, narrative, and anecdotal. Like Canadian scholars with limited focus, Gates did not examine the whole career of her subject. Moreover, she appeared unfamiliar with the recent historiographical evolution of the rebellions. Nevertheless, Gates's work provided the most intimate and detailed profile of Mackenzie's life in America. Despite their weaknesses, the books of White and Gates represented the first step in the crucial and necessary investigation of what happened after the failure of the Canadian rebellions.

One of the answers to Paul Gagnon's question "Why study history?" relates specifically to failure. For Gagnon, a thorough understanding of the past and true historical consciousness obliges the historian to go beyond success. He wrote:

It takes a sense of the tragic and of the comic to make a citizen of good judgement. . . . It takes a sense of paradox, so as not to be surprised when failure teaches us more than victory does, or when we slip from triumph to folly.⁷⁸

Like many Canadian historians, the former premier of the province of Ontario, William Davis, described the rebellions as tragic and comic. He claimed that the defeat of the rebels discredited the resort to arms and violence in Canada as a means for change. Davis wrote:

Thus, the rebellion was at once the most marked break in the evolutionary pattern that has so largely characterized the province's political development over its two hundred year history and a confirmation of that moderate, gradualist tradition.⁷⁹

In Canadian history, perhaps no events were so tragicomic and paradoxical as the rebellions of 1837. Clearly, they were a failure. But were they folly? While Canadian historians do not question the defeat, they differ on the implications of failure. Were the rebels madmen or visionaries? Answers to such questions will only be found in a fuller examination of the whole story.

In conclusion, some serious questions should be asked about the Canadian rebellions and their repercussions in the United States. Why

should Americans know about these events? This was the first time since 1776 that North Americans had risen against the British on the continent. At the time, many Americans believed the Canadian episode was a repetition of what they had experienced eighty years earlier. In the prospectus for his *Gazette*, William Lyon Mackenzie recalled the words of a supportive New York City editor, written to him several years before: "There is a time for all things; and when that time comes let them [the Canadians] send down to New York and they shall have a schoolmaster to teach them the ABCs of democracy very cheap."⁸⁰ The lessons, when they were taught, were completely unexpected. The instruction of the Americans left the Canadian patriots despondent. Serious historical analysis of the response in the United States, official and unofficial, would teach Americans about the nature of their relationship to Canada, of their government's hesitation to export their revolution, and of Americans' failure to supply substantial and useful support. Familiarity with these events could teach Americans much about the evolution of their role in the world.

Why should Canadians extend their historical investigation over the border? One simple answer is that the story did not stop in Canada. If the rebellions were important, so, too, were the itineraries and the evolution of the political thought of the exiles. Absence of substantial American support caused many in Canada to conclude that American models of government and politics were not appropriate for Canada. Their long and arduous exile led many Canadian patriots to acknowledge that Canadian development, whatever the direction, would be unique. This was a lesson learned only through living in the United States.

Historical analysis of the story of the rebellions beyond Canada should continue. The limits of Canadian and American historical perspectives should be transcended. In so doing, we may even establish the truth or falsity of Mason Wade's provocative and untested supposition that in ignoring America an important element of the Canadian character is missed. Perhaps such an investigation would illustrate that Canadians really are North Americans with a separate identity. Canadians may learn the same lessons as the Canadian patriots who crossed the boundary in 1837-1838 — that the political model of their friends and neighbors to the south would not work for Canada. The limited boundaries of historical perspective really should be dismantled.

NOTES

I wish to thank Clint White, professor of history, Campion College, University of Regina, who read an early draft of this material and commented with his customary balance of severity and good humor.

¹ A longer examination of Wade's "Canadian" work is contained in my article, "Histoire sans cœur?": Historiographical Reflection on the Work of Mason Wade," *American Review of Canadian Studies* XVII, no. 3 (Autumn 1987).

² Mason Wade, "Presidential Address: A View from the South," *Canadian Historical Association Annual Report* (June 1965): 2.

³ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴ Fernand Ouellet, *Histoire Economique et Sociale du Québec, 1760-1850* (Ottawa: Fides, 1966), 433.

⁵ Michel Brunet published three important titles after the appearance of *The French Canadians* in 1955. In none does he mention Wade's work. See Brunet's *La Présence anglaise et les Canadiens* (Montréal: Beauchemin, 1958); *Québec/Canada anglais: Deux itinéraires: un affrontement* (Montréal: Editions HMH Ltée, 1968); *Les Canadiens après la Conquête, 1759-1775* (Montreal: Fides, 1969).

⁶ Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English Canadian Historical Writing, 1900 to 1970* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 184.

⁷ Wade, "A View from the South," 12.

⁸ Paul Gagnon, "Why Study History?" *Atlantic Monthly* (November 1988): 173.

⁹ I examined the same five books analyzed in Paul Gagnon's "Why Study History?" (see note no. 8). See Daniel J. Boorstin and Brooks Mather Kelley, *A History of the United States* (Needham, Mass.: Prentice Hall, 1989); Henry W. Bragdon and Samuel P. McCutchen, *History of a Free People* (New York: Macmillan, 1981); James West Davidson and Mark H. Lytle, *The United States: A History of the Republic* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988); Norman K. Risjord and Terry L. Haywoode, *People and Our Country* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982); Lewis Paul Todd and Merle Curti, *Triumph of the American Nation* (Chicago: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986).

¹⁰ John A. Garraty, *The American Nation: A History of the United States to 1877*, vol. 1, 3d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

¹¹ Samuel Eliot Morison, Henry Steele Commager, and William E. Leuchtenburg, *A Concise History of the American Republic*, vol. 1, *To 1877* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 199-200.

¹² Richard Hofstadter, William Miller, and Daniel Aaron, *The American Republic*, vol. 1, *To 1865* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 469-470.

¹³ Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol. 1, *To 1914* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1989).

¹⁴ Donald B. Cole, *Martin Van Buren and the American Political System* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 321.

¹⁵ James C. Curtis, *The Fox at Bay: Martin Van Buren and the Presidency, 1837-1841* (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), 171.

¹⁶ John Duffy and H. Nicholas Muller, "The Great Wolf Hunt: the Popular Response in Vermont to the 'Patriote' Uprising of 1837," *Journal of American Studies* 8 (August 1974): 153-169.

¹⁷ John Niven, *Martin Van Buren: The Romantic Age of American Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 436.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Major L. Wilson, *The Presidency of Martin Van Buren* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1984), 157.

²⁰ *The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren*, vol. II, John C. Fitzpatrick, editor (New York: Da Capo Press, 1973), 465-466.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 538.

²² Albert B. Corey, *The Crisis of 1830-1842 in Canadian-American Relations* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1941; reissued 1970), 46.

Confusingly, Corey wrote that president Van Buren issued his first neutrality proclamation on November 21, 1837. That date was before the outbreak of rebellions in Canada. The first neutrality proclamation was on January 5, 1838. In the following months, the president convinced the reluctant Congress to legislate a stronger neutrality act. On November 21, 1838, the president issued a second neutrality proclamation as a result of the renewed raids into Canada from New York and Vermont. See Cole, 323-325; Niven, 439-440; Curtis, 173-181; Wilson, 158-162.

While Corey did make an important chronological error that crept into other books, his analysis of the dilemma of the Van Buren administration was correct. See especially chapter IV of his book *Curbing the Patriots*. I certainly do not agree with Curtis that Corey's mistake seriously flawed his entire analysis. See Curtis, 174 FN 11.

- ²³Oscar A. Kinchen, *The Rise and Fall of the Patriot Hunters* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1956).
- ²⁴William Kilbourn, *The Firebrand: William Lyon Mackenzie and the Rebellion in Upper Canada* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1956), 218.
- ²⁵A discussion of Mackenzie and other patriot journalists is contained in my article, "Strangers' Sojourn": Canadian Journalists in Exile," *American Review of Canadian Studies* XVII (Summer 1987).
- ²⁶William Dawson LeSueur, *William Lyon Mackenzie: A Re-interpretation*, edited with an introduction by A. B. McKillop, Carleton Library No. 111 (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1979). See especially chapters 18 & 19, "The Activities of an Exile" and "Imprisonment and Other Vicissitudes," 305-348.
- ²⁷Kilbourn, 218-243.
- ²⁸Charles Lindsey, *The Life and Times of Wm. Lyon Mackenzie: with an Account of the Canadian Rebellion of 1837 and the Subsequent Frontier Disturbances, chiefly from Unpublished Documents*, vols. 1 & 2 (Toronto: P. R. Randall, 1862), 100-301.
- ²⁹Mackenzie reported the release of Nelson and Côté in *Mackenzie's Gazette*, June 2, 1838. Two weeks later, he picked up the report of the Montpelier banquet from the *Watchman and Journal*. See *Mackenzie's Gazette*, June 16, 1838. Later in a series entitled "History of Canada," which Côté published throughout 1840 and 1841, he recounted his arrest, trial, and release in Windsor, Vermont. See the *North American*, June 23, 1841.
- ³⁰See Duffy and Muller, 154. See also an article by Eugene Link, "Vermont Physicians and the Canadian Rebellion in 1837," *Vermont History* 37 (Summer 1969): 177-83.
- ³¹*Mackenzie's Gazette*, June 16, 1838.
- ³²"Les dissensions internes, la rupture entre Papineau et les radicaux du groupe révolutionnaire rendirent particulièrement ardue la mise sur pied d'un organisme capable d'assumer la direction d'une entreprise militaire." (English translation by the author.) Ouellet, 429. See also his later book *Le Bas Canada, 1791-1840. Changements structureux et crise*, 2e édition (Ottawa: Editions de l'université d'Ottawa, 1980), 470.
- ³³Corey, 75-77.
- ³⁴There is material on Duvernay in my article about patriot journalists that is already cited in note 25. More information is contained in another article by me entitled, "Duvernay's Exile in 'Balenton': The Vermont Interlude of a Canadian Patriot," *Vermont History* 52 (Spring 1984): 103-122.
- ³⁵"L'opinion publique des grandes villes est généralement contre nous. Le petit nombre d'amis que nous avons n'osent pas se prononcer en notre faveur." (English translation by the author.) The Archives Nationales du Québec contains hundreds of letters from Duvernay's correspondence during his exile. A list and compendium of the correspondence was published in *Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province du Québec, 1926-1927*. See Ludger Duvernay à Louis Perrault, 17 février 1839.
- ³⁶Robert Rumilly, *Histoire des Franco-Américains* (Montréal: édité par l'auteur, 1958), 23.
- ³⁷"Quant à Ludger Duvernay, le plus célèbre des patriotes et le directeur, du non moins célèbre journal montréalais *La Minerve* — un fanfaron, un lâche, un buveur mais un homme qui, étrangement demeura toujours populaire — lui aussi avait réussi . . . à échapper aux soldats britanniques et à rejoindre les autres au Vermont." (English translation by the author.) Jacques Monet, S.J., *La Première Révolution Tranquille: Le Nationalisme Canadien-français, 1837-1850*, Richard Bastien, trad. (Montréal: Fides, 1981), 25.
- ³⁸"Plus tard il lança *le Patriote Canadien*, une feuille au style enflammé, mais ce fut un échec financier total." (English translation by the author.) Ibid.
- ³⁹*Le Patriote Canadien*, 7 août, 1839 et 4 décembre, 1839.
- ⁴⁰*Mackenzie's Gazette*, November 23, 1839.
- ⁴¹André Beaulieu et Jean Hamelin, *La Presse Québécoise, des origines à nos jours* T.I. 1764-1859. (Québec: Les Presses de l'université Laval, 1973).
- ⁴²*North American*, April 10, 1839.
- ⁴³"Incidents of the Canadian Rebellions," *Second Report of the Mississquoi County Historical Society*, cited in Beaulieu et Hamelin, 84.
- ⁴⁴*North American*, August 12, 1840.
- ⁴⁵Marianna O'Gallagher, S.C.H., "J. B. Ryan," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. IX, 1861-1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 695.
- ⁴⁶*North American*, June 12, 1839.
- ⁴⁷Colin Read and Ronald J. Stagg, eds., *The Rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada: A Collection of Documents*, Publications of the Champlain Society, Ontario, series XII, Carleton Library Series No. 134 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1985).
- ⁴⁸Frederick H. Armstrong and Ronald J. Stagg, "William Lyon Mackenzie," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. IX, 496, 508.
- ⁴⁹Colin Read, "The Rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada," *The Canadian Historical Association: Historical Booklet*, no. 46 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1988), 19-22.

- ⁵⁰ Edgard E. Mahant and Graeme S. Mount, *An Introduction to Canadian-American Relations* (Toronto: Methuen, 1984), 36-37.
- ⁵¹ Gerald M. Craig, *Upper Canada: The Formative Years, 1784-1841*, Canadian Centenary Series (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Limited, 1963), 249-251.
- ⁵² Craig, *The United States and Canada* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 123-124.
- ⁵³ Craig, "A Historical Perspective: The Evolution of a Nation," in *Understanding Canada. A Multidisciplinary Introduction to Canadian Studies*, William Metcalfe, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1982).
- ⁵⁴ Craig, *Upper Canada*, 249.
- ⁵⁵ "Le bilan de la seconde insurrection est beaucoup plus tragique que celui de l'année précédente." (English translation by the author.) Ouellet, *Le Bas Canada*, 482.
- ⁵⁶ Craig, *Upper Canada*, 248.
- ⁵⁷ Edgar McInnis, *Canada: A Political and Social History*, 3d. ed. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, Ltd., 1969), 257.
- ⁵⁸ A. R. M. Lower, *Colony to Nation: A History of Canada* (Toronto: Longmans Canada, 1946), 226, 242.
- ⁵⁹ W. L. Morton, *The Kingdom of Canada. A General History from Earliest Times* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), 247-248.
- ⁶⁰ J. L. Finlay and D. N. Sprague, *The Structure of Canadian History*, 3d. ed. (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, Canada, Inc., 1989), 126.
- ⁶¹ Read, *Historical Booklet*, no. 46, 21.
- ⁶² Ouellet, *Histoire Economique et Sociale du Québec*, 431, 432, 435.
- ⁶³ Ouellet, *Le Bas Canada*, 466.
- ⁶⁴ *Histoire du Québec*, publiée sous la direction de Jean Hamelin (Montréal: Editions France-Amérique, 1976), 337.
- ⁶⁵ Monet, 21.
- ⁶⁶ Read, *Historical Booklet*, no. 46, 3.
- ⁶⁷ John Bartlett Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle; The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain*. Carleton Library, no. 30 (1945; reprint, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), 144. See also Lower, 226-227.
- ⁶⁸ Fernand Ouellet, "Louis-Joseph Papineau. A Divided Soul," *The Canadian Historical Association. Historical Booklet*, no. 11 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1964). See also Ouellet's *Histoire Economique et Sociale*, 432-434, and *Le Bas Canada*, 431.
- A prolific and provocative critic of Mackenzie is Frederick Armstrong. See his articles, "William Lyon Mackenzie: First Mayor of Toronto," *Canadian Historical Review* XLVIII (December 1967); and "William Lyon Mackenzie: The Persistent Hero," *Journal of Canadian Studies* VI (August 1971). See also the biography of Mackenzie, *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. IX, 496-508.
- ⁶⁹ Craig, *The United States and Canada*, 124.
- ⁷⁰ Read, *Historical Booklet*, no. 46, 24.
- ⁷¹ Michael S. Cross, "1837: The Necessary Failure," in *Readings in Canadian Social History*, vol. 2, *Pre-Industrial Canada, 1760-1849*, Michael S. Cross and Gregory S. Kealey, eds. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 155-156.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, 146. To situate the Short Hills I searched in a standard Canadian historical atlas. They could not be found. Nor was I able to locate any map of any of the military episodes during the rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada. See D. G. G. Kerr, ed., *A Historical Atlas of Canada*, 2d. ed. (Don Mills, Ontario: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1966).
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, 146-147.
- ⁷⁴ Phillip A. Buckner, *The Transition to Responsible Government; British Policy in British North America, 1815-1850* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 192.
- ⁷⁵ Ruth L. White, *Louis-Joseph Papineau et Laménais: Le chef des Patriotes Canadiens à Paris, 1839-1845, avec correspondance et documents inédits*, Cahiers du Québec, Collections Documents d'histoire (Montréal: Hurtubise HMH, 1983).
- ⁷⁶ Lillian F. Gates, *After the Rebellion. The Later Years of William Lyon Mackenzie* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1988).
- ⁷⁷ See the following articles by Gates: "W. L. Mackenzie's 'Volunteer' and the First Parliament of United Canada," *Ontario History* LIX (September 1967); "Mackenzie's Gazette: An Aspect of Mackenzie's American Years," *Canadian Historical Review* XLVI (December 1965); "The Decided Policy of William Lyon Mackenzie," *Canadian Historical Review* XL (September 1959).
- ⁷⁸ Gagnon, 44.
- ⁷⁹ Read and Stagg, *Documents*, vii-viii.
- ⁸⁰ Prospectus of *Mackenzie's Gazette*, published in *L'Estafette Extra* (New York), April 17, 1838.