The Pawlet Expedition, September 1777

The American Expedition to Pawlet had as its goal to divide, divert, and harass the army of General John Burgoyne. This marked the beginning of a new military climate. The long retreat and defensive posture of the main American army had been reversed.

By Edward A. Hoyt

Preface, Discussion and Conclusions by Ronald F. Kingsley

Edward A. Hoyt, Jr. (1913–2003), was raised in Flushing, Long Island, NY. He graduated from Williams College, Williamstown, Mass., in 1936, where he stayed on as a teaching assistant from 1939–1940. Family connections in Castleton brought him to Vermont, where he worked as the Librarian-Curator at the Vermont Historical Society, 1940–1942. Mr. Hoyt was the first full-time professional employed by the VHS. He left that position to serve with the U.S. Army from 1942–1945. Posted in Puerto Rico while in the service, he published A History of the Harbor Defenses of San Juan, P. R., under Spain, 1509–1898 (1944).

After the war, Mr. Hoyt returned to Vermont, where from 1950–1955 he was Editor of State Papers. During these years and for several years following his tenure in this position, he edited four volumes of the General Petitions presented to the Vermont General Assembly during the years 1778–1799, volumes 8–11 in the series of Vermont State Papers, published 1952–1962 by the Office of the Secretary of State of Vermont. For many years following his retirement until shortly before his death in 2003, Mr. Hoyt served almost daily as a volunteer at the Vermont Historical Society Library, assisting library patrons, the library staff,
scholars, and researchers in early Vermont history and genealogy. During this time he continued his own research and writing on early Vermont history, with a special interest in the period of the American Revolution and early statehood. Following his death on December 27, 2003, Mr. Hoyt’s papers—notes, manuscripts, unpublished papers—came to the Vermont Historical Society. His unpublished typescript, “The American Expedition to Pawlet, September 1777,” is dated Montpelier, August 1977, no doubt composed to mark the two hundredth anniversary of the events he describes. We present the article as Mr. Hoyt left it, with the addition in brackets of a few first names of historical figures, subheads to describe the sections of the article, which Mr. Hoyt marked with Roman numerals, and with changes in the endnotes to conform to contemporary reference style.

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Preface

An American Perspective on the Attack upon Burgoyne’s Supply Depot at Mount Independence and Fort Ticonderoga, September 1777

Lieutenant General John Burgoyne’s campaign in 1777 into the Champlain Valley–Hudson River Basin from Canada continues to challenge historians’ and the general public’s understanding of causes for its failure. The campaign has been the focus of considerable study and scholarly publication for a century, including some additional works in the last decade. Richard Ketchum’s recent book,
Saratoga. Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War (1997) has become an invaluable resource. The publication in 1998 of correspondence of Sir Francis Carr Clerke, Burgoyne’s Aide-de-Camp, offers the reader a view from the general’s side. Until recently the contribution of German auxiliaries, under the leadership of General Friedrich von Riedesel, was inadequately studied and understood because of unavailability of sources and difficulties in translating the archaic German. Historians will be forever grateful to the late emeritus professor and translator-researcher Helga Doblin, whose dedication, skillful translations, and research resulted in numerous books and journal articles on the hired German auxiliaries from Braunschweig and Hesse Hanau who served the British cause under Burgoyne.

The participation and contribution of the German auxiliaries at Ticonderoga from late June to November 1777 was the subject of several archaeological and documentary investigations under the now completed German Auxiliaries Project (GAP).

Burgoyne established a series of supply depots at Fort Ticonderoga, Mount Independence, Diamond Island on Lake George, and Fort George at the southern end of Lake George. The depots served to support his army along the invasion route as they marched south toward the objective, Albany. The depots were protected by troops, but while necessary, this requirement depleted his finite army. Burgoyne initially assigned as rear guard the British 62nd Regiment and the German Prinz Friedrich Regiment under the command of Brigadier General Hamilton, but later he replaced both the commander and the British regiment. Brigadier General Powell took Hamilton’s command and the 53rd Regiment of Foot replaced the 62nd. The Prinz Friedrich Regiment remained in place. Additional troops assigned to the rear guard included members of the Hesse Hanau artillery company and likely Captain Borthwick’s Company of Royal Artillery. One or more cannon were kept on Sugar Loaf Hill (Mount Defiance) along with a guard. Some members of the 53rd served at the Ticonderoga Portage landing, moving supplies to Lake George, while others guarded American prisoners held in the “great barn” and performed sentry duty. Illness and fatigue prevailed among members of the small garrison.

Following the retreat of the Americans from Ticonderoga on July 6, American militia participated in a series of engagements with British-German forces, including the protective cover engagement at Hubbardton and the defeat of a detachment of Burgoyne’s German troops under Colonel Baum in their unsuccessful effort to capture supplies at Bennington. By mid-September two thousand or more militia gathered at Pawlet, Vermont, a small town in present-day Rutland County. After a meeting with New Hampshire militia leader John Stark, Major-General
Benjamin Lincoln formulated a plan to disrupt Burgoyne’s supply route by a coordinated armed attack.

The Massachusetts militia colonel Benjamin Lincoln had joined Washington at Morristown in 1777 and was promoted to the rank of major-general. In July he joined Benedict Arnold to serve under General Schuyler against Burgoyne. After the Pawlet expedition, he joined Gates at Stillwater where he was wounded and made lame. In 1778 he was appointed to command the Southern Department. In the northern colonies, Lincoln’s name is more familiarly associated with the Pawlet expedition.

Lincoln’s plan at Pawlet called for detaching three colonels, each with 500 men. Massachusetts militiamen under John Brown would attack the bateaux at the north end of Lake George, Benjamin Woodbridge would march to Skenesborough (present day Whitehall) to cover Brown’s retreat, and Vermont militiamen under Samuel Johnson were to divert the enemy at Mount Independence. Lincoln himself, with about 600 remaining men, would reinforce Woodbridge. The plan was implemented on September 18, 1777.

Following the unsuccessful recapture of Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, John Brown sailed south on Lake George and attacked Burgoyne’s outpost on Diamond Island. The small British-German contingent on the island successfully repelled the American attack, and Brown withdrew after experiencing losses in men and vessels.

Until recently historians have long relied primarily on British accounts of the American attempt to recapture the supply depot. In the 1990s the late Helga Doblin and I presented a German perspective on the attack. The article that follows, by the late Edward A. Hoyt, provides information about the Pawlet Expedition, the composition of Major General Lincoln’s army, and conditions in the field under which they operated, from an American perspective.

The American Expedition to Pawlet, September, 1777

The Pawlet expedition of September, 1777 is better understood if the military prospects of the main American army at that time are made clear. In early September, the army under
General [Horatio] Gates was posted at or near the Sprouts, the junction of the Hudson and Mohawk rivers. It arrived there on 15 August after almost six weeks of constant retreat before [British General John] Burgoyne’s forces in which seven posts had been abandoned beginning with Ticonderoga on 5–6 July.

The latter half of August, however, saw substantial changes in its fortunes. The Battle of Bennington on 16 August resulted in the loss to Burgoyne of close to 900 men as prisoners or casualties. Almost a week later on 22 August, General [Barry] St. Leger to the west was forced to lift the siege of Fort Stanwix and watch his army withdraw in headlong and disorderly retreat. Burgoyne was thus reduced in his military power by considerable losses of his own soldiers and by the failure of the expected assistance from General St. Leger. He himself was unable to advance for lack of supplies, having failed to obtain them at Bennington, and was forced, while collecting them from the north, to remain east of the Hudson 25 miles above the American army.

At the same time the strength and prospects of the American army were considerably improved. On 22 August it was joined by two New York Continental regiments, Colonel Philip Van Courtlandt’s and Colonel Henry Beekman Livingston’s, sent up from Peekskill at the urgent suggestion of General Washington. They were, it is true, sent out the next day to join General [Benedict] Arnold in the expedition to relieve Fort Stanwix, but they returned within six days. These units constituted a real addition to the strength of Gates’ army. Another addition—both to strength and morale—came with the arrival on 30 August of Colonel Daniel Morgan’s corps of 400 riflemen armed with their deadly long-range weapons. They were sent by order of Washington. In their retreat before Burgoyne the Americans had been demoralized by the terror created by his Indians. Morgan’s corps could be expected to break this terror and supply Gates’ army with a formidable striking power. Finally, on 31 August General Arnold returned from Fort Stanwix and brought the Continental contingent of Gates’ forces to full strength.1

Furthermore, additional militia units arrived in camp and, more important, there was real assurance that many more were on the way. As early as 22 August about 120 militiamen from Ulster County, New York were with the Army and on 31 August the Dutchess County militia companies arrived, making altogether an addition of 400 men.2 More New York militia were also promised. On 28 August and again on 1 September substantial numbers of Connecticut horse[men] came into camp, doubtless bringing with them assurances of numerous infantrymen on their way from that state.3 There was ground to hope, too, that General [John] Stark, released by his victory at Bennington from the menace of any enemy, might be persuaded to bring his independent command to
Gates’ assistance for its remaining two and a half weeks of service. At the end of that time more militia would certainly have arrived to take its place.

In view of these developments and prospects the time had come to plan the future conduct of the American campaign. General Gates and General Benjamin Lincoln held two meetings at Van Schaick’s Island at the Sprouts, one on 24 August and another on 1 September. Gates summoned Lincoln from Bennington where he commanded the Massachusetts militia and other troops gathering there. At their first meeting it was decided that these militiamen would assemble and remain “in the Grants [Vermont] where, probably they will act for a time.” At the second, it is evident, the conclusion was reached that this militia force could be spared for operations that would increase its distance from the main army and might prevent prompt mutual assistance in case of emergency.

The Pawlet expedition was planned at this meeting and its broad objectives determined. Later correspondence makes it clear that the decision was taken to move Lincoln’s troops to Pawlet, which was about 35 miles to the north of Bennington and well to the rear of Burgoyne’s main army. It was not known then, of course, that within two weeks the British general would reduce his forces at Fort George and Skenesborough to mere tokens, would evacuate Fort Edward and thereby cut his communications with Ticonderoga, and would begin his advance to Albany with only his accumulated supplies in prospect. At this time, he still maintained his posts on his line of communication. General Lincoln was therefore given general orders to divide, divert and harass the enemy. He might do this by attacking the posts and outposts in Burgoyne’s rear on which he still depended for his supplies. Discretion was left with Lincoln to determine the specific measures to be taken in light of developments and circumstances.

The movement of troops to Pawlet had at the time other objectives as well. Their mere presence there, it was doubtless understood, would have consequences. It would compel Burgoyne either to employ large escorts for his supply convoys, thereby reducing the strength of his main army for its advance on Albany, or to cut his communications and run grave risks of being surrounded and taken. In addition, as General Lincoln later pointed out, his forces at Pawlet would protect valuable country filled with provisions and would restrain the Loyalists in the area. Furthermore, there was in early September still the possibility that Burgoyne might retreat—he had considered it—and forces at Pawlet could strike at his flank while Gates struck at his rear.

The question naturally arises as to why Pawlet was preferred over some other location as the base for General Lincoln’s operations. In the
first place, Pawlet was, as General Lincoln put it years later, “a strong post, both of our flanks being covered by mountains, in most places impassable, forming, at this place, almost the point of an acute angle, not unlike my ideas of Thermopylae.” In mentioning Thermopylae, the general surely had in mind that in the northwest corner of the town there was a pass through the mountains, a narrow defile, through which ran a road that gave access to points west and north. This pass could be held by a few troops against strong attack and allowed at the same time easy exit for the forces holding it. In his reminiscent letter of 1781, Lincoln also noted another reason for the choice of this town. The road along the western side of Vermont at this time could carry wagon traffic only as far as Pawlet. Beyond there to the north it was unfinished, and ammunition and food could only be carried over it by the troops themselves, or at best, by horses. A base of operations could not therefore be established beyond it.

Although it was not mentioned at the time, another reason for the choice of the town suggests itself. Pawlet is approximately equidistant, as the crow flies, from Ticonderoga and Stillwater. This meant, naturally, that Lincoln’s troops could move from there with roughly equal speed to either place, as need might require. Whether this equidistance was accidental or a determining factor in Gates’ and Lincoln’s selection of Pawlet, it is impossible to say. In any case, it was certainly an advantage and thus worthy of mention.

The meeting between the two generals on 1 September marked the beginning of a new military climate. General Lincoln promptly returned to Bennington and within less than a week began to carry out his task. Gates also readied his army. On the very day that Lincoln arrived with his first contingent of troops at Pawlet, 8 September 1777, Gates advanced his army from the Mohawk to Stillwater. The long retreat and defensive posture of the main American army, which continued through July and August, had been reversed. The defensive posture and independent actions of the auxiliary forces in Vermont during the same period had been abandoned. Burgoyne, who still remained on the east side of the Hudson just north of Saratoga, was no longer confronted with a retreating and uncoordinated enemy on the defensive. He was now faced with an enemy which dared to advance in front of him and with a coordinated and aggressive one menacing his rear.

II [Lincoln’s “Little Army”]

In his reminiscent letter to Colonel John Laurens written in February 1781, General Lincoln referred to his “little army” as consisting of 2,500 men. Although a more careful count might increase that figure by
a hundred or two, it is sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes. It might be kept in mind, however, that not all of these soldiers were in Pawlet at any one time. Three days after his arrival, on 11 September, the general wrote that he had in camp “about two thousand men.” On the next and the following day 1,500 men left on the three expeditions to the northward. By the 17th the troops remaining at Pawlet had increased from 500 to 1,000. On 22 September most of the troops there were marched to Stillwater. At the end of the month the three expeditions returned for a brief stay before joining General Gates’ army to the south. Although some additional troops were recruited late in Sep-
tember and marched to Pawlet, the total number present for this brief period did not equal 2,000. So it is safe to conclude that the 2,000 present on 11 September represented the maximum.

Lincoln’s “little army” consisted of roughly 2,000 Massachusetts militia and around 500 Vermont and New Hampshire troops which included small Continental units. The New Hampshire segment may not have amounted to 100 men. The inadequacy and inaccuracy of the records of Revolutionary service make a more exact description of the numbers involved virtually impossible.\(^\text{10}\)

The Massachusetts militia consisted almost entirely of men called up for three months of service under the resolution of the General Court passed on 9 August 1777.\(^\text{11}\) They came from all the Massachusetts counties, except those of the southeastern part of the state where the militia was needed for service in Rhode Island. In addition, men were also called out from York County in the province of Maine. A small extra contingent from Berkshire County was called into service for 20 days to speed the supply of flour to Lincoln’s army.\(^\text{12}\)

The three-month men were organized into regiments by county. There were seven regiments from the following counties under the following Colonels:

2. Hampshire: Col. Benjamin Ruggles Woodbridge
3. Worcester: Col. Job Cushing
4. Middlesex: Col. Samuel Bullard
5. Suffolk: Col. Benjamin Gill
6. Essex: Col. Samuel Johnson
7. York: Col. Joseph Storer

Contemporary evidence establishes the presence at Pawlet of companies from all but two of these units, Colonel Gill’s and Colonel Storer’s regiments. But Lincoln himself stated that all the three-month men were posted in Vermont, and there is no ground to doubt that companies from these two regiments also served at Pawlet.\(^\text{13}\)

The Vermont and New Hampshire troops consisted of at least two small Continental units and Vermont state troops and militia. The Continental units were Colonel Seth Warner’s regiment and Captain (later Major) Benjamin Whitcomb’s Independent companies of Rangers which comprised mostly New Hampshire men but included a few Vermonters.\(^\text{14}\) Warner’s regiment and Whitcomb’s rangers were both small units. The Vermont state troops were, of course, Colonel Samuel Herrick’s rangers, and the militia were companies from eastern Vermont belonging to Colonel Joseph Marsh’s regiment.\(^\text{15}\) At least two companies of Colonel
Peter Olcott’s militia regiment, also from eastern Vermont, reached Pawlet late in September, but, of course, are not included in Lincoln’s figures. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to ascertain with certainty how many companies or men of any of these units actually served at Pawlet, although Herrick’s rangers were probably the most numerous of any of them.

The Massachusetts three-month men either were drafted or volunteered facing a possible draft. By its resolution of 9 August the Massachusetts legislature drafted one-sixth of the militia in the seven counties—with minor exceptions in Essex and Suffolk counties. From the records it is not possible to determine the number of those drafted compared to those who volunteered. However, they do clearly indicate that many men were drafted, and what is more, that the draft had teeth in it.

There was a provision in the resolution of the General Court which assured enforcement. It declared that if any person being drafted, should “neglect to march” and not make “a reasonable excuse” or obtain a substitute, he would be “considered as a Soldier in the Army for the time aforesaid and treated as such.” In other words, he would be arrested and forced into the army. In at least one instance and possibly more, this provision was enforced. Certain men drafted in Colonel Job Cushing’s regiment who would not serve were forced into the service. Colonel Cushing’s regiment was, of course, involved in the Pawlet expedition. Ebenezer Chase of Uxbridge, Massachusetts “and others” (not specified) were drafted “but refused to march.” Whereupon, on the warrant of the militia captain dated 11 September 1777 they were “ordered to be conveyed under guard to Colonel Cushing at or near Bennington.”

Chase joined his company on 15 September, though whether at Bennington or at Pawlet it is not possible to say. He was discharged 26 September after eleven days service for reasons not given. Ordinarily such an early discharge indicated illness or incapacity, and in this case as well may have had no other reason. In any case, men who served in Lincoln’s command were brought to it under guard in execution of a draft. That word of this eventually reached the troops involved in the Pawlet expedition is a safe assumption. They could thus be confident that the draft under which they entered the service was being enforced against recalcitrants.

The manner of creating these temporary regiments out of the permanent organizational units of the Massachusetts militia deserves description. The brigadiers of the several counties were directed to cause one-sixth of the militiamen to be drafted and equipped out of their
permanent units. In practice this meant that he directed the colonels of his brigade to draft one-sixth of their several regiments and that the colonels, in turn, directed the captains or lieutenants, as the case might be, to draft one-sixth of their several companies. The actual number of men to be supplied was established all along the line. In short, a quota was fixed. If volunteers appeared, the quota of those to be drafted from their company was reduced by their number. There were no state-wide procedures established which regulated the choice of particular men to be drafted. The matter was left to the towns, provided, of course, they filled their quotas. In some cases of drafting, the men were chosen by lot. In others they were chosen by the town committee of safety acting with the militia officers and sometimes including the selectmen with them. Often the militia captain or lieutenant acted alone.

The men so drafted along with any volunteers were formed into companies of sixty-eight men each or as near that figure as might be. Some companies had four sergeants and four corporals as well as a fifer and a drummer. The brigadiers formed eight companies or as near that number as possible into a regiment and chose from their brigades a captain and two lieutenants to command each company. They also selected from their brigades a colonel, lieutenant colonel and major to command the regiment. Thus the officers as well as the rank and file were drafted.

Although the circumstances are not so clear, the men in the Vermont militia companies under Colonel Joseph Marsh also were either drafted or volunteered under threat of a draft. On 11 August the Vermont Council of Safety called out one-half of Colonel Marsh’s and Colonel Peter Olcott’s militia regiments in eastern Vermont. A call for any specific fraction of the militia meant, of course, that a draft—or a threat of a draft—was inherent, since the failure of that fraction, in this case one-half, to volunteer would require the colonel to draft the remainder in order to carry out the commands of the Council. As far as any record indicates, only companies from Colonel Marsh’s regiment marched to Pawlet under this call. The troops of Colonel Peter Olcott’s regiment which arrived late in September marched under a later call.

These militiamen were called out by the Vermont Council of Safety on 18 September. At least some of them—and possibly all—were drafted, as the diary of Lt. Colonel Jacob Kent of Newbury, Vermont indicates. These soldiers had, of course, no part in the expeditions under General Lincoln’s direct command, although there were involved in a small expedition from Pawlet early in October.

The remainder of General Lincoln’s army was volunteers. The men of Colonel Herrick’s regiment of rangers enlisted at Bennington at
their own discretion for six months beginning 15 July 1777. In many cases they were men who had fled southward with their families before Burgoyne’s advance. Some of the families returned to their original homes in Connecticut or Massachusetts, and the men were left without homes or close ties. Colonel Seth Warner’s regiment and Captain Benjamin Whitcomb’s companies of rangers were organized under special resolutions of the Continental Congress and were thus Continental units. The officers and enlisted men were all volunteers and engaged to serve for three years.

The officers and enlisted men were all volunteers and engaged to serve for three years. The majority of the troops in the Pawlet expedition were ordinary infantrymen. There were, however, other sorts of soldiers. As already noted, Colonel Herrick and Captain Whitcomb commanded ranger units. At the time of the Revolution, rangers were special infantry soldiers—not mounted—who were familiar with the frontier and its woods and streams. Understanding silence and concealment, they made excellent scouts and were effective at obtaining information about the enemy. Of hardy physique, they were capable of long and rapid marches with limited food and of sudden and surprise attacks on the enemy. Their military skills were not unlike those of the Indians and some of them had experience with Indian warfare. In addition to the rangers, there were also some light-horse troops—cavalry—among the Massachusetts militia, although their number has not been determined. The small body of Berkshire County militia, already mentioned, were not cavalry, but they came to camp as mounted infantrymen. The Pawlet soldiery also included, it may be noted, from ten to twenty Negroes and at least one Indian.

Lincoln’s army consisted of components with a varied military background. The militia troops, unlike Herrick’s rangers and the Continental elements, had not served together as units prior to the Pawlet expedition. As already set forth, they were collected from various companies and regiments of the permanent militia establishment. Although most of them had some previous military service as individuals, they were for the most part new to each other and their officers. Colonel Seth Warner’s Continentals, on the other hand, had acted together for roughly six months or so and had fought together at Hubbardton and Bennington. Captain Whitcomb’s men, many of them, had been in service for even a longer period and had done scouting. Colonel Herrick’s rangers, in most cases, had been together for almost two months and during that time had been on constant scout. As volunteers for a stint of six months, they were committed to the discipline of the military service and to its demands and risks.

The precise location of the encampments in Pawlet cannot be determined from any evidence found thus far. Lt. Colonel Ralph Cross of
Colonel Samuel Johnson’s regiment noted in his journal that on 10 September, he arrived at Pawlet “4 miles” from Rupert and camped along the road. The night before he had apparently camped in what is now East Rupert, since he mentioned that at this location “their [sic] is a rode over the mountain to Fort Edward.” Four miles from the present East Rupert would be the southern part of Pawlet where the valley of the Metawee is broad. Colonel Cross after his arrival referred to a road at “The Upper End of this Town” implying he was located in the lower part.

Common sense suggests that the troops were posted in the valley to the north of the village as well as to the south. Probably the men were spread out along the length of the road and the river rather than posted in depth at any point or points along them. Such an arrangement would facilitate use of the river for water, prevent crowding and make it easier to form the companies on the road for marching with a minimum of confusion. But these thoughts are largely conjectural. All that can now be said with any certainty is that the soldiery camped along the road and the Metawee.

It appears that Lincoln’s army had no tents. The indications are that they slept in the open or in barns or makeshift shelters. Not even the officers had tents. General Lincoln gave orders to Colonel Cross—and certainly to all other officers—“to leave behind all our heavy baggage and to take one shift of clothes only.” The colonel himself slept along the way to Pawlet either in a barn or stable or in the open. Nor does any other account of the expedition state or imply that tents were in use. In fact, the journal of Major Eleazer Craft, also of Colonel Samuel Johnson’s regiment, mentions that shortly after the troops from Pawlet joined the main army at Stillwater on 24 September all or some of them “Recd [Received] our Tents,” leaving no doubt that they at least had previously had none.

The evidence concerning food is rather slim. Beef and flour were the major articles available. These were, of course, the basic items of the army ration. The “beeves,” as General Lincoln called them, were slaughtered as needed. The flour was on occasion baked into bread, probably in the kettles which were the sole cooking utensils at hand, as far as is now known. On other occasions flour may have been used to make “fire cakes,” which would be similar to our present day pancakes. Pork and potatoes appear to have been in some supply and “chock-latte” [chocolate] as well. “Peas,” somewhat akin to the present day split pea, were issued to the troops at Bennington on the 4th and 5th of September, though not on the 6th. The supply could have been exhausted or shipped ahead to Pawlet. Salt was issued on all three days at Bennington and presumably was in supply at Pawlet.
Vegetables—often referred to as “sauce” or “saus” and usually pronounced ‘sass’—were probably available. On 29 August “saus” was ordered by the Vermont Council of Safety for the prisoners at Bennington.\textsuperscript{32} It seems highly doubtful that at almost the same time it would be denied to the American soldiers. There were farms in Pawlet and people living on them at the time.\textsuperscript{33} The commissary could have purchased vegetables from them and from other farmers along the line of march. Or the men themselves might have been given “sauce money” by the commissary to make purchases for themselves. Rum—which was an item of the army ration—was not issued at Bennington and apparently not at Pawlet. The main army at Stillwater did not have sufficient supplies to issue it daily, but it did pass it out on special occasions. It is clear that the expeditions that marched out of Pawlet to the north did not carry rum with them in any quantity. Colonel John Brown, after he had taken the outposts at Ticonderoga and their rich harvest of plunder, wrote General Jonathan Warner—not without humor—“wish I could supply you with Rum which would [improve?] your convenience extremely well.”\textsuperscript{34} The implication is obvious that the colonel had found rum in the loot and that General Warner’s men before Mount Independence lacked it.\textsuperscript{35}

Food was prepared in the several companies by “messes” which comprised about six men each. A camp kettle or “kittle,” as it was often spelled and pronounced, was issued at Bennington each mess.\textsuperscript{36} The six men were expected to pool their meat ration and boil it in their kettles or, if other items were available, to pool them as well and prepare a sort of stew. In the Revolutionary army the men usually took turns acting as cook, though skill and preference doubtless varied this practice. At the time of the Revolution boiled meat was deemed to be best, while fried, baked or broiled was considered bad for the health. Obviously some soldiers ignored this and fried, baked or broiled it regardless. The kettles, of course, encouraged observance of the “health” rule.

Very large amounts of flour were stored and issued at Pawlet. Two-thousand and more troops had to be fed. On 12 September 304 pounds—four pounds per man—were issued to Captain Joseph Fuller’s company of Colonel Samuel Bullard’s regiment to be made into bread. There is no question that similar amounts were issued for the same purpose to all of the 1,500 men who marched that and the following day—a total of at least 6,000 pounds or three tons.\textsuperscript{37} Still more was forwarded with the troops for future use, and more yet had to be on hand for 500 to 1,000 troops that remained behind.\textsuperscript{38} Later on in September, mounted militiamen were dispatched from Bennington to carry flour from Pawlet to the troops under General Jonathan Warner before Mount Independence.\textsuperscript{39} The store of flour thus continued to be maintained.
Additional provisions as well as other items of supply were certainly stored in the town. Specific evidence, however, is limited to powder and musket cartridges.\textsuperscript{40} The expeditions sent out on the 12th and 13th September were supplied with extra cartridges from the local store, and additional ones were issued on the 14th and 15th to at least one company that remained behind.\textsuperscript{41} That considerable stores were maintained at Pawlet into October is indicated by the fact that General Lincoln directed Colonel Brown on 2 October to have the commissary there make a return of them and send it to him at Stillwater.\textsuperscript{42}

Obviously some sort of structure or structures, permanent or improvised, were essential for the protection of these supplies from the elements. Rain could ruin them totally. But no record of any such building or its location has been found. Perhaps here is the place to note that there is one reference to a “Headquarters.” Captain Frye Bayley, who arrived after General Lincoln’s departure, made a record that on “30th [September] we arrived at Headquarters at Pawlet.”\textsuperscript{43} In view of the absence of tents, this notation hints but does not prove that a permanent building was involved. But no other mention of it and no reference to this site have been uncovered.

A numerous herd of cattle descended on the town with the soldiery. The beef issued to the men was fresh, not salted. This meant, as General Lincoln put it, that “the beeves were kept on foot.” No idea of their number can be hazarded. Naturally they had to be grazed and fed to be kept in condition for slaughtering and consumption. One leading Pawlet citizen, John Thomson, probably supplied grass and grain for this purpose.\textsuperscript{44} In addition to the beef cattle there were horses and oxen which also had to be supplied with forage. Some of the officers had horses, and horses and oxen were coming and going with supplies from the south. The resources of the town may have been seriously strained and forage brought in from neighboring places.

The consequences for the inhabitants of Pawlet of the descent upon them of any army of well over 2,000 men are veiled by lack of any concrete evidence. Although given protection, they must have been taken aback at this sudden and overwhelming intrusion on their quiet frontier lives, taken aback and menaced to a degree as well. To be sure, no document has been found that discloses any damages inflicted on them by the American soldiery. But that some damage was inflicted by some of that soldiery is all but a certainty. It could have been the inadvertent trampling of gardens and fields. And it could have been more deliberate offenses. The American soldiers of the Revolution and particularly the militiamen were notorious for a frequent lack of respect for the property of the inhabitants along the line of their march. Their friends
as well as their foes testified to this. The American generals, including General Gates in the Saratoga campaign, acknowledged in general orders the existence of grave abuses in this connection and threatened the perpetrators of them with the lash.

It is virtually impossible that in Pawlet no log or fence rail was ‘found’ and taken away to stoke a soldier’s fire, that no vegetable was ‘appropriated’ to sweeten the insipid contents of a soldier’s kettle, and that no stray chicken was ‘liberated’ from the oppressive thrall of its rightful owner to enjoy the glory of making a tasty meal for a hungry American patriot. It is comforting that it is almost as certain that the inhabitants sold their produce to the army at a good price and that in consequence that could more easily forgive whatever depredations were committed against them.

III [“Divide and Distract the Enemy”]

When General Lincoln came back to Bennington after his conference with General Gates, he was confronted with the powers and responsibilities of a commanding general. His orders from Gates were to march his army to Pawlet and from there “divide and distract the enemy” by “diversions.” Under these broad limitations he had a virtually independent command. Like any other commanding general, he must see to his supplies and otherwise prepare his army for the undertaking in hand and he must gather intelligence of the enemy and decide on the time of march.

At the head of an army consisting primarily of militia the general realized that his troops could not, as he put it, “long be held, without proper attention is paid to their supplies.” Lincoln was independent of the main army in the procurement of supplies and dealt directly with the commissaries in the field. Although according to the general, the army had beef “in plenty,” he learned on 2 September that there was a shortage of flour. He wrote at once to the civil and military officers of Berkshire County, Massachusetts, as well as to “a number of private gentlemen” there, asking their aid in furnishing teams to the commissary for forwarding on the flour. There was no shortage as a good supply had been bought up by the commissaries and stored in the county. The problem was transportation, which Lincoln described as “extremely difficult.” Apprehensive that the ordinary transportation by wagon might be too long delayed, he also wrote to the county “for a body of their militia . . . mounted, each bringing his sack of flour.”

There was also some shortage of ammunition, though apparently not an acute one, which caused Lincoln anxiety. The Massachusetts militia was less provided with it than was expected from the orders of the Gen-
eral Court. Furthermore, the supply sent from Springfield and Albany was not “of a size suitable for the muskets.” Although the general wrote away for an additional supply, no record has been found that any arrived in time. Fortunately, the campaign required no more than was on hand.  

The success of the Pawlet expedition, it was evident, would largely depend upon the speed of its movements. It would not be involved in pitched battles or sustained actions, but in swift raids or, at most, brief
encounters or assaults. In consequence, the army was to travel as light as possible. No artillery with heavy and slow ammunition carts would accompany it at any time. The armament was a musket and 24 cartridges per man. There was a kettle for every six men, but this could be carried by one or two men by turns. As already noted in connection with the matter of tents, General Lincoln gave orders that the army was “to Leave behind all our heavy Baggage and to Take one Shift of cloaths only.” The impedimenta were to be stripped to the bare essentials.

Intelligence work for the Pawlet expedition produced substantial but limited results. Spies and scouts were sent out to procure information on the location, activity and intentions of Burgoyne’s army. The actual state of affairs is, of course, now known. Burgoyne had come to a decision. Shortly after the defeat at the battle of Bennington, he decided to collect provisions for his army by transporting them from Ticonderoga, extending his forces north and south to protect his supply convoys and maintaining at the same time his advanced position. After he had collected provisions for six weeks, he intended to cut his communications to the north, draw his army together and cross the Hudson for an advance on Albany.

Although General Lincoln learned some of this by early September, he did not learn all. He knew from his agents that Burgoyne’s army was spread out from the Batten Kill north along the Hudson to Fort Miller and Fort Edward and that other of its units were at Fort Anne and Skeanesborough as well as at Fort George. He surmised from “every appearance” and all reports that Burgoyne planned to “move down the river,” but this was not established beyond doubt. He did not learn that the British general intended to cut his communications and either evacuate the posts in his rear or hold them with merely token forces. Moreover, Burgoyne’s larger intentions were not yet fully known when the American general was still at Bennington.

On 6 September General Lincoln left Bennington for Pawlet, marching off “with the troops that were collected” there. The decision to go forward on that date appears to have been entirely his own and not General Gates’. There was need for such speed as could be managed. Intelligence reports at the least indicated that Burgoyne was preparing for some sort of stroke or movement. American forces at his rear could inflict damage as well as exercise pressure upon him. Remaining at Bennington Lincoln’s militiamen could inflict no damage and exert little pressure. Moreover, it seems safe to assume that Lincoln knew that Gates would shortly lead the main army in an advance. In consequence, he sought to coordinate, as far as possible, his own movement with that of the major American force. The sooner he moved out, the
more effective his aid to Gates would be. As it happened, Lincoln arrived at Pawlet on 8 September, 51 and on that very day the army at the Mohawk started its advance to Stillwater. 52 The coordination, if such it was, could not have been more perfect.

The general’s decision to march to Pawlet was taken in the face of real difficulties. He was suffering from a shortage of men as well as the shortages of flour and ammunition already noted. The number of Massachusetts militiamen that marched with him was, as he expressed it, “little more than half the number proposed for the northern post.” 53 Nor was the want of flour substantially supplied before his departure. The deficiency of ammunition was apparently never corrected. No general engaged in operations faced such shortages with any relish. To be sure, Lincoln had assurances from the militia already arrived that more men were on their way, as indeed they were, and equal assurances that more flour was on its way, as indeed it was. But assurances are not men or flour. The general simply made up his mind to take his risks. “Nothing venture, nothing win.”

Shortly after the arrival at Pawlet, on 8 September, only the problem of intelligence about the enemy’s situation remained. The flour from Berkshire County arrived in a more than sufficient supply. As the general put it some years later, the county authorities, civil and military, “and the people at large, stimulated by the most laudable motives, soon gave us, though the transportation was extremely difficult, the most ample supply.” This was achieved by 12 September when the special militia unit arrived on horseback with sacks of flour. 54 By 11 September, 2,000 men were in camp. 55 This was held to be sufficient for some sort of action to be taken against the enemy, although Lincoln was to declare almost two weeks later, after even more troops had reached Pawlet that “the number sent out is far short of what I expected.” Nevertheless, the presence of 2,000 men encouraged him to announce that as soon as the scouts came in with “a good account of the enemy’s situation,” he would not fail to attempt a diversion. 56 In other words, the intelligence he received would determine the specific actions he would take to “divide and distract” the enemy.

The intelligence that came in and the consequent actions of 12–13 September may be better understood if Burgoyne’s actual situation at the time is made clear. On 10 September all but a token force was evacuated from Fort George and on 12 September Fort Edward was abandoned. No date for the departure from Fort Anne has been found. This took place before the 12th, since the troops there were to join the main army to the south by the 13th at the latest. The main body of Burgoyne’s army was still east of the Hudson in the vicinity of the Batten Kill on
the 12th. But on the 13th the whole army, including all the troops from the posts to the north, crossed the Hudson. After it did so, the bridge over which it had crossed was removed and the line of communication with Ticonderoga and Canada was cut.\textsuperscript{57}

At the time General Lincoln made his decision to dispatch the three expeditions to the northward, he knew little about these developments. It was not until the 18th and 19th apparently that he learned from Gates that Burgoyne had abandoned all the posts in his rear and that he also “had broken down all the bridges immediately on passing them.”\textsuperscript{58} It may well be that on the 12th Lincoln knew that Fort George and Fort Anne were abandoned, but his intelligence sources had clearly not fathomed Burgoyne’s intentions to cross the Hudson the next day and sever his communications. He wrote on the 14th to Gates merely mentioning “movements” by the enemy, which Gates had already mentioned to him, but these signs did not foretell to him even the crossing of the Hudson, much less the breaking off of the enemy access to the north.\textsuperscript{59}

As far as the American general at Pawlet was concerned when he made his decision, Burgoyne’s army might remain in whole or in part east of the Hudson. In either case it would be capable of acting against Lincoln to the northward. It is evident, though not specifically stated, that the American command thought that Burgoyne might at one and the same time make an attempt to get to Albany and keep some of his forces at a post or posts east of the Hudson. The British army, it should be noted, had not yet suffered defeat and was still a formidable power. Lincoln might have to face a part of it if he made raids to the south and west.

In view of this understanding of Burgoyne’s situation and intentions, the intelligence that came in to both Lincoln and Gates about the state of affairs at Ticonderoga open up a much better opportunity for the employment of the American forces at Pawlet. Almost all the reports that were brought in mentioned “the weak state” of that fortress and its outposts. The presence of “a considerable number” of American prisoners at Lake George Landing “under a very small guard” as well as the existence there of “a large magazine of stores” offered additional inducement for an American attempt in that quarter. Furthermore, there was the outside chance that Ticonderoga itself and even Mount Independence might be taken, and not just the outposts. And Lake George might be cleared of British forces. These would be very serious losses for Burgoyne and would make his retreat virtually impossible. The chances of success were increased by the fact that the field of operations was quite beyond Burgoyne’s striking power.
Having these and perhaps other thoughts in mind, General Lincoln “with the advice of the officers” came to the decision on 12 September to send out three expeditions of 500 men each: one under Colonel John Brown to Ticonderoga, one under Colonel Samuel Johnson to Mount Independence and one under Colonel Benjamin Ruggles Woodbridge to Skenesborough (now Whitehall). These expeditions marched out of Pawlet on the 12th and 13th of September.

The primary purpose of these expeditions was an attack on the outposts of Ticonderoga. This was the prime goal of Colonel Brown’s undertaking, of course, while Colonel Johnson’s march to Mount Independence was primarily to divert the enemy at the same time that Colonel Brown was making his attack across the lake. Both Colonel Brown and Colonel Johnson were only to attack the main forts if the prospects of their capture were good and did not involve “risking too much.” Colonel Woodbridge was sent to Skenesborough, which had been abandoned by the British on the arrival of the American troops at Pawlet, in order to cover Colonel Brown and secure his retreat if necessary. His force was also to “march on towards Fort Edward [through Fort Anne] and give the enemy a diversion in that quarter.” And there was the usual proviso: “if it could be done without risking too much.”

The expeditions were not for the most part composed of complete regiments but of companies from various regiments or of parts of regiments. Colonel Brown’s expedition consisted of Whitcomb’s rangers and of companies from his own regiment and from the regiments of Colonel Warner, Colonel Herrick, Colonel Marsh, Colonel Johnson, Colonel Woodbridge and Colonel Cushing. Colonel Johnson’s expedition to Mount Independence was made up of the remaining men of Colonel Warner’s regiment under Lt. Colonel Samuel Safford and of militia companies from at least three regiments including his own. In view of the composition of these two expeditions the make-up of Colonel Walbridge’s excursion to Skenesborough and of the troops that remained behind at Pawlet could only have been similar.

The assignment of troops to Colonel Brown’s and Colonel Johnson’s commands, particularly the former’s, was clearly selective. The expedition to Ticonderoga required speed and surprise for its success and Herrick’s and Whitcomb’s rangers were the soldiers best able to produce them. The men from Warner’s regiment supplied a leaven of soldiers with battle experience. The expedition to Mount Independence, next in importance to that of Ticonderoga, also needed leaven, composed as it was otherwise of militia. A portion of Warner’s regiment would tend to steady the inexperienced and less disciplined men, and was accordingly assigned to Johnson’s command.
The troops when they marched out from Pawlet “moved very light.” They were accompanied by no wagons or carts of any sort, either for provisions or other supplies. The roads were simply not passable for vehicles. Armies at the time of the Revolution were usually accompanied by such wagons in considerable numbers, which was a great obstacle to the speed of their movement. The absence of these impediments as well as the lack of artillery increased the pace at which the expedition could advance.

More rapid means for transporting provisions and supplies were improvised. General Lincoln directed that the mounted Berkshire County militiamen, who had brought up the flour in sacks, be “divided among the three commands” and take on the flour for their provision on the march. The meat supply was also managed expeditiously since “the beeves were kept on the foot.” Furthermore, cavalry units, light horse, were included in some of the militia contingents and these were “ordered on” to carry spare cartridges. There was substance to Lincoln’s claim years later that the expeditions moved “with great despatch.”

Before the achievements and consequences of the Ticonderoga expedition are presented, consideration should be given to subsequent events at Pawlet. Four days after the departure of the three expeditions—that is, on 17 September—General Lincoln started out for Skenesborough with 600 or 700 men. The 500 or so men who had been left at Pawlet on the 13th had increased in the interval to around 1,000. In consequence, 400 could be left there “to cover the stores.” The purpose of this new expedition was two-fold: “to join Colonel Woodbridge the more effectively to cover Colonel Brown” and “to move in force into the rear of General Burgoyne” after Lincoln and Woodbridge had been joined by the forces under Colonel Brown and Colonel Johnson.

This operation proved brief. It was interrupted by letters on 18 and 19 September from General Gates and his orders to General Lincoln to join him at Stillwater. The general and his troops returned to Pawlet. On the 21st he rode off to Stillwater and was followed by most of his men on that and the next day. “A proper guard” was left at Pawlet. The general, before he left, gave orders to Colonel Brown and Colonel Johnson, who were still at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence respectively, “to return and join me at Stillwater, as soon as they should have succeeded, or all hopes of success should be cut off . . .” Colonel Woodbridge was left for the time at Skenesborough to protect the withdrawals of the other two colonels.

The three expeditions came back to Pawlet before the month was out. Colonel Samuel Johnson’s men returning via Skenesborough or via Castleton arrived on 26–27 September. Lt. Colonel Cross noted that not one man “that went with Coll. [sic] Johnson to the Mount . . . was wanting.
The Preservation was worthy of Notice.” It was worthy of notice, to be sure, but it was not a sign of strenuous military activity. Five or six days later this contingent marched from Pawlet south through Manchester, Cambridge, and “Saratoga mills” to Stillwater, where it arrived on 5 October. Although the precise dates of their arrival and departure have not been discovered, certainly Colonel Brown’s and probably Colonel Woodbridge’s detachments also returned to Pawlet and remained there for a few days. With the probable exception of Herrick’s rangers, they then joined General Gates at Stillwater or at some nearby post.

A small additional body of troops, which had not been involved in the northern expeditions, also arrived at Pawlet at the end of September. This contingent consisted of at least two companies of Colonel Peter Olcott’s militia regiment from what was then northeastern Vermont. It has already been briefly mentioned. The two companies were under the command of Captain Frye Bayley and Captain Joshua Hazen and entered the service only in the last week of September, arriving around the 30th. The ultimate destination of a part of these militiamen is uncertain. They may have stayed on at Pawlet. Another part became involved in the last expedition to be sent out from there prior to Burgoyne’s surrender.

As originally conceived by General Lincoln, this expedition was to consist of 200 or 300 men and its objective was to cut off all communication between Fort Edward and Fort George. Colonel John Brown was ordered to see that the project was undertaken, and he appointed Captain Benjamin Whitcomb to command it. However, if Captain Frye Bayley’s “Reminiscences” are to be trusted, these orders were somehow changed and the detachment was directed merely to make a scout of Fort Edward and not to cut off its communications with Fort George. Seventy men, 45 from Captain Bayley’s company—“the best of my company” and “well accustomed to the woods”—and 25 from Captain Hazen’s company, joined others to form Captain Whitcomb’s command of 200 men. They marched out on 4 October and arrived near the Hudson River south of Fort Edward on the 6th. A scout was undertaken but appeared to accomplish little. On 9 October Whitcomb’s men marched south to join the other militia stationed on the east side of the Hudson opposite to Saratoga.

Despite the departure for Stillwater and other posts to the south of most of the troops that came to Pawlet, some undoubtedly remained there through the time of Burgoyne’s retreat and surrender. In a letter to the Massachusetts Council on 29 September, General Lincoln stated that he would leave “the rangers raised on the grants [i.e., Vermont] at Pawlet.” On 12 October Colonel Herrick, his major, Benjamin Wait
and one of his captains, Elisha Burton, were all present there. On the other hand, pension records indicate that Captain Ebenezer Allen’s and Captain Elisha Burton’s companies were both present at the surrender of Burgoyne and had been in the vicinity of Saratoga for some days previous to it. However, pension records are often unreliable. It is therefore safe to assume that Lincoln’s original intention was not completely altered by his own or Gates’ later orders and that, if not all of Herrick’s men remained at Pawlet, some did do.

In any case, after Burgoyne’s surrender on 17 October, the rangers who were at Saratoga returned to Pawlet, which became the headquarters for Colonel Herrick’s regiment. The rangers remained there or undertook operations from there until their discharge from the service in late November or early December.

One more event closed out the drama of Pawlet’s participation in the campaign of 1777. It was from Pawlet as his base that Captain Ebenezer Allen made his attack in November on the British who were retreating after the abandonment of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. With his company of rangers, he attacked the rear of the enemy near what is now the village of Essex, Essex County, New York, across Lake Champlain from Charlotte, Vermont. He captured 49 prisoners, upwards of 100 horses, 12 yoke of oxen, four cows and miscellaneous war material. This smart little action was the closing scene of the Burgoyne campaign and drew the curtain down happily on a great American success.

IV [The Pawlet Expedition and Col. John Brown’s Raid on Ticonderoga]

Colonel John Brown’s expedition to Ticonderoga scored substantial successes. The expedition under Colonel Johnson to Mount Independence kept a good many troops occupied by his appearance before that fortress and thereby relieved Brown from the danger of any counterattack. Colonel Woodbridge stationed some of his troops at the “Narrows” of Lake Champlain in this way covering Brown’s retreat or withdrawal. But neither of these expeditions produced results otherwise. This is not the place for a detailed history of these undertakings, but a brief account of Colonel Brown’s accomplishments is essential to an understanding of the Pawlet expedition.

Although the colonel did not attempt to take the main fort—he had been virtually ordered not to make the attempt if it involved too great a risk—he made havoc of the enemy positions in its vicinity. Achieving almost complete surprise, he struck on 18 September and captured altogether six enemy outposts, including Lake George Landing and Mount Defiance. In these operations he released all 118 American
prisoners and captured over 330 enemy soldiers. He took possession of two hundred boats, including seventeen gun boards and one armed sloop. In addition, he seized numerous carriages, cattle, and horses as well as cannon, arms, and ammunition. He also captured near the fort a considerable amount of plunder, including clothing, rum, and other stores. Before withdrawing from Ticonderoga, he armed and employed the released American prisoners and sent off into captivity the prisoners he had taken. He also destroyed all the carriages and boats in his possession at the time and killed or sent off into the woods all the cattle and horses. And, finally, he burned many of the stores he had seized. Although his subsequent effort to take Diamond Island in Lake George and destroy British control of that lake failed, he was able to retreat overland to Skanesborough and to bring off considerable plunder.79

Colonel Brown’s success, which seriously crippled the British position at Ticonderoga, made it impossible for either reinforcements or supplies to be sent to Burgoyne. The loss as prisoners of over 300 men out of the total of about 1,000 that constituted the garrisons meant that more men were needed merely to hold the fort and Mount Independence. Obviously none could be spared to go elsewhere. In fact, General Sir Guy Carleton, who was in command in Canada, feared the loss of the forts to the Americans and dispatched reinforcements for temporary duty there. In addition to these new forces, Brig. General Barry St. Leger, who was under Burgoyne’s orders and who had retreated the previous month from Fort Stanwix, arrived from Canada on 29 September with about 600 men. However, Brig. General Powell, who was also under Burgoyne and was in command of the two forts, refused to allow him to leave in order to reinforce their commander. Burgoyne had given orders that St. Leger join him and had pressed urgently that he be sent on. And St. Leger himself was anxious to go forward, but Powell restrained him. He feared the renewal of American attacks.

Furthermore, the losses in horses and oxen and in carriages and boats inflicted by Colonel Brown also had consequences for Brig. General St. Leger. For some days the shortage of transport made it actually impossible for him to start out for Burgoyne’s army. Any prospect of bringing provisions to Burgoyne as well as troops was equally impossible. The opportunity which St. Leger’s arrival and the defeat of the attack on Diamond Island opened up could not be exploited. St. Leger’s detachment remained at Ticonderoga.80

The frustration of St. Leger’s efforts to reinforce Burgoyne was only a secondary factor in bringing about that general’s surrender at Saratoga. Burgoyne himself later implied this, when he wrote that St. Leger’s arrival would not have helped his advance but would have facilitated
his retreat. The lack of help from Ticonderoga in the last days of the campaign cannot be compared in its effect on Burgoyne’s fate to the defeats sustained at Bennington and Stanwix nor to the disappointment of his hopes of obtaining provisions from the country as he moved southward. Nor was it at all comparable in its effect to the hard and sustained fighting of the American soldiers who defeated his army in the two great battles at Stillwater. Yet the failure of St. Leger to join Burgoyne did shut off the last slim chance of his escape.

Although not one of the great events of the American Revolution, the Pawlet expedition performed a part in it. It launched Colonel John Brown’s raid on Ticonderoga from an advanced and secure base. That undertaking had important consequences. Because of those consequences the Pawlet expedition became, not a main strand, but one of the threads of the web that entangled and destroyed Burgoyne. And that destruction was momentous for American history.

Discussion and Conclusions

What and how ideas are presented in reports and letters by the various participants strongly reflect to whom and the purpose for which they were written. The bias of writers is evident when documents are compared. This is true not only of the Pawlet expedition but of the accounts of the experience told when the British and German garrison from the post traveled back to Canada in mid November.

The defeat of and surrender by General Burgoyne at Saratoga on October 17, 1777, stunned British leaders who had anticipated a quick victory and an end to rebellious thinking and behavior. Burgoyne’s supply line was no longer functional for their intended purpose. Now they were vulnerable to attack by raiding parties. After consultation, Sir Guy Carleton and Brigadier General Powell decided to abandon the posts. Anything useful to the enemy was destroyed before withdrawing with the garrison, Loyalists, and Native Americans to Canada. They would use the Lake Champlain waterway that once brought them south just a few months earlier. A description of the process of destruction and withdrawal is on the web and will be the basis of a future reenactment.
Notes


6 John Stark was a veteran of the French and Indian War and served along with Robert Rogers. Stark and Seth Warner of Vermont lead their men in the successful and important engagement at the Battle of Bennington on August 16, 1777.


8 David B. Mattern, Benjamin Lincoln and the American Revolution. (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1995). Lincoln was born and raised in Massachusetts, was a farmer, became involved in government and was a colonel in the militia. He was involved in a number of engagements in Massachusetts, New York. Lincoln is better known for his service during the war in the southern states, notably Savannah, Charleston, and Yorktown. He was designated by Washington to receive the sword of Cornwallis and to serve as secretary of war from 1781–1784. In 1787 his forces quelled Shays’s Rebellion and he was elected lieutenant-governor of Massachusetts. He continued to serve his country until his death in 1810.

9 Ketchum, Saratoga, 376–379.


[Editor’s note: In addition to his endnotes, Mr. Hoyt assembled “A Bibliography of the Expedition to Pawlet, September 1777.” The six-page typed list of manuscript and printed sources is filed with the original typescript of this article in the collection of Mr. Hoyt’s papers at the Vermont Historical Society.]

1 For these items, see Revolutionary War Journals of Henry Dearborn, 1775–1783, edited by Howard H. Peckham and Lloyd A. Brown (Chicago: The Caxton Club, 1939), 103.


3 For the arrival of the Connecticut horse, see “Diary of Rev. Enos Hitchcock, D. D., a Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army,” Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society, New Series, 7 (1899): 130. The infantrymen were in fact on their way.

4 For the meeting of 24 August, see Jared Sparks, Correspondence, 2: 525, 526.

5 That Burgoyne had already decided to cut his communications because of the possibility of menaces to his rear was, of course, not known to the American command when the decision to send an expedition to Pawlet was taken. The American advance to Pawlet thus did not in fact force Burgoyne to cut his communications. It was the real possibility of such an American move that accomplished that.
Lemuel Roberts, Capt. John Gideon Bayley's company payroll is dated at Pawlet 29 Sept. 1777.  


Cranson); 178 (Isaac Crouch).  

The presence of Warner's regiment in the Pawlet expedition is beyond any doubt. His personal presence is problematic, however. Only one source has been found that mentions it. See Sketch of the Life of Col. Seth Warner, manuscript at Vermont Historical Society. This account, which is neither clear nor accurate, states that he marched his regiment in early September to near Skenesborough and then back to Pawlet. Even if present, Col. Warner apparently played no prominent role in the Pawlet phase of the campaign. He is, of course, to be distinguished from Gen. Jonathan Warner who did play a considerable part. Col. Seth Warner's regiment, though generally referred to as a Vermont unit, also contained men from Massachusetts and Connecticut and even New York.  


For other instances of men recorded as drafted, see Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors of the Revolutionary War, 3: 997: Ephraim Corbin, Col. Job Cushing's regiment, drafted 13 August, enlisted 16 August.  

518. One authority states that Whitcomb was commissioned as captain by the Continental Congress 14 October 1776. See George F. Morris, “Major Benjamin Whitcomb, Ranger and Partisan Leader in the Revolution,” Proceedings of the New Hampshire Historical Society, 4 (1899–1905): 309. No record of any such appointment has been found. However, a resolution of the Continental Congress passed 17 July 1777 assigned Whitcomb’s corps to the Massachusetts quota of Continental troops. See Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, 8: 561.

21 See Jared Sparks, Correspondence, 2: 533–534.

26 The military rolls often fail to mention race or complexion. Of the nine Negroes or probable Negroes discovered as enrolled in regiments involved in the Pawlet expedition only four were listed as such in Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors in the Revolutionary War. The other five were found to be negro from other sources and/or from their names. For the nine names, see ibid, 3: 212 (Cato); 4: 345 (Cuff [Clough] Cuzzens [Cozzens, Cuzens, Cuzzin]; 4: 852 (Cuff Dole); 4: 881 (Thomas Dority [Dorothy, Dority, Dorthy]; 7: 896 (Primus Hill); 8: 738 (Caesar Jehar [Jahah, Johar, Jahor, Jehah]); 9: 673 (Marcus Lemon [Lyman]); 10: 137 (Pomp Magus [Magos]); 12: 750 (Caesar Prescott). Many Blacks adopted New England names, often those of their masters. Doubtless some of these were in the Pawlet expedition and cannot be identified on the rolls in instances where race or complexion are not mentioned.

“Otto [Cato?] Negro” is listed as in Capt. Seth Hodges company, Col. Joseph Marsh’s regiment from 16 August to 4 October 1777. There is little ground to doubt that Negor was a negro. But the presence of Hodges company at Pawlet, though possible, cannot be established. See Vt. Rev. Rolls, 32.

One Indian has been identified as present at Pawlet: Zumenick [Tuminic] Indian who was in Capt. Frey Bayley’s company, Col. Peter Olcott’s regiment. See Vt. Rev. Rolls, 53. For the presence of Capt. Bayley’s company at Pawlet and a later mention of this Indian, see “Col. Frye Bailey’s Reminiscences,” Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society for the years 1923, 1924, 1925, pp. 47–48, 52.


29 See Jared Sparks, Correspondence, 2: 524, 525, 533–534.

30 For references to pork, see The New England Genealogical and Historical Register, 74 (October, 1920): 285 (Col. Brown to Gen. Lincoln, Poultney, 13 September 1777); Vermont State Papers: Manuscript vol. VIII, 419. For the references to “chorklatt” and to potatoes [“pertatoes”], see Joseph Bates’ Journal, no pagination. The item on “pertatoes” is on the last page and is extremely difficult to read.

31 For the references to “peas” and salt, see Joseph Bates’ Journal, no pagination.

32 Governor and Council, 1: 152.

33 Governor and Council, 1: 187 (Council of Safety to David Castle of Pawlet, 8 October 1777).

34 The New England Historical and Genealogical Register, 74 (October, 1920): 287.

35 For additional evidence of this, see Memoirs of Captain Lemuel Roberts, 59.

36 For the existence of messes and for the issue of kettles, see Joseph Bates’ Journal, no pagination. For the use of the kettles on the expedition to Ticonderoga, see Memoirs of Captain Lemuel Roberts, 54.

37 For the order to Capt. Fuller’s company, see Joseph Bates Journal, no pagination. For the order to bake bread and for its application to the detachments ordered to march, see The Journal of Ralph Cross of Newburyport . . ., Historical Magazine, vol. VII, Second Series, No. 1 (January, 1870): 9.

38 Jared Sparks, Correspondence, 2: 534.

39 For the orders of the Council of Safety in this connection on 24 September, see Governor and Council, 1: 179–180.


41 Joseph Bates’ Journal, no pagination. The Massachusetts militiamen were for the most part supplied with cartridges at Bennington.

42 The New England Historical and Genealogical Register, 74 (October, 1920): 291 (Gen. Lincoln to Col. Brown, 2 October 1777).


44 John Thomson was selectman of Pawlet 1776–83 and was presumably resident in Pawlet in September, 1777. He later claimed that he had “in the year 1777 supplied the Troops in the Service of this and the united States with Grass and Grain to the amount of twenty five pounds nineteen Shillings . . .” The record does not specifically indicate that the grass and grain were supplied to the army at Pawlet in September, 1777, although it was the most likely recipient of such a supply. Furthermore, Elisha Clark, who was adjutant of Herrick’s regiment at the time. Later discovered a doc-
ument pertinent to the transaction. For Thomson's petition for payment, see *State Papers of Vermont*, vol. IX (General Petitions, 1788–1792 [Montpelier, Vermont, 1955], pp. 482–484.

45 Jared Sparks, *Correspondence*, 2: 525–526.

46 For the matter of supplies and the shortage of flour as well as for the quotations, see ibid., 2: 524, 533–534.

47 See ibid., 2: 525 (Lincoln to Gates, Pawlet, 11 September 1777); also *Gates Papers*, Box 7 (Lincoln to Gates, Manchester, 7 September 1777).


49 Jared Sparks, *Correspondence*, 2: 524.

50 Ibid., 2: 534.

51 Ibid., 2: 528. Gen. Lincoln while at Manchester on 7 September ordered Herrick's rangers to march that morning for Pawlet. He planned to move out the next day. It is therefore possible that the rangers arrived on 7 September. See *Gates Papers*, Box 7 (Lincoln to Gates, Manchester, 7 September 1777).


53 *Gates Papers*, Box 7 (Lincoln to Stark, Manchester [sic], 9 September 1777).

54 Jared Sparks, *Correspondence*, 2: 533–34 (Lincoln to Col. John Laurens, 5 February 1781).

55 Ibid., 2: 525.

56 Ibid., 2: 530.


58 Jared Sparks, *Correspondence*, 2: 529.

59 Ibid., 2: 526.

60 Gen. Lincoln’s dating is often confusing. He states in one place that the expeditions left on the 13th (See Jared Sparks, ed., op. cit., II, p. 526) and in another on the 14th (See ibid., II, p. 528). Col. Brown’s orders were dated on the 12th (See ibid., II, p. 525). Col. Cross indicates that he marched on the afternoon of the 12th as part of Col. Johnson’s force. [See “Journal of Ralph Cross of Newburyport . . .,” *Historical Magazine*, vol. VII, Second Series, No. 1 (January, 1870), p. 9.] Most if not all of Col. Brown’s men appear to have left Pawlet on the 13th. (See *The New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, vol. 74, (October, 1920), pp. 284–285.) It is not impossible that a few of the troops did not leave Pawlet until the 14th. For Col. Johnson’s orders, see *The Bulletin of Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, vol. XI, No. 4 (July, 1964), p. 213. They are to be read with Col. Brown’s orders cited above.

61 Jared Sparks, *Correspondence*, 2: 525.

62 For Gen. Lincoln’s descriptions of his orders to the three expeditions, see ibid., 2: 526, 528, 534. His description of his orders to Col. Walbridge vary somewhat. Unfortunately, no copy of these orders has been found.


65 For the materials and quotations in this and the previous paragraph, see Jared Sparks, *Correspondence*, 2: 534.

66 For this brief expedition, see Jared Sparks, *Correspondence*, 2: 529, 534. Col. Walbridge had remained at Skeneborough and not moved south toward Fort Edward. No evidence has been found indicating whether this was at his own or Gen. Lincoln’s instance.


68 Jared Sparks, *Correspondence*, 2: 527–528, 535.


70 For the presence of Col. Brown’s men at Pawlet on their return from Ticonderoga, Lake George and Skeneborough, see *Memoirs of Captain Lemuel Roberts . . .* (Bennington, 1809), p. 63; also “Col. Frye Bailey’s Reminiscences,” *Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society* for the years 1923, 1924, 1925, p. 47; also pension applications of David Griswold (Vt. Ruby, W19358) and of Solomon Parker (S11183) at the National Archives (Military Service Records) Washington, D.C.; transcript of the pension application of Shubael Wales in the manuscript collection of the Vermont Historical Society: MS827 #38.

In view of the return of both Col. Johnson’s and Col. Brown’s men and their stay at Pawlet, it is probable that Col. Woodbridge’s detachment followed the same course.
72 For the primary source of this and the previous paragraph, see “Colonel Frye Bayley’s Reminiscences,” Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society for the years 1923, 1924, 1925, pp. 47–50.
74 Vermont State Papers, Secretary of State’s Office, Montpelier manuscript vol. VIII, p. 424.
75 See the following pension applications at National Archives (Military Service Records) Washington, DC 20408: David Griswold (Vt. Ruby. W19538); Solomon Parker (S11183); Jacob Wood (Martha. R11796). See also Photostats of Revolutionary War Pension Applications, Vermont Historical Society manuscript collections (MSC36): John Powell.
76 See Governor and Council, 1: 200; also H.P. Smith, ed., History of Essex County [New York] (Syracuse, N.Y.: D. Mason & Co., 1885), 143, 547.
78 For Lincoln’s orders to Brown 12 September 1777, see Jared Sparks, Correspondence, 2: 525–526.
82 See Kingsley and Doblin, “A German Perspective,” note xi, above.